LAND AND W! A T E R . 
AugusE 14, 1915. 
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Lion Yii-5 
Noon escaping 
1 I r I I I I — r 
11-3 am. to l2-20p.m. Scale of Sea Miles 
that is, until 10.48 — no corresponding damage was 
done to the enemy. The Bleucher was still afloat, 
the other two German ships kept their station, 
though by this time the range should have been 
only 11,000 yards. What is the explanation ? 
Is it that the manceuvres oi the enemy's 
destroyer squadron forced the Vice-Adrairal to 
put his ships under helm to meet or evade their 
attacks ? He tells us at one time that he had to 
regroup his squadron. And he must have changed 
course when the enemy shifted their direction to 
the North. Such changes of course would have 
had two effects. First, there would have been 
a diminution in the reduction of the range. The 
second is far more important. The change of 
course would have thrown out the fire control of 
the ships and made it necessary to rediscover the 
rate and its constituent factors before effective 
fire could be reopened. If several such changes 
took place it is possible that the fire of the 
squadron was much less efficient in the course of 
this critical hour and a haK than it was in the 
first twenty minutes, although the range was 
shorter. But, then, in the first period, both the 
enemy and our ships kept steady courses. 
It is quite possible that inability to keep the 
range while manoeuvring may have been a decisive 
factor ia.the German escape. 
GERMAN GUNNERY AND FIRE 
CONTROL. 
The German gunnery seems to have been as 
good as might have been expected. Both Lion and 
Tiger were hit. Published letters speak of 
salvoes falling just sEbrt and just over, telling 
indeed the same story that Commodore Tyrwhitt 
tells of the third action in which Arethusa and 
Fearless were engaged off Heligoland. The same 
story is told again in letters relating to Admiral 
Sturdees engagement. Halcyon's experience was 
similar. 
What is the explanation of these repeated 
statements that the German firing was " severe "' 
and " almost accurate," when all the time we 
know that it did everything except hit? Two 
inferences can be drawn. That whole salvoes 
should follow so closely together, come within 
twenty to thirty yards of the target every time 
as Commodore Tyrwhitt and the Falkland Islands 
accounts describe, points to excellent fire disci- 
pline and extraordinarily good gun-laying It 
suggests, indeed, the use of a director. It also 
seems to show that the guns are well calibrated 
or they could not be brought together so accu- 
rately. Ihese things would explain the closeness 
Supplement to Lanc and Water, Aueuit 14. lo^i*. 
of the pattern and the regular repetition of 
salvoes following each to the same range. 
Their not hitting is probably to be accounted 
for in the fact that the German control parties 
had insufficient experience of long-range shoot- 
ing. I have very good reasons for thinking that 
up to the year 1912 the Germans had definitely 
made up their minds that the English effort to 
develop shooting at very long range was not only 
doomed to failure, but based upon an entirely 
wrong tactical conception. The theory they went 
on was that the right tactics in action was to 
close at top speed and to engage at a range at 
which the niceties of fire control would be imma- 
terial, and at that range to develop the highest 
intensity of fire. At 6,000 yards, say, 50 or 60 
per cent, of hits with big guns could be got with 
the most rudimentary fire control arrangements. 
That this theory really governed the German 
theory of sea fighting, and consequently their ure- 
paration for sea figting, is borne out by certain 
features in their ships' design. Note, for in- 
stance, that the older ships carry more guns than 
ours. Again, I think I am right in saying that 
until 1912 no German ship had a fire control 
station high up the mast — a thing which is the 
most conspicuous feature of every English capital 
ship and large cruiser. In no German ship, in- 
deed, was there, at the date of which I am speak- 
ing, any position for observing her fire at more 
than forty to forty-five feet above the water. 
Finally, in no ship were more than one or two 
range-finders ever carried. And these were not 
protected or armoured in any way. It looks as if 
no great importance was attached to their re- 
maining in action. 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE. 
The net results of the trade war can be shown 
graphically with great simplicity. In the 
diagrams each column represents a week's cap- 
tures. The first fifty weeks of the war are 
represented. 
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