LAND AND IKATER. 
August 14, 1915, 
insl nortE of Soissons, north of Rheiras, through 
the middle part of the Argonne Forest, and so to 
a point upon the Meuse about ten miles north ot 
,VeC Fi-om that defensive line the enemy 
was not dislodged through the ^hole of he re^ 
maining period to the moment of writing these 
lines. 
With this date, the middle of September we 
conclude the first chapter of the great war, which 
history will also probably or certainly i-egaid as 
the capital period in the whole stoiy. ^^net as was 
the period over which it extended (t^^^^tj -three 
■days) from the first main attack upon the bambie 
to the check of the Allied pursuit upon the lines 
of the Aisne, the upshot of the whole operations 
was a position from which Prussia could never 
attain the political object with which she had 
made war. The succeeding period up to the 
moment of writing is nearly twelve times as long 
in mere time. It has cost mcalculab y more in 
human lives and in economic values, it has been 
actions on an even larger scale; the tall and re- 
covery of famous cities in the East; the entry into 
the w-ar of vet another great Power, Italy ; the in- 
ception of the Dardanelles expedition, and all that 
enormous eastern campaign which is stiU unde- 
cided and still in progress. Yet it remains true 
to sa.y that all that has passed between September 
14 1914 and August 1, 1915, is no more than 
equal in 'historic value and military meaning to 
the bare three weeks which saw the failure of the 
German invasion in the West. 
In order to appreciate what immediately fol- 
lowed this German stand upon the lines of the 
Aisne, we must grasp very clearly the paradoxical 
situation that, in this Western field, a very much 
superior force had been pursued and was now 
pinned by an inferior one. Roughly speaking, 
something between nine and ten men had, in the 
battle of the Marne, pushed back between sixteen 
and seventeen opponents, and on the lines of the 
Aisne pinned these opponents to the defensive. 
So successful had been the counter-attack of this 
minority upon that majority which had 
blundered, that the minority even attempted the 
task of getting round the extreme western end 
of the German defensive line, out-flanking it, and 
so threatening it w^ith envelopment and compel- 
ling its further retreat. But with numbers so 
gravely inferior, a task which properly belongs 
only to considerably superior numbers, was im- 
possible of achievement. The British contingent 
lay along the Lower Aisne, while the French 
forces to their left were attempting this turning 
movement round the town of Noyon. The enemy's 
superiority in number permitted him to meet 
every attempt at outflanking by the presence of 
German troops sent to oppose each such move- 
ment. As one French attempt after the other was 
thus foiled, as each failed to get round the end 
of the increasing German line, the opposing 
forces necessarily stretched further and further 
north until at last the sea was reached, and all 
efforts of either to outflank the other were for- 
bidden by this obstacle. 
One may roughly put the date October 9, 
which is also that of the entry of the German 
troops into Antwerp, for the conclusion of this 
process which has aptly been compared to the 
freezing or solidifying of a body hitherto mobile. 
From about that date, after the first third of the 
month of October, the iMHes and the Ger- 
mans in the West face each other across narrow 
belts of territor)% separating opposing trenches 
sometimes no further from each other than some 
hundred vards; never at a distance of more than 
half a mile. There was still to be some fluctua- 
tion in the extreme north of these lines, and occa- 
sional slight retirements or advances have affected 
certain sections of them from time to time. But, 
taken as a whole, throughout the winter of 1914, 
to the spring and throughout the greater part ol 
the summer of 1915, the two enemies have re- 
mained closely locked, and their common line ot 
contact has run along the following contours :— 
From a point between Ostend and Nieuport, 
but nearer the latter town, the line makes for 
Ypres, passes in a slight bend or salient to the 
east of that town, southward to the east of Armen- 
tieres, leaving Lille in the enemy's hands; still 
southward between Bethunef and La Bassee to 
Arras, which point is held by the Allies, and so 
on to the Oise, which it strikes at a point rather 
nearer Noyon than eompiegne. Thence the line 
turns eastward, following that course along the 
Aisne River and across Champagne just north of 
Rheims to the Argonne, which has already been 
described. In the Argonne it just includes 
Varennes, which it leaves in the hands of the 
enemy. Passing, as w^e have seen, ten miles or 
so to the north of Verdun, the opposing lines bend 
inw^ard to the Meuse at St. Mihiel, thence go east- 
ward, leave Pont k Mousson in French hands, 
nearly follow the frontier of Lorraine, and, cross- 
ing the crest of the Vosges a little north of Colmar 
and thence to the Swiss frontier, include a narrow 
belt of the eastern slope of those mountains. 
VI. 
The enemy, thus pinned by inferior numbers 
to his own, the late wet autumn and winter ap- 
proaching, his original object no longer to be 
achieved, opened the second chapter of the war 
by the obvious policy which circumstances im- 
posed upon him, which was to use his superior 
numbers of men and vast superiority in heavy 
guns for breaking through the line that contained 
him. He proposed to effect this at the extreme 
northern end of that line, and that for several 
reasons. 
It was here that he had the best communica- 
tions behind him. It was here that he had the 
most diverse force opposed to him, for the British 
armv had been brought round from the Aisne to 
the sector in front of Ypres, and was there linked 
up with French and Belgian troops. Further, 
the enemy, if successful in here breaking the 
Allied line, would at once become possessed of 
the ports of the Straits of Dover, Calais, and 
Boulogne, from which he could most seriously 
menace British commerce, and even perhaps 
threaten invasion. 
In his plan for breaking through, however, 
he showed the same incapacity for direct and 
simple action w^hich had appeared in his blunder 
before Paris six weeks earlier. 
He attacked not with full weight upon one 
portion of the line, but successively upon several 
portions. He underestimated the formidable 
obstacle provided bv the marshy district of the 
River Yser, which, flooded at the end of October, 
became more formidable .still. That one of his 
eftorts which has most impressed this country, and 
MuppUmeni to I.u<i> and WaTSU, 'August 14, 1915. 
10* 
