August 14, 1915. 
LAN D AND WATER 
problem of dealing with the submarine been 
undertaken properly in times of peaw, it is not 
impossible that we might have gone through the 
war without a submarine casualty at all. 
Of the submarine campaign against trade, it 
is unnecessary to say much. The purpose of the 
" Blockade " was to stop all ships from reaching 
or leaving British ports. It has, in point of fact, 
stopped less than one and a half per cent. Its 
economic result is inappreciable. It has not 
affected the morale of the nation in any manner 
favourable to the enemy. It has been a potent 
cause in making the neutral countries of the 
civilised world realise what German world- 
ascendancy would be if Germany should win. It 
is claimed that it has had this valuable military 
result, that it has given the German submarine 
captains an extraordinary practical experience in 
the handling of their boats. This certainly is 
possible, but against this it seems certain that a 
very considerable number of submarines have 
perished in the campaign, and the balance of 
advantage can hardly be with the enemy. 
Before leaving the subject of submarines, it 
would be improper not to allude to their quite 
legitimate and very successful employment, both 
iu the Baltic and at the Dardanelles. It was an 
open secret for many months that a British sub- 
marine, under Commander Max Horton, was to 
be at the disposal of the Russian Navy. It has 
met with many successes, sunk a battleship 
and destroyer. The skill and courage exhibited 
both here and in the Dardanelles by the 
British submarine captains is conclusive evidence 
of what can be done with this craft. They have 
pierced through the Dardanelles to the Sea of 
Marmara on many occasions, and have very 
seriously interrupted the communications between 
the Turkish forces in Gallipoli and the mainland. 
The adventures encountered on these expeditions 
are almost a fairy tale for wonder. It would 
surely do no harm for the diary of Ell to be 
published. When the German submarines reached 
the ^Egean, their effect on our bombarding opera- 
tions was immediate. Triumph and Majestic 
were sunk — and new methods had to be adopted. 
NAVAL ACTIONS. 
The only actions, of which we have sufficient 
information to make them worth discussing, are 
the Heligoland affair, the battle off Coronel, the 
Sydney — Emden engagement. Sir Doveton 
Sturdee's defeat of Von Spee, and the Dogger 
Bank chase. Plans of first, fourth, and fifth of 
these are given, because these are the most in- 
structive. I shall not attempt a description of 
each engagement, but shall assume that the 
reader has the dispatches accessible to him. The 
plans should then assist him in understanding 
what occurred. They are based on the dispatches 
and the best information available. 
Before passing to the actions, it is important 
to have a clear idea of two things which these 
actions illustrate. The first is the nature of the 
advantage which heavy guns have over lighter 
pieces. In each of these actions the side which 
had the largest number of heavier guns, or 
generally heavier guns, was successful. A heavy 
shell obviously has far greater effect than a light 
shell when it hits. Its advantages in this respect 
do not need demonstration. It is as well, how- 
ever, to make it quite clear why it is more prob- 
able that a heavy shell will hit. 
And next, these actions illustrate the great 
advance in fire control which has been made in 
the last ten years, and they also show, and I 
think convincingly, the limitations of the systems 
in use. As my comments on these actions will 
be particularly directed towards showing the 
tactical developments that have followed on the 
advance of gunnery and towards what further 
tactical developments must follow from a greater 
advance, it is essential that the nature of the fire- 
control problem should be understood. The next 
sections, therefore, deal with these two points. 
ADVANTAGES OF HEAVIER GUNS. 
The principle of heavy guns being superior 
at long range is exemplified by the Sketches 1 and 
2. Sketch 1 represents the manner in which a salvo 
of guns may be expected to spread if all the sights 
are set to the sa.me range. All guns lose in range 
accuracy as the range increases, but light guns 
more than heavy. If six 6-inch guns are fired at 
a target at 12,000 yards tiie shell will be apt to 
be spread out as shown in the top line. Six 9.2's 
will fall in a closer pattern, as shown in the 
second line, six 12-inch in a still smaller space, 
and the 13.5 in one still smaller. Regarded 
simply as instruments for obtaining a pattern at 
a given range, heavy guns are therefore far more 
effective than light ones. 
But this is far from being the heavy guns' 
only advantage, as will be seen from Sketch 2. 
The heavier the projectile is, the longer it retains 
its velocity. The angle at which a shot falls 
from any height depends solely upon its forward 
velocity while it is falling. Sketch 2 shows the 
outline of a ship broadside on to the enemy's fire, 
the shell being fired from the right hand of the 
sketch. A is the point where the ship's side 
meets the water. If the gun were shooting per- 
fectly accurately and was set to 10,000 yards, all 
the shots would "hit at this point. And clearly any 
shot set at a range greater than this, but one 
which did not carry the shot over the target, would 
hit the ship, somewhere between the points A and 
SuppUment to I.ANO a-wo Watss, August 14, 191^ 
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