LAND AND WATER 
August 7, 1915. 
of 1812. The Russian retreat in that campaign 
drew Napoleon's army into half-deserted terri- 
tory, where the supply of a nuiltitude of men could 
only be kept up by slow m agons and at an immense 
expense of labour. The German general who 
pointed out the other day that when, as in modern 
times, the troops on tiie Narcw^ can eat on Sunday 
bread baked the day before upon the Oder, the 
analogy of 1812 fails. The one great point in 
common betAveen a modern Russian campaign and 
that of one hundred years ago is the illimitable 
space into which the Russian Army can retire. 
The argument drawn from the length of com- 
munications increasing as the enemy advances 
has nothing like its old strength, at any rate upon 
such a scale as we are now considering. 
To return, then, to the question of the two 
lines between which the enemy can elect, we may 
sum up and say that while the line of the Vistula 
would be that recommending itself to a prudent 
strategy with plenty of time before it, it is the 
more advanced line that will probably attract the 
enemy. And we may add that he is almost com- 
pelled to this advanced line, because he has 
definitely committed himself to exercising pres- 
sure at least, if not more, with Von Billow's array 
in the north. It is obvious that he cannot continue 
to occupy territory, let alone to advance in Cour- 
land and the Baltic Provinces, without commit- 
ting himself to a line well eastward of the 
Vistula. 
But whatever line the enemy chooses to bold 
the Russians upon while he concentrates for 
active movement elsewhere, that active movement 
will obviously be clearly dependent upon the 
factor of numbers, and to this perpetual element 
in our judgment, the dullest and least romantic 
of all the factors in war, and infinitely most 
important, I must return. 
Lastly, what numbers has he now free for his 
new effort? What has he lost as the price of his 
success ? With what margin can he stake one last 
throw ? It is this chief problem which I projwse 
to examine next week. H. BELLOC 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By A. H. POLLEN. 
Id accordance with the requirements of Ibe Press Bureau, wbicb does not object to tbe publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibility lor the correctness of the statements. 
FOR several weeks now there has been a 
regular succession of reports as to the 
Russians destroying the sailing boats 
that are trying to get to Constantinople 
with coals, and of British submarines attacking 
the transports trying to get to Gallipoli. Last 
week the Russians claim to have sunk forty col- 
liers and to have damaged the hauling and load- 
ing machinery at the mines as well. This time 
the story is authentic. But the tales of sub- 
marines sinking transports have been coming, 
week after week, from Athens and similar 
places. They bear a family resemblance to 
previous stories. This, of course, would be no 
f round for complaint if the tales were true, 
ndeed, the more submarines that can reproduce 
the doings of Ell the better. But one rather fears 
these stories arise because they are wanted and 
not because they are authentic. On Tuesday 
morning our doubts were set at rest. The sink- 
ing of a transport, the attack on the Constanti- 
nople wharves, the bombarding of the military, 
have all really happened. It is good news indeed! 
The Italians have not been long in seizing the 
destroyer base that I suggested they would take. 
It is the island of Legosta, which is about as far 
from Pelagosa as Pelagosa is from Gargano Head. 
Jt IS on the edge of the Dalmatian Archipelago, 
and should serve the purpose of making the south- 
eastern end of the archipelago somewhat less safe 
for raiders on the Bari section of the eastern rail- 
;way. The section of this line between Ancona and 
Rimmi has this week been attacked at SenigaUia 
and Pesaro, and these raiders probably came from 
Pola. The Italians are badly handicapped in 
having no real naval base in the Adriatic 
"IDLENESS" OF THE GRAND 
FLEET. 
A phrase in my article of a fortnight ago has 
been made the subject of reproachful criticism — 
criticism most kind, good-humoured, and indeed 
flattering, but reproachful all the same. Speak- 
ing of the seeming inaction of fleets, which must 
always follow when one side is overpoweringly 
stronger than the other, I said that, after Tra- 
falgar, there were ten years without a fleet action, 
and that history was repeating itself to-day. 
And I went on : " The Grand Fleet has been, in 
the fighting sense, idle since the beginning of the 
war, with the exception of Admiral Beatty's 
lightning dash to Heligoland and his unsuccess- 
ful chase of Admiral Hipper across the Dogger 
Bank." My critic points out that this can be read 
to mean (1) that the Grand Fleet is idle, (2) that 
its only attempt to fight big ships vras unsuccess- 
ful and (3) that Admiral Beatty was responsible. 
Could I possibly have meant this ? I am asked. 
I certainly do not accept this interpretation 
of my words, and it would not, I think, be difficult 
to show, both from the context and from what I 
have previously written on these subjects, that it 
was quite impossible I should have meant any 
such thing. But I cannot deny that it is a possible 
meaning, though I can deny that it is mine. And 
if it were necessary, I should express my denial 
with some indignation — for little as any of us 
here know either of the doings of the Grand Fleet 
or the merits of the Dogger Bank affair, that little 
is in absolute conflict with the significance put 
upon my words. 
Many years ago there was a skit, I think in 
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