August 14, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER, 
guns are silenced, and the battleship is a terribly 
good target. But it is impossible to argue that 
there was not a chance of success, and it is difficult 
to maintain that when a great end is sought the 
one chance in ten should not be ganAled on. In 
the history of war countless enterprises have suc- 
ceeded in defiance of the text books. The landing 
at Gallipoli on April 25 was on paper an impossi- 
bility. Are we to rule out altogether those under- 
takings which, in Voltaire's phrase, '" are called 
divine when they succeed and are regarded as 
chimeras when they fail '' ? Even in a subsidiary 
operation it is permitted to take chances, so long 
as they are genuine chances. In the old days war 
used to be three parts an art and one part a 
science. To-day it is three-fourths science, but 
you cannot get rid of the element of art. A bold 
scheme may succeed, and a commander may em- 
bark on it in defiance of a great weight of argu- 
ment, relying upon a certain instinct for the mood 
and the moment which has brought many wild 
adventures to victory. The attack by the ships 
failed. Had it succeeded, it would have been 
loudly and justly acclaimed. Its failure, even the 
loss of three battleships, did not embarrass the 
conduct of the war elsewhere. There was nothing 
in it which r?.n contrary to the definition of a 
genuine subsidiarv operation. 
But the thira question leads us into contro- 
versy. An Expeditionary Force was landed to 
face an enemy fully warned and prepared, 
strongly posted in very difficult ground, superior 
in numbers, in guns, and in ammunition. Once 
the landing had taken place there could be no 
turning back. It was necessary to go on at what- 
ever cost, and it was necesary to have reinforce- 
ments. These reinforcements, say the critics, 
could only come from troops destined for the main 
theatre, and their defection must therefore 
weaken our effort in that tlieatrc. 
It is not my intention to argue this question 
in these pages, for any such argument at the pre- 
sent stage would be in the highest degree futile 
and improper. I would rather urge the drop- 
ping of argument and criticism altogether, and 
for these reasons. In the first place, if we regard 
both the Eastern and Western fronts as one 
battle line, and the Eastern as for the moment 
the more critical one, it is obvious that the Dar- 
danelles expedition, directed towards the assist- 
ance of that front, may altogether cease to be a 
subsidiary operation and be properly regarded 
as part of our effort in the central theatre. In 
the second place, not more than half a dozen 
people in Europe to-day have the knowledge 
which enables them to say that the Dardanelles 
reinforcements are crippling our strategy in the 
West. It may be so. On the other hand, it may 
not be so. It is a matter for the most expert mili- 
tary judgment, and it would be more decent if 
gossip and criticism ceased, and the evolution of 
the whole business were left for the present to the 
High Commands. 
THE SPHINX IN THE BALKANS. 
By Dr. E. J. Dillon. 
AMOXG the problem.s which e.xercise tlie in- 
genuity of the Allied Powers to-day three are 
of the highest moment — the successful prose- 
cution of the war, the prevention of its recur- 
rence, and the way to deal with the neutrals — 
and in particular with those who, occupying positions 
of decisive strategic importance, rely on the immutable 
goodwill of the Allies. And in most respects these three 
problems are so clearly interwoven with each otlier that 
a single solution will fit them all. 
When the Allies were forced into this struggle for 
national existence and civilisation ihey had no adeqiiate! 
notion of the forces that confronted them, of tlie sacrifices 
they would be compelled to offer up, or of the time nece.s- 
sary to reach the goal. Their hopes were therefore high 
and their estimates of cost correspondingly low. Events 
have since opened their eyes, and to-day their credo 
may be summed up by a frank avowal of the enormous 
difticulties of their task and a hope that some time and 
.somehow it will be performed satisfactorily. But that 
is not enough. They can and should take the matter 
into their own hands, boldly fix the time and devise the 
means, even though heroic measures may be needed to 
exorcise the unprecedented danger. And it would be 
folly to gauge the fitness. of the means for that purpose 
by time-honoured standards. F"or with seismic force we 
have been hurled from our comfortable stronghold of use 
and wont and must adjust ourselves to the new condi- 
tions whidi are not of our own choosing. 
If it be true that Germany has. as Mr. Kipling aptly 
puts it, " reduced civilisation and all that civilisation 
menns to the simple question of kilt or be killed," it is 
equally true tliat the doctrine of national or individual 
neutrality betv\een right and wrong is criminal. 
We have no right to e.xact friendship from other 
nations. But in our interests and those of our cause we 
should set before them motives to help themselves by 
helping us more potent than any they have yet had to 
consider. And not to have done this before is a 
tactical mistake. What we have hitherto said to 
them is virtually this: " If we come out of this 
war victorious, you stand to gain enormously in 
every conceivable respect, for we uphold the prin- 
ciple of nationality, which involves the realisation of 
your dreams of national greatness." Thereupon they 
practically reply : " As in virtue of your principles you 
assign to us unconditionally the territories we crave, 
we need not make any sacrifices to take them. If you 
are victorious we will wrest them from your crushed 
enemies without an effort. In case you are defeated, 
we shall receive part of them from your conquerors as a 
reward for not having helped you. In either event we 
shall fall on our feet. And meanwhile our people ivill 
go on profiting by the stream of German gold which is 
flowing through all neutral lands. For we pursue a 
policy of interests, not of principle." Now, it is for 
the Allies to fa.shion a handle that will fit this*1evfr of 
interests and to make it worth the while of those neutral 
.States, whose co-operation is really indispensable, to 
tender their services. The principle of nationality is 
respectable, but in the present emergency it should be 
declared capable of sucli modifications as the needs of 
civilised Kurope may determine. If it stand between us 
and our goal it would be folly i^-to insist on apply- 
ing it. If Bulgaria be honest and ready to assist 
us in return for Macedonia, and if owing to her com- 
manding strategic position her help be indispensable, 
as many experts declare, then it is in the interests of 
civilisation tliat the price should be paid with as little 
delay as pf)ssible. For, after all, if Serbia were to refuse 
to cede her Macedonian acquisition, and the Allies 
failed in consequence to score a decisive victory, Serbia 
would lose not onlv Macedonia, but Bosnia, Herze- 
govina, and Croatia 'as well. And it would be madness 
U 
