August 14, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
II 
entrenched, adequately equipped in every way, 
and opposed to their equals in arms. 
With this caution as to tlie necessan,^ draw- 
backs under which a contemporary summary is 
written. I proceed to my task, in which I shall 
attempt to give only the military process and not 
to digress into considerations of political or moral 
motive, save in so far as these have re-acted upon 
military problems. 
II. 
Upon July 31, 1914, the Government of the 
German Empire presented, virtually sinuil- 
taneously, two notes to the Russian and the French 
Governments respectively. These notes were each 
in the form of an ultimatum — that is, they sig- 
nified that unless the demands contained in them 
were fully satisfied the German Government 
would make war upon the Russians and the 
French. That such an effect — or the complete 
humiliation of these two nations and the corre- 
sponding victory of the Germans without war- 
fare — was intended, is not historically open to 
question. But, if proof be needed, it is sufficient 
to point out that the note delivered to Russia was 
in precisely the same form as that which had 
proved so successful five years before, and that 
the wording of either note was minatory in the 
last degree. To which those curious in seeking 
further confirmation of the obvious may add : — 
That a complete silence and a complete absence of 
provocation were observed by the enemy in the 
month of preparation which followed the assass- 
ination by certain of his Slav subjects of the Heir- 
Apparent to the Austrian throne : That the 
Austrian Government was still making efforts for 
peace at the moment when the Government of 
Berlin acted thus : That a British demand of the 
French and of the German Governments respec- 
tively, whether each would respect a Treaty 
whereby each had guaranteed the neutrality of 
Belgium, was rejected by the German Govern- 
ment alone : That the Russian urgent request for 
arbitration was similarly so rejected; and, finally, 
that before the expiration of the delay accorded 
by the ultimatum to France, the French Ambas- 
sador in Berlin was informed that German patrols 
had already crossed the frontier. 
At five o'clock in the afternoon of the next 
day — Saturday, August 1— the German Govern- 
ment declared war upon Russia, and after that 
moment the formal entry into hostilities of France 
and Austria-Hungary, and their exact moments 
have but an academic interest. It was at five o'clock 
on Saturday. August 1, 1914, that the Great War 
was forced by Prussia upon the Continent. 
The Government of Great Britain, upon 
whose neutrality in this Continental conflict the 
German Government hhd counted, made a test of 
the respect that might be paid to the solemnly- 
guaranteed neutrality of Belgium. But not until 
Tuesday. August 4, was the final message sent by 
the British Government to the British Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin requesting him, in the form of an 
ultimatum, to obtain a reply from the German 
Government before midnight. 
The British Ambas.sador at Berlin received 
this message from home at .seven o'clock in the 
evening of that Tuesday. The German Govern- 
ment handed him his passports before the expira- 
tion of the time limit set. Already the Belgian 
frontier had been crossed by German troops, an(J 
Sutplement to Laad kao Watek, .liifiui 14, i<)iy , [ 
it is worthy of remark that this initial movement 
was undertaken, with curious superstition, upon 
the precise anniversary of the crossing of the 
French frontier forty-four years before. It has 
even been maintained (though exact proof will not 
be obtainable for a long time to come) that this 
superstition extended to the first movement being 
made to coincide with the very hour in which 
Prussia had passed the Lorraine lx)undary on the 
way to its great victories of a generation ago. 
We have now to ask ourselves why the enemy 
had thus prepared the violation of Belgian terri- 
tory, on what plan he proposed to act, and what 
conception he had of the immediate future. 
IIL 
If the total "potential military power — that 
is the total power ultimately obtainable — of the 
five great nations already engaged — Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, and Britain — 
were alone considered, we should make a very 
false estimate of the enemy's plan and of its 
chances of success. 
The potential military resources of any 
nation, though limited as a maximum by the 
number of adult males capable of taking the field 
at any moment, vary indefinitely in the number of 
trained men actually present at the moment and 
in the rate at which even these can be put into the 
field and maintained there. 
When we speak of the ultimate or potential 
military power of any State we further necessarily 
consider the facor of time. A State may enter 
war with a military power not a tenth of that 
which it will develop before, say, two years of such 
warfare have elapsed; or it may be so organised 
that the whole of its potential power is developed 
within a much shorter time, and that no further 
resources are open to it save those provided by the 
gradual growth into manhood of the youth below 
the age of military' service at the inception of the 
campaign. 
The total potential military power which 
might, under the most favourable circumstances, 
be ultimately developed by those whom we will in 
the rest of this call " The Allies," looks superior 
to the corresponding power of the German and 
Austro-Hungarian Empires (whom we will simi- 
larly call " the enemy ") ; for though the combined 
manhood of Great Britain and of JF ranee was far 
less numerous than that of the enemy (in the pro- 
portion of about 8 to 12), yet the enormous re- 
sources in men of Russia alone was more than 
equivalent to all the enemy's ultimate man-power. 
The industrial resources of the Allies, their 
power of producing arms and munitions and 
equipment, were, indeed, inferior as a whole to 
those of the enemy, and would necessarily long 
remain inferior on account of the imperfect and 
backward industrial organisation of Russia. Of 
the various States engaged Great Britain alone 
could here compare with the enemy's opportuni- 
ties, and even this only after many months and 
the transformation of her national industries 
which had hithero envisaged no great war by land. 
But general conceptions of this sort were 
justly disregarded by the enemy's higher com- 
mand, because it was* appreciated by the Austro- 
German Governments, as it was by the 
French (the only other nation involved which was 
fully organised" for such a war), that the issue 
would probably be determined in a brief delay, 
