August 14, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER, 
Germany, and of over '600,000 odd in Austria- 
Hungary, do not exhaust all possible sources of 
recruitment, though they exhaust all the really 
good material available. The German Empire 
had trained rather more than half its manhood; 
rather less than half remained to be dealt with by 
process of training during the Avar. But Austria- 
Hungary had trained far less than half its man- 
hood, and her reserve was proportionately greater. 
There were also a certain proportion of tlie boys 
below twenty-one — and even as low as the age of 
Beventeen — who could ultimately be impressed; 
men beyond the age of ordinary military efficiency 
could be called for services not immediately upon 
the front ; and a certain small proportion of those 
hitherto rejected for medical reasons could, in the 
last extremity, be summoned. But it is doubtful, 
however, whether all these sources of supply would 
give the enemy more than from a million and a 
half to a million and three-quarter men beyond 
the batches which he had prepared for the first 
year of war, and the already trained men Avith 
whom he had begun his campaign. 
The method and power of recruitment upon 
the Allied side formed a complete contrast. The 
French, with their much smaller numbers, had 
trained every available man. Before the first year 
of war was over their maximum power was lully 
developed. They wisely reserved (and continue to 
reserve) a very large proportion of this maximum 
power, calling out the very youngest classes, 
especially only towards the end of the period, for 
they know that time is upon their side. But, at 
any rate, the French recruitment was, in propor- 
tion, so far as the total of actual trained man- 
power was concerned (not the men actually 
at the front) more rapid than the enemy's. 
But the two other great Allies, whose reserve 
of man-power would necessarily be a deciding 
factor, were differently situated. Great Britain, 
by an amazing voluntary effort, without con- 
scription, raised an immense reserve, but that 
reserve necessarily suffered from tardiness in 
equipment. The mere provision of rifles for a 
very large force of infantry is a matter, in normal 
times, of years, and even under the necessities of 
such a war as this, it is a matter of very many 
months. 
Great Britain had never contemplated, and 
had never been asked by her Allies to contemplate. 
Continental warfare of the first magnitude. She 
had not only to produce this new great mass of 
equipment after war had broken out, she had also 
to train an almost entirely new body of officers; 
she had to provide the horses, the guns, the muni- 
tion which her increased numbers demanded. 
If one should strike a curve showing the 
number of men fully organised at various dates 
by this country, with all their officers trained, all 
their equipment provided, that curve would not 
show successive and regularly appearing batches 
of recruitment as would the enemy's. It would 
show no " waves *'; it would be discovered run- 
ning almost flat for the first few months, and then 
rising steeper and steeper as the summer ap- 
proached. But even after a full year of war it 
would not nearly have reached its maximum. 
Russia, for different reasons, was in a some- 
what similar case. Her opportunities of recruit- 
ment were better; she could train at any one time 
a larger number of men, for she depended upon 
conscription. But the officering of these was a 
difficult problem, and equipment, especially 
during the strict blockade to which Nature and 
the enemy submitted her during the winter ; 
months, was formidable indeed. The Russian | 
curve also, therefore, if we should strike it, would 
show a similar slow rise which, after the first 
year of war, has not yet nearly reached its 
maximum. 
In general the effect of the contrast between 
the enemy's method of recruitment and those of 
the Allies was this : That upon the enemy's side 
numbers could perpetually be kept up until a 
maximum was reached before the end of the first 
year of war, though after that period a decline, 
would set in; while upon the Allied side the; 
growth of numbers would only become weighty 
towards the end and even after the end of that^ 
period. In other words, the enemy maintained 
his enormous numerical superiority for all the 
first months of the war, and was still at evens 
with his opponents in the summer of 1915. It is 
not until a period later than that of the present 
writing that the full numerical advantage of the 
Allies can tell. 
So much being said, let us return to the. 
enemy's plans in Poland. 
Hindenburg having failed to carry Warsaw 
by direct assault, the second great batch of recruit- 
ment was at his disposal for the stratagem he next' 
proposed. The Russians had, while Hindenburg 
was thus striking in front of Warsaw, forced their 
way into East Prussia again over a belt of twenty, 
or tliirty miles wide. They had in this second in- 
vasion taken full and justified reprisals, and 
nothing is more satisfactory than the reading of 
the German complaints, recently published, upon 
the nature of those reprisals. Wherever the in-; 
vader passed civilians were held as hostages, and| 
their property was systematically seized after thej 
examples set by the Prussians in Belgium and' 
France. The abominable crimes which Prussian' 
military tradition regards as advisable or per- 
missible in war were not committed. But thci 
enemy was made to feel during this second in-; 
vasion of East Prussia something of what his per- 
verted morality had deserved. 
It was essential, therefore, to the German 
Government that this invasion should be checked,, 
and the accomplishment of this task was combir.ed 
with an attempt to capture Warsaw and command! 
the line of the Vistula in a new fashion. 
About half a million men were gathered in 
East Prussia, launched at the Russian fq^ges 
there, which numbered about two-fifths of their 
opponents, and began, with the first week in 
February, the clearing of the proviftQe. By the 
12th of the month the last Russian .soldier was 
beyond the frontiers, and the large Geiwan force 
thus established to the north of Warsaw and east 
of it moved down southward to take the capital of 
Poland in reverse. 
The I'ailway communications with Warsaw 
are protected by the line of the Rivers Narev and 
Niemen, with fortified posts stretched along those 
rivers. Upon that line the Germans advanced in 
the third week of February. One comparatively 
small body succeeded in crossing the Niemen; the 
army as a whole was checked before it reached the 
Narev, and at the battle of Praznych, upon 
February 26, the German offensive was broken and 
case to an end. 
SuptUmtnt to Laxd and Watkb, August 14, loiS- 
15* 
