August 14, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
the same sketch; To the south of this new frontier 
lay the neutral territory of Switzerland. To the 
north the small neutral territory of Luxemburg 
and the larger neutral territory' of Belgium, be^ 
tween Luxemburg and the North Sea. 
The new German Empire after 1871 had 
frontiers marching with those of the new French 
Republic only upon this double line from the 
frontiers of Switzerland to the frontiers of 
Luxemburg. The whole distance from Switzer- 
land to Luxemburg is, as the crow flies, no more 
than some 150 miles. As it was inconceivable 
thirty years ago to the French (and, indeed, to all 
civilisation) that any European State would 
violate neutral territory wantonly upon a declara- 
tion of war (Prussia herself haci been most scru- 
pulous in this matter even in the war of 1870-71) 
the French expended all their available energy in 
fortifying the only line upon which invasion 
threatened. 
At the points of Verdun (V), Toul (T), Epinal 
(E), and Belfort (B) they had constructed great 
ringed fortresses capable of containing a large 
garrison each, and the whole line was linked to- 
gether by a great number of permanent works. 
Had the German Army attacked this frontier 
they would have laboured under the disadvantage 
of having a very short line upon which to deploy; 
they could not possibly have spread out along it 
for the first shock, so that all should tell, the two 
millions of men (and rather more) which they had 
set aside for the first decisive operation against 
France. Further, the fortified lines correspond- 
ing to that frontier would at the least have 
checked this first effort, and so have imperilled 
that immediate decision in the West which was 
the corner-stone of their strategy-. 
The Prussians determined, therefore, to 
violate the neutrality both of Luxemburg and 
of Belgium and so to turn the fortified line— • 
V. T. E. B. — by the north, passing through the un- 
defended area stretching between V (Verdun) and 
the North Sea. To be more accurate, they pro- 
posed with one portion of their forces to deploy 
opposite the fortified line and v, ith the remainder 
and larger portion to swing round it by the north. 
Although Prussia had increasingly, as the 
years passed, proclaimed her contempt for inter- 
national morality of Christendom, and had by the 
construction of particular works, notably in con- 
nection with her railways, given ground for the 
belief that she might thus break all treaties in her 
next war, yet the French Government had not 
found in these suspicions a sufficient ground for 
the immense expenditure that would have been 
required to add to their existing fortification of 
the German frontier a corresponding fortification 
of the Belgian. There was nothing betv/een 
Verdun and the North Sea modern, properly 
munitioned, or equipped. The nearest thing to a 
fortress was the incomplete experiment of Mau- 
beuge. Lille could not be defended. And, in 
general, there had been no sufficient preparation 
for an attack upon this side. 
What did stand in the way of a great German 
move here were the two Belgian ring fortresses of 
Liege and Naraur. Li^ge, standing in the narrow 
gap Ijetween the Dutch frontier and the high, 
rough country of the Ardennes and controlling 
railway communication through that gap might, 
garrisoned by a fully - e<]uipped and suffi- 
ciently numerous force, heavily munitioned 
and fully prepared for modern war, have 
checked the invasion. But the Belgian for- 
tresses, though originally constructed upon the 
strongest model, were not thus provided. They 
had for their defence neither a sufficient store of 
munitions nor anything like an adequate provi- 
sion in trained men. Prussia, in attacking Bel- 
gium, knew that she was attacking a State not 
only small but not organised for war. She calcu- 
lated justly that the resistance even of these two 
great fortresses, even of Liege and Namur, would 
be negligible in the military sense; aud she pre- 
pared to pour the " marching wing " of her great 
force through the Belgian Plain.* 
Upon Tuesday, August 4, 1914, the covering 
troops of the German invasion, behind which 
mobilisation was rapidly proceeding, attacked the 
Belgian outposts to the east of Liege. B3' the 
morning of Friday, August 7, the town and the 
southern forts of the ring were in the hands of 
this German advance body, though the Belgian 
commander. General Leman, was still holding out 
in one (perhaps more) of the permanent works to 
the north. It was another week before all tho 
permanent works of Liege, and, therefore, the 
railway communications which thev commanded 
^/^? }^}^^ ^^^'^^ of the enemy, the resistance 
of this fortress with the imperfect means at its 
disposal may be said to have thrown back the 
enemy's plans by about seven davs. He had, 
presumably, calculated upon a complete mastery 
of the communications from his own territory 
mto the_ Belgian Plain by the 8th of the month. 
He obtained it exactly a week later— on the 15th. 
The greater part of the next week, up to 
August 20, was occupied by the steadv flooding 
ot the Belgian Plain with the novv rapidl? 
mobilising forces of the enemy. A cavalry screen 
went on before the main advance, was checked 
slightly by such Belgian troops as could be mus- 
tered along the line of the Dyle, and ceased its 
operations upon the arrival of the main German 
body. 
Upon August 20 Brussels was occujned. and 
the Belgian forces in the field had retired behind 
the works of Antwerp. 
Upon that same day, August 20, Namur was 
attacked by the German siege train from the east 
and the north, and fell at once— with what con- 
sequences we shall understand when we consider 
the position of the Allied forces which were 
drawn up for the reception of the German assault. 
The French Army, in such strength as it 
had been mustered by this date of August 20 
(which may be regarded as the term of the firstr- ' 
mobilisation upon either side of the frontier), 
was, generally speaking, grouped in three- maiu*^ 
bodies. 
One was concerned with the fortified^frontiec. 
of Alsace-Lorraine. From it there had been de- 
tached forces which had occupied the passes of 
the V«6ges, had crossed into Alsace and Lorraine, 
and were advancing both eastward and north- 
ward. 
The second, which was in touch with this 
first, and formed but a continuation of its line, 
lay like an '" L," in a rectangular formation, one 
limb u|X)n the Middle Meuse, up to the neigh- 
bourhood of Xamur, the other along the Sanibre, 
and further west in front of Mons. This last 
SuptUment to I.ASt. and Watek. Aunsl ti. igis. 
n 
' When of a whole force in line, one portion stands to cootaio tii* 
enemy and the other pivots round to encircle him, the latter U called 
"the marrhinir win^ " of the attempted envelooment. 
