LAND AND WATER. 
August 7, 1915. 
if they prosecute it, consists m getting all the 
men along the bulge to the left of X Y bac^ 
towards X Y along the arrows but ^^^^^^H^H 
doing this-that is, while the bulk of their troops 
are on the march-those troops cannot also be 
fiSt^ng They must be protected by a screen of 
Swho still Ud on iAhe rear of the arrows 
and only fall back as the marching columns get 
further and further away to the right. 
Meanwhile, the supply of .^^od munitions 
and all the rest, on which this retiring bo^y 
.within the bulge depends, '^,^'^'''1^ '\}^^l^) 
part by the northern Warsaw—Petrograa; 
?Swav which I have marked upon Diagram II. 
Snth? conventional fashion as a line crossed 
^^ 'xmv,'to''imperil such a retirement along the 
arrows there are two bodies acting direc%, and 
one indirectly. The first body acting f^^J^ 
the bi- army of close on a million to the south, 
imler the Archduke and Von Mackensen, which is 
pressing in against the bottom of the bulge a^d 
ih^ch 1 have marked on Diagram U. witj the 
letter B The second body which is tryiBg to act 
'directly and crush in the flanks of the retirement 
Ss the body under Von Hindenburg, about haK as 
large as the southern body, marked on the Dia- 
gram C. This army is trying to crush in the top 
of the bulge. , _.. -d-i^^ 
Meanwhile a third army, under Von Bulow, 
of about the same size, is acting independently up 
in the north at D, with the possible object (though 
it is not certain, as will be seen in a moment) ot 
' petting at the railway and thus not only embarras- 
iin" the retreat, but interfering with the supplies 
of all the Russian army. Both within the bulge 
and behind it, there is, of course, a continuous line 
of German troops opposite the Russian positions 
everywhere, but these are the three operations 
ppon which we must concentrate our attention. 
Having thus expressed the matter in the form 
of a diagram, it may be well to go into it in a 
little more detail with a sketch map. 
The situation of the Russian front upon 
Saturday last may be represented by the line of 
•dots upon this Sketch III. At W is Warsaw, 
upon the Vistula, which river is touched at a 
point somewhat below Ivangorod (I), but not 
crossed, for the enemy who passed the stream 
Borae days ago here have been thrown back. 
It will be seen that the front now describes a 
very pronounced salient from the neighbourhood 
of Ossowiecz (0) to the place where the River Bug 
crosses the southern railway, 2—2—2, at A. The 
intention of the Russian high command, if this 
retirement be successfully proceeded with, is to get 
that salient straightened out. The enemy is already 
in various places across the Narew, and has upon 
the front of that river, perhaps, 300,000 men, with 
presumedly, the reserves behind. He is making 
for, and hopes to reach before the retirement is far 
accomplished, the northern railway line, 1 — 1 — 1, 
upon which that retirement in part depends. The 
southern railway line, 2 — 2 — 2, is already in the 
hands of the enemy, the Russians having retired 
from Lublin (L)"^ and Cholm (Ch), and the 
Austrian and German cavalry having entered 
those points at the end of last week. 
The other railways within the salient — which 
are amply sufficient for the retirement — are not 
shovm on Sketch III., but it is clear that the 
actual cutting of the southern railway and the 
approaching menace to the northern one put the 
extreme western bodies of the troops moving east- 
ward in some, though not yet in grave, peril. Ihe 
operation which is thought, in certain quarters, 
more menacing is that of the third body, under 
the conduct of Von Bulow in Courland. 
This German force, very amply provided 
with cavalry-which is, perhaps, significant of its 
intentions-is acting between Kovno K) ^^^ the 
region of Riga, upon a front of about 150 miles. 
It was long in doubt whether this northern opera- 
tion had the political and economic object ot seiz- 
ing and occupying Riga, the militair object of 
crating a diversion and drawing north the troops 
required to protect the Warsaw salient (or a 
retirement therefrom), or the more important and 
direct strategic object of striking upon one of the 
great lines of communication at the moment when 
Qiat retirement should begin. It is the latter of 
these three hypotheses which we are now 
^^"uJJ^f Saturday last a certain body of the 
enemy crossed the River Aa in front of Riga, at 
about the point Z, on Sketch IIL This local 
success would be full of meaning if Riga were the 
full object, and if the enemy army here operating 
had a political mission; so would the occupation 
of Mittau at M, which took place the next day. 
But under the hypothesis that this great force, 
with its very large proportion of cavalry, is rather 
intended to get astraddle of the Russian northern 
communications— that is, the Petrograd rail- 
way—while the retirement is in progress, the 
Buciess on the Aa means nothing, and the real 
obstacle before Von Billow is the River Sventa. 
This stream will be seen upon Sketch 111. tailing 
into the Vilia just above Kovno, the fortified point 
where the Vilia itself falls into the Niemen. It 
forms, with the lower reaches of the Vilia and 
with the fortress of Kovno, a screen for the main 
raUway through Vihia, similar to the screen 
afforded to the railway lower down by Novo 
Georgievsk (N), the lower reaches of the River 
Bug and the line of the River Niemen. But with 
this 'difference, that the screen formed by the 
Sventa to Vilna, Kovno, and the Niemen is 
further removed from the railway than is the line 
of the Narew. The belt to be traversed by Von 
Buelow, should the line of the Sventa be forced by 
his army, is nearer forty than thirty-five miles on 
the average, and his main body would not reach 
Vilna and the railway — even if it could break 
down all opposition and march directly— in less 
than three days after passing the river. The 
cavalry could, of course, operate with far more 
rapidity, and hamper, though not destroy, this 
avenue of Russian supply and movement. 
The belt to be traversed by Von Hindenburg 
(who already has bridge-heads across his river— 
the Narew) is at the narrowest but one day's 
march. 
Now, I suggest that the menace to the Russian 
armies does not mainly proceed, at present, from 
the northern army in Courland, but rather from 
the two armies further down to the north and 
south of the salient. 
If this Courland army be really aiming at the 
railway, if it be not held up in the process, if it 
ultimately forces the Sventa, isolates or occupies 
Kovno, and proceeds towards Vibia, it will indeed 
render impossible the retirement of the Russians. 
But the actual process of flattening the salient 
is not a process so lengthy as to be very seriously^ 
