LAND AND WATER 
August 7, 1915. 
avenue of supply would absolutely fail, and the 
Russian front would, to that extent, be starved. 
But it is not, perhaps, appreciated by all critics 
in this country that, quite apart from a perma- 
nent interruption of this sort, the enemy is aim- 
ing at certain vulnerable points, a successful 
attack upon vphich would destroy the usefulness 
of the line for some time to come, and these 
points are all tvest and south of Grodno — that 
is, in front of Von Hindenburgs army, not the 
northern army in Courland. 
These highly vulnerable points are not 
numerous because the railway, like nearly all 
Russian railways, runs for the most part over flat 
land and has but few junctions or points of com- 
plexity. But these vulnerable points are very 
much worth noting, if we are to understand fully 
the effort the Germans are making from the 
Karew. 
The dirse Vulnerable poinis on 
the Northirn Kaihuau 
CJrodno 
Bielostock, 
(or B^olosfok) 
In the first place there is — (1) on Sketch I"V. — 
the gre<it bridge over the Bug just south of Brock 
Station. This bridge is the more important 
because, on the southern side of the river, it and 
its continuation as a low viaduct span wide 
marshy fields, the work of repair over which, once 
the wet season begins, will be formidable. The 
bridge over the Narew, which is the next point 
(2), is of less consequence. But the bridge over 
the Niemen at Kouznitsa (3), just before Grodno 
• — or, rather, the very high viaduct which carries 
the railway over the broad stream and valley 
there — is another matter. It is at once vulnerable 
and almost irreplaceable. 
Immediately beyond this viaduct the line 
reaches and serves Grodno.* Beyond this town of 
.Grodno vulnerable points upon the line are rare 
and upon the whole insignificant, the first stretch 
for a long way north of Grodno running through 
a well-d^ned, shallow valley about 100 feet in 
depth, the wall of which is eminently capable of 
defence. Nothing but a permanent occupation of 
Ihe line north of Grodno would have any effect 
upon its value as an avenue of munitions from the 
factories of the capital to the front. 
The rakdsr iriio ia following the«c notss upon th« m»p issued by 
U^MD AMD Wateb soma months ago will notioa the crossing of (ho 
B»g byUio railway in the top left-hand comer of sqnaro 16 G. and 
Grodno and the oroaing of the Niemen immediately aouth of it are in 
the (op right-hand corner of saoare 16 F. 
It is apparent, therefore, from this cause, as 
from the others we have mentioned, that the real 
danger to this line of communications at least is 
notlprom the operations in Courland, but from 
those further south upon the Narew and upper 
Niemen front, and it is further apparent that 
only a comparatively rapid success there could 
embarrass the Russian forces still within the 
great salient. 
But when we consider the fashion in which 
the Russian commanders have hitherto carried 
out their great retreat since the first of May last, 
and in particular the final phase of this retreat 
during the last few days, we shall conclude, I 
think, that the chances of trouble are not so great 
as certain critics in this country would have us 
believe. 
The German effort upon the Narew, though it 
has succeeded in crossing that stream at several 
points, has now been in progress for close on a 
fortnight, and has not made in that time any- 
where six miles of going. In most places it has 
not advanced at all. Nor has it been able to link 
up the various forces which have effected a cross- 
ing at three or four points. 
The enemy in front of Warsaw has failed, in 
efforts extending over the whole period of three 
months, to carry the Russian chord of defence 
across the bend of the Vistula, save for the 
recent Austrian crossing of the stream just 
north of Ivangorod. When the Bzura line 
was abandoned two weeks ago, and the Blonie 
line taken up in its place, the movement was 
perfectly deliberate and was not undertaken 
under the pressure of the forces before it. The 
southern railway, from Ivangorod through LubKn 
and Cholm, has been left to the enemy in the same 
fashion. His cavalry have entered the two 
evacuated towns, Lublin and Cholm. They are 
following up a retreat. They are not pursuing 
a flight. In other words, the retirement, which, 
if it is intended to complete it in full, will 
demand a fortnight, has already been in pro- 
gress for nearly a week without suffering any 
apparent confusion or feeling the menace of the 
enemy anywhere upon its avenues of retreat. The 
successive steps of the operation have been con- 
ducted at moments chosen by the Russian higher 
command, and not imposed by the enemy, precisely 
as was the case in the evacuation of Przemysl, and 
later, in the evacuation of Lemberg, and, indeed, 
throughout these unfortunate three months, with 
the exception of the dangerous moments in the 
first days of May, upon the Dunajec and Biala. 
We are justified, then, in concluding with the 
following summary : 
1. The higher command of our Allies de- 
cided, now a week ago, it might prove necessary to 
abandon the salient of which Warsaw, with its 
bridges, is the most prominent point. 
2. This decision, if persisted in, would be 
equivalent to abandoning the line of the Vistula 
to the enemy. 
3. In the conduct of this operation, which 
would demand, as a whole, about, or rather less 
than, a fortnight, the fate of the two Western 
fortresses of the " triangle," Novo Georgievsk and 
Ivangorod, remains uncertain. But, if it be 
decided to abandon them, it is difficult to see how 
this decision can be carried out without paying a 
very considerable price in material. 
4. This retirement is being conducted in pre- 
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