Angust 14, 1915, 
tAND AND SKATER. 
THE YEAR'S NAVAL WAR. 
By A. H. POLLEN. 
IN this brief review of the ,War at Sea I shall 
not attempt a complete story. Excellent 
narratives are already in existence. Com- 
mander Robinson's in " Brassey's " sur- 
vey is admirably complete. There is much 
valuable matter in the " Fleet Annual." Before 
these pages are in the reader's hands there will no 
doubt be others from which he can choose. Nor 
shall I attempt to describe any event or action 
minutely. The information at our disposal is still 
far too fragmentary. Very few dispatches have 
been published, and none but have, apparently, 
been blue pencilled out of existence. That we 
should be entirely ignorant of certain events, and 
largely ignorant of them all, is no doubt a public 
advantage — so long as the enemy shares that 
ignorance. And if thereby the field of controversy 
is limited, that surely is not a thing to lament. 
But it obviously makes the writing of history im- 
possible. I shall limit myself, tlierefore, to re- 
viewing the main lines of naval action, and to 
suggesting the broad lessons which it teaches. 
In the past year Whitehall has been called 
upon to decide an almost infinite number of 
issues, in circumstances that were almost infinitely 
novel. The surprising thing is, not that many 
and even grave mistakes were made, but that its 
policy during the war has been in the main so 
right. It has already become a commonplace that 
never in previous history had the objects of sea 
power been attained so rapidly or so completely. 
CONCENTRATION AND 
CIVILISATION. 
Two things, it seems to me, combined to make 
the task of the Admiralty extraordinarily difli- 
cult. The electric cable and wireless telegraphy 
had brought every ship at sea — however remote 
— within an hour or two of Whitehall. It 
followed, then, that a mass of information 
poured hourly into the Admiralty, and it was 
the only centre into which all the informa- 
tion went. Being, then, the sole repository of in- 
telligence, a strategical responsibility was thrown 
upon it such as had never fallen on its predeces- 
sors. It may have become quite impossible to 
distinguish between advice to men on the spot and 
orders to them. Interference may well have 
become the rule. 
The real question was, who was to exercise 
the authority which this modern system of com- 
munication centred in Whitehall? A hundred 
years of peace had given an almost completely 
civilian complexion to the Admiralty machine. 
The Board was so constituted by law as no longer 
to ensure that the Navy was admini.stered by a 
committee in which naval officers predominated. 
The supreme authority was vested in a Cabinet 
Minister. He had, indeed, naval advi.sers, but 
was under no obligation to follow their advice. 
.There was nothing to prevent him conceiving a 
policy of his own, carrying it out on his own lines, 
and forcing his nominal colleagues to the choice of 
acquiescence or resignation. If this was the 
SmtPUmtmt to J^»D tno W*mi, August 14. >9i3- 
IS*, 
general position, let it al.'vo be remembered that 
neither the civilian nor the professional side of the 
Admiralty had any experience of war whatever. 
BRITAIN S RISK IN WAR. 
When a nation is entirely dependent for its 
existence on a dajly service of supply ships, it is 
obvious that it must either possess such power at 
sea as to forbid any other nation closing that high- 
way, or its existence must be at the mercy of its 
enemies. The loss of the free use of the sea may, 
be a grievous loss to any country. To be cut off 
from sea supplies may in the end be a determining 
factor in the defeat of a country that is apparently 
self-contained. It may be the determining factor 
in the defeat of Germany. But it is far from clear 
that Germany's sea trade — vast as it was — was a 
necessity of national existence. She imported, 
after all, less than 15 per cent, of her food sup- 
plies. Of the things necessary for war that sha 
did not produce her stores were ample, and in 
seizing Belgium and ten departments of France 
she increased that store largely. Germany's sea 
trade was a condition of her industrial expansion, 
for without it her factories could not have attained 
their amazing growth in the last quarter of a 
century. It did not follow that the deprivation 
of that sea trade would be fatal. 
But Great Britain, when she goes to war, 
alone of all great powers, risks teing brought to 
her knees, and that almost instantly. Were her 
Grand Fleet defeated and the British sea-power 
broken, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
the national surrender would barely even be a 
question of weeks. If any country could hold the 
sea against us it would be quite unnecessary to 
invade these shores. Famine, either actual or 
certain, would compel submission before an invad- 
ing force could be organised or landed. This 
simple and quite elemental^ truth is not always 
realised. It explains why, beyond any country in 
the world, Great Britain must be chary of alter- 
ing upon war with any combination of countries 
that can dispute her sea command. 
FAITH IN AN UNTRIED MACHINE. 
But it should bring another truth home to us 
also. The ultimatum sent to Germany twelve 
months ago, in the full knowledge that it nieant 
war, immediate, ruthless, and decisive, was a 
supreme act of faith in the British Fleet. And it 
was an act of faith all the more remarkable be- 
cause the Fleet was a cojnpletely untried machine. 
And it would be directed from London, and would 
be commanded at sea, by men who had had no 
experience to guide them. It was a hundred and 
eleven years since England had gone to war know- 
ing that its sea power was the only thing tliat 
stood between this country and ruin. In the inter- 
val, the instruments of naval force had been revo- 
lutioni.sed again and again. 
The most recent experience had been with 
shii)s which it is tlie custom to-day to (ir.smiss as 
possessing np miliUry value whatever, ihrco 
