LAND. AND WATER 
August 14, 1915. 
changes, each in their way coini)letely revolu- 
tionary, Iiad come alx)ut since the battle of Tsu- 
shima. The development of fire control had given 
the guns, which at that j)ei;iod could not be made 
tt. h?t beyond a range of 6,000 yards, far greater 
efficiency at twice that range. And these guns had 
been surpassed by others of larger calibre and 
flatter trajectories, which had raised the pos- 
sii)le hitting range to something like half as much 
again. Ten years ago no capital ship couhl com- 
iiuind a greater speed than 19 knots. Lion, Tiger, 
and Princess Royal, carrying batteries of eight 
13.5 guns each — a striking force four times as 
powerful as any capital shi|) carried in 1895 — 
went into action at the Dogger Bank at 28 knots. 
Speed had increa.sed by at least 50 per cent. 
Finally, the torjjedo had taken on an entirely new 
aspect. The wea[)on itself had been greatly in- 
crejised in size, so as to become at least six times 
as destructive as the torpedo of ten years ago. 
And the development of the hot-air engine and 
mechanical improvements had created a still more 
able, and that these circumstances existed 
becuuse Germany did not expect us to fight. 
This is ind&ed quite clear from the two inter- 
views between the German Chancellor and the 
British Ambassador in Berlin on July 29 and 
August 4. It was an integral part of Germany's 
«)nce{)tion of the [)oliticaI situation that Great 
Britain would be glad of any excuse, even the 
flimsiest, to remain neutral. The ofler to respect 
the integrity of French territory, while taking the 
French Colonial possessions, though it appeared 
dishonourable and even ridiculous to us, was 
made by the German Chancellor in the most 
perfect assurance that it would be accepted. The 
rage and disappointment which, when the ofl'er 
was rejected, he exhibited at the final interview, 
are conclusive on this. Our vltimatnm of August 3 
was, then, a complete surprise. 
So much must, it seems to me, be admitted by 
everyone who reads the correspondence, and it fol- 
lows that in so far as British intervention has 
affected the course of the war, to that extent it has 
astounding advance in s[)eed, range, and accuracy, given Germany a war quite difJerent from what 
The.se developments really constituted it a new she expected. 
< 
weapon. But combined with the development of 
the submarine, the torpedo almost revolutionised 
naval warfare. In ten years, and principally on 
the intiative of Great Britain, the submarine had 
been developed into a sea-going craft with a 
surface speed exceeding that of battleships of ten 
That the influence of Great Britain's inter- 
vention on its ultimate course must be very 
great, cannot, of course, be questioned. ,Will it 
be decisive ? It is possible that the war may end 
without a military decision being reached. But 
the numbers of the enemy are diminishing. The 
years ago and carrying fuel in such quantities as fact that we have had to create an Army since war 
to give it a radius of action as great as any ship was declared, ensures that our larger numbers 
possessed then. The paradox became true that a will be coming in just when the enemy's reserves 
navy could have all its surface ships driven of? the 
sea and yet be free to use its submarines almost 
as if no stronger enemy force existed. 
are exhausted. They may turn the scale. If, 
owing to conditions of trench war, superior 
numbers cannot win a military decision, then the 
war vvill end by national exhaustion, and as the 
material resources of Great Britain are greater 
than those of Austria and Germany combined, 
If we are to form any useful judgment as to ^?^:f'lf^^ P°^^^ protects those resources from 
the course which the sea campaign actually took. 
GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS. 
we must have a clear appreciation of the general 
conditions at the commencement of the war. 
There are many evidences that the great war 
that was to make Germany impregnable in Europe 
and ultimately the dominant world power, was 
the act, almost exclusively, of the military side of 
the great General Staff.' At the moment chosen 
for the creation and precipitation of the crisis the 
British Fleet, instead of being scattered, as it is 
apt to be in the summer time, was concentrated in 
the Channel. The largest and most complete 
mobilisation that has ever taken place was just 
completed. That this mobilisation was due at the 
date on which it occurred, that our Fleet instead of 
being dispersed would be concentrated and ready 
for war at this moment, had been known to every 
one in Europe for many months. To move it to its 
war stations was a simple operation. It was in 
station before the ultimatum was sent. The imme- 
diate paralysis of the German Fleet followed. 
It would have been patent folly to have attempted 
a fleet action. From August 4, 1914, Great 
Britain has exercised, until the present date, a 
control of the sea which has been unquestioned 
because it was unquestionable. The three occa- 
sions on which squadrons of ships have been en- 
gaged h - 
any des 
commaim, and the results of these actions have not 
even remotely affected it. The circumstances u 
■wfuch war broke out made this command inevit 
diminution — and, indeed, enables us to add to 
them — then it will be the belligerency of Great 
Britain that will decide the fate of Germany. 
a 
IF GERMANY HAD FORESEEN. 
For this situation Germany had not pre- 
pared; She had calculated on a war in which 
Great Britain would be neutral. This fact sug- 
gests two speculations. It would be a tempting 
exercise to contrast the war which Germany has 
got with the war which she expected. It is of more 
immediate moment to ask ourselves what 
Germany would have done if, determining to 
make war on Europe, she had realised that Great 
Britain would, if she could, intervene, and inter- 
vene decisively. What steps could she have taken 
to ensure our intervention being powerless to 
spoil her Continental plans ? 
It might have been practical to bring tlio 
Austrian Dreadnoughts, on some excuse or other, 
to Wilhelmshaven. She certainly would have 
armed, not as she did less than a dozen, but more 
than half a hundred of her liners. She could 
have prepared an expeditionary force of 100,000 
men. When the liners were armed and afield, tho 
troops would have been hurried on the transports. 
1 Lve nore^ffiZ I T ''Z' TV^ ^"^^ ^^'' ^'S^' ^'^' Fleet would have put to sea! 
esirrortTe fvi n N." ^T^^'' f^'"''\^-^' ^^"l^ltaneously, and at a given signal Germany, 
and and tt rZu If^f""^ to ques ion this would have fallen, with all her nav°al forces, with 
<uui, ana tlie results of these actions have nnf. f^vo,.,. .i^of^^„^„ „.„.„., „..u • _ _ i ' 
in 
<»*/•(, 
emeni to Lano and Water, Aueuit 
. ilf.i;:(:i: I fi i.i; , 
lA. 1015. 
ft:-:!,! 
20* 
every destroyer, every submarine, and every 
Dreadnought that she possessed, or could borrow 
from the Adriatic, upon all, or upon a portion, of 
M.^ 
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