tAND AND -^ATER. 
August 14, 1915. 
expedition is a case in point. It was something 
more than defensible on grounds of general 
strategy, and, as we know, it occasioned Napoleon 
grave uneasiness. But, quite apart from its mis- 
management, it never had or could have had more 
than an outside chance of success. Amdteur 
strategists are always ready with such schemes, 
and if one wants bold and generous enterprises, 
one will get them from any club smoking-room. 
A descent upon the Baltic coast of Germany, an 
expedition to Jutland, a flank attack upon the 
Frisian shores, these would no doubt be highly 
profitable adventures if they were practicable. 
But if battle is joined in one great theatre, sub- 
sidiary operations which promise much, but 
whose issue is highly doubtful, are to be avoided, 
even if there are sufficient troops and guns to 
give them a sporting chance. The reason is that, 
if the risk is too great, the subsidiary operation 
may develop at an alarming pace and become a 
rival to the main operation. This will lead in- 
evitably to confusion and distraction and a hope- 
less division of effort. 
The third question is perhaps the most im- 
portant : will the operation be self-supporting ? 
Can it be conducted without weakening the 
strength in the main theatre ? A subsidiary opera- 
tion may be important in its results, and it may 
succeed ; but its success may be too dearly bought. 
If it succeeds at the expense of the failure or the 
weakening of the effort in the main theatre, then 
it is a blunder. If, for example, Germany had 
sent large reinforcements last January to Enver 
in the Caucasus from her front in Western 
Galicia, and thereby enabled Enver to defeat the 
Russians and drive them back to Tiflis, that very 
real success would have been too dearly paid for if 
the main Russian armies had broken down the 
weakened defences of Cracow and ensconced 
themselves on the Oder. It would have been too 
dearly paid for if something much less than this 
had happened : if the Caucasian adventure had 
so disorganised the German armies on the Vistula 
that von Mackensen's great offensive of May was 
thereby postponed. 
DARDANELLES EXPEDITION. 
It is worth while to apply these considera- 
tions to the Dardanelles expedition. There has 
been much misgiving about the enterprise from 
the start and a great deal of unintelligent criti- 
cism and gossip. Anything like a reasoned judg- 
' ment of military operations is still impossible, but 
even now one or two points are fairly clear. 
It 'Is a mistake to regard the Eastern and 
Western fronts as two separate theatres of war. 
The 'whole Allied lines in Europe are one battle 
front against a single enemy. The gap caused by 
a neutral country like Switzerland is properly to 
be regarded as a piece of dead ground in the 
faring line. We have seen how sensitive any part 
of our front is to movements on another part. The 
brand Duke Nicholas in the beginning of the year 
advanced into East Prussia principally to ease the 
pressure m the West. The French attacked re- 
cently in the Artois to detain troops which mi^ht 
have reinforced von Mackensen. The war will be 
T^?'^ 7^^}^ destruction of the German strength in 
tne held, and it is immaterial whether this 
happens on the Oise or the Rhine or the Vistula 
or the Dniester. Any movement on any part of 
the front which contributes to this great end is 
strategically right. 
Now, Russia has obviously the most difficult 
part to play. She has been holding a line of a 
thousand miles, and, since this is for the moment 
a gunner's war, her great numbers avail her 
nothing. Whatever helps her in her titanic 
struggle is a direct contribution to the Allied 
victory. We may assume that the main purpose of 
the Dardanelles expedition was to clear a passage 
for supplies to Russia; to influence hesitating 
neutrals, who, if they once joined in, would create 
a vital diversion on the enemy's right flank, and, 
by the defeat of Turkey, to release certain Russian 
troops for service in Poland and Galicia. '". There 
never was a great subsidiary operation of war,"' 
Mr. Churchill has told us, " in which a more com- 
plete harmony of strategic, political, and economic 
advantages has combined, or which stood in truer 
relation to the main decision which is in the 
central theatre." I do not think that this can be 
denied. If the Dardanelles expedition succeeds it 
will be abundantly fruitful, and its influence will 
be felt at that point which for the present is the 
most critical point of the whole European theatre. 
SHIPS AND FORTS. 
What of the second question : Had the expe- 
dition a reasonable chance? Most people will 
probably agree that it had not, as at first con- 
ceived. The attempt to force a passage by ships 
alone undoubtedly flew in the face of the accepted 
teaching of history. We had to guide us the local 
experience of Duckworth in 1807 and Hornby in 
1878, which went to prove that in order to secure 
the passage of the Dardanelles it was necessary to 
win and hold the Gallipoli peninsula. Again, to 
pass the Straits involved a battle of ships against 
forts, and the best opinion seemed to be that forts 
would win in such a contest. That was the view 
of Nelson in 1794 and of Moltke — in connection 
with this very question of the Dardanelles — in 
1836. 
The bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 was, 
as it happened, successful; but those who had 
studied the details had come to the conclusion that 
it was in reality a very remarkable proof of the 
superiority of forts against fire from the water. 
The Egyptian guns were badly mounted and very 
badly served, but not more than three were put out 
of action by direct hits. If the forts had not sur- 
rendered, twenty-eight of their guns could have 
been brought into action next day, when our fleet 
was practically destitute of ammunition. The 
difficulty of ships attacking forts was accepted in 
the Spanish - American war and in the Russo- 
Japanese war, and it was as near being an axiom 
as any military doctrine in the books. Lord Syden- 
ham, a very high authority, considered that the 
advantages of the fort had increased under 
modern conditions. 
Why, then, did we enter upon so heterodox 
an enterprise ? The answer seems to be that there 
was still an unknown X in the problem — the effect 
of the latest long-range naval guns and of aerial 
reconnaissance. It remained to be seen whether 
these would not alter the situation — whether the 
forts at the entrance could not be destroyed by 
long-range fire from the outer sea, and the forts 
at the Narrows by indirect fire from the Gulf of 
Saros. On the whole the probabilities leaned 
against success. Mobile howitzers and concealed 
land batteries make it very difficult to tell when 
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