August 14, 1915. 
LAND AND W.ATER 
our Grand Fleet. The expeditionary force would 
have landed on the coast of Kent or Essex, the 
raiders would have begun the wholesale destruc- 
tion of our merchantmen on every ocean. These 
three things Germany would have done, not 
during a period of diplomatic tension, but while 
disguising as completely as she could every hostile 
intention. A simultaneous attack upon our Fleet, 
our coast, and our ocean trade, attacks made as 
a complete surprise and with a ruthless disregard 
of losses, would have had very terrible results. 
But they would almost certainly not have been 
fatal. Our sea power would have re-asserted 
itself. Our trade, though crippled, would, under 
the aegis of that sea power, have been re-estab- 
lished. The invading force would ultimately have 
been destroyed to a man. But Great Britain 
would have received a shock. Her power would 
have suffered a .serious diminution. We could 
obviously not have taken any immediate part in 
a Continental war. Germany would have been 
free to have pursued her policy with regard to 
France and Russia for many months with.uit our 
effective interference. 
Would her power have been materially 
diminished by these attacks upon us? Let us 
suppose every ship of the German Fleet to have 
been captured and destroyed. Let us assume 
every cruiser and liner ravaging the trade routes 
to have been run down, sunk, or captured within 
a few months. Let us suppose the raiding force 
beatetn into surrender. Would the loss of this fleet, 
the loss of these converted merchantmen, the loss 
of these men, have weakened Germany for the 
purjx)ses of Continental war? She would have 
been without such command of the Baltic as she 
can exercise now. But, except for such command, 
and such doubtful protection as the German Fleet 
gives to the German coasts, I can see no benefit 
that Germany gains from the High Sea Fleet 
which she has intact to-day. It has done nothing 
of niilitary value during the war, and can do 
nothing before the end. 
THE COURSE OF THE WAR. 
Given the initial condition that the sea war 
opened with the German Fleet locked up in its 
harbours, the campaign took more or less the 
course that might have been expected. Except for 
the activities of her submarines, the German Navy 
showed no initiative o£ any kind until Yarmouth 
and Scarborough were raided by the battle- 
cruisers. And, except for the attempts to catch 
the raiders, there was no organised British naval 
movement to attack the Germans except the affair 
of the Heligoland Bight at the end of August. 
In the Dogger Bank chase the raiders lost the 
Bleucher and came near losing the whole 
squadron. The Heligoland affair was the only 
attack that the British Navy was enabled to make. 
These events will be discussed under " Naval 
Actions." 
For the rest, such incidents as occurred arose 
either from chance encounters when the German 
destroyers ventured out too far afield or to the 
results of submarine activity on one side or the 
other. The successes of the German submarines 
were confined to attacks on the cruisers either 
patrolling the North Sea, or engaged in searching 
the neutral trading ships. The successes of the 
.Briti.sh submai^ines .were ^limited to two, for ifhe 
excellent reason that no German ships ventured _ 
out of harbour, except escorted by -destroyers ir 
such numbers as to make submarine attack im- 
possible. 
THE SUBMARINE SCARE. 
Of the many interesting aspects of the sub- 
marine campaign, by far the most important for 
the purpose of understanding the lessons of this 
war was the effect its successes had upon the 
public mind. As we have seen already, it was a 
new and untried instrument of war. It was an 
old claim of torpedo enthusiasts that underwater 
attack would supersede gun attack. The secrecy 
of the weapon and the finality of its successful 
employment introduced an element into the 
argument which defied analysis and logic. The 
French Navy at one time was led into torsaking 
capital ships for torpedo boats and destroyers. 
The failure of the torpedo in the Russo-Japanese 
War exposed the folly of these claims without 
converting the enthusiasts. When about six years 
ago the range of the torpedo was enormously 
magnified, it had to be admitted by everyone that 
its influence on fleet actions must be very con- 
siderable — principally because it would add a 
new and most difficult problem to fire control. 
But when the submarine became a sea-going 
ship, an entirely new factor appeared in naval 
war; The torpedo enthusiasts were justified 
by events. In 1911 an ex-Director of Naval 
Ordnance read a brilliant paper to the In- 
stitution of Naval Architects, and left upon 
his hearers the impression that the command 
of the sea might not much longer rest with 
the largest and most powerful ships. Mr. 
Churchill, speaking not long before the war, said 
the time might con^ when sea power would not 
be measured by Dreadnoughts alone, and, indeed, 
might not be measured by Dreadnoughts at all. 
The public mind had thus been then to some 
extent prepared for doubting whether the capital 
ship was indeed the citadel of our supremacy. 
But a more serious warning was to come. Not 
two months before the war began a startling and 
uncompromising declaration appeared in the 
Press over the signature of Sir Percy Scott. We 
were told in so many words that the submarine 
had made it impossible for any surface ship to 
put to sea or lie safely in harbour, that the day of 
the battleship was therefore over, and if mer- 
chant ships dared to appear on the ocean they 
could be torpedoed at sight. To the warnings of 
a former Director of Naval Ordnance was thus 
added the lament of one whom the public 
accepted as the author of all gunnery advance. 
Admiral Scott's opinions were heavily discounted 
by many able writers and speakers. But he con- 
fessed himself unconverted by his critics. It 
cannot be denied that the new gospel of sea power 
had a profound effect. 
First, it gave the impression throughout the 
world that while we had been pressing the de- 
velopment of the submarine, we did not appear to 
have organised and developed means for frustrate 
ing its attacks. Within the Navy itself the 
neglect to face this problem had long been a 
subject of wonder. It was so very obvious that if 
ever we went to war it would be the enemy's ships 
that would be driven to their harbours and ours 
that would have to hold the sea. To us, therefore, 
the submarine was the device for only occasional 
use— on the rare occasions, that is, when the enemy 
SuPDUment to ].A^s and Wats», August 14. 1913. 
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