LAND AND WATER. August 14, 1915. 
scene and finisb. -i her off. A rethnsa then got into repeated since without the public being informed, 
action with a large four- funnelled cruiser at long we do not know. But two jxtints in this connec- 
range, but received no hits herself, and was not tion may be borne in miud. The affair off Heligo- 
able to see that she made any. land took place on August 28. Vp to tkis time we 
It was now 12.15. Fe'irless ».ud the first flotilla had heard nothing of German submarines, except 
lia<l already been ordered home by the Commodore, that one had attacked a cruiser squadron unsuc- 
The intervention of the battle-cruisers was very oessfully and Imd been itself sunk by H.M.S, 
i'a|)id and decisive. The four-funnelled cruiser Birmingham. In the course of the next two 
that had l>een tlie last to engage A rethusa was months we were to hear a great deal of sub- 
soon cut off and attac-ked, and within twenty niarines. Does their activity explain why no 
minutes a second cruiser crossed the Lion's path, further attempts were made to repeat the per- 
She was going full speed, probably twenty-five formance of August 28? This, of course, is just 
knots, r.nd at right angles to Lion, who was steam- conceivable. But a far more probable explanation 
iug twenty-eight. But both Lion's salvoes took is, that after losing three cruisers in these condi- 
e&o-ci, a piece of shooting which the Vice- Admiral tions the Germans managed their affairs very 
veiy rightly calls most creditable to the gunnery differently. Perhaps from this time on no Ger- 
of his ship. The change of range mu.st have l»een man craft ventured into the North Sea at all, 
900 yards a minute. I know of no parallel to this except when the ships came out in force. And 
feat, though it must be remembered that the range they did not come out in force very often, nor at 
was short. Lion's course was now taking her to- all, except at night or when the weather was clear 
wards known minefields, and the Vice- Admiral enough for the fleet's scouts, either in the form of 
very properly judged that the time had come to airships, destroyers or cruisers, to give long warn- 
withdraw. He proceeded to disj)ose of the cruiser ing of the presence of danger. The two raiding 
he first attacked — which turned out to be Koln — expeditions and Von Hipper's excursion of 
before doing so. January 28 are, of course, exceptions. 
The expedition had been a complete suc^cess. Whatever the explanation, there was no more 
Three German cruisers had been sunk and one fighting in home waters for exactly five months, 
destroyer. Three other cruisers liad been gravely ^^^ the Germans had made two expeditions in 
damaged and many of the German destroyers had force right across to the English shores. Early 
beee hit also. Our losses in men were small and i^ November a squadron of cruisers appeared 
we lost no ships at ail. Arethusa had perhaps off Yarmouth, fired at the Halcyon, let off some 
suffered most, though some of the destroyers had rounds without doing any damage on the town, 
been pretty roughly handled. But all got safely ^^^ retreated precipitately, dropping mines aa 
home, and none were so injured but that in a very ^^^^7 went. A British submarine unfortunately 
few days or weeks they were fit again for service. ^^^ ^oul of one of these and was lost with all 
.^ The affair was in every respect well conceived 'ian<is at once. Halcyon, perhaps the smallest 
and brilliantly carried out. The two essential ^°<i ^^s<^ formidable vassel that ever crept into the 
matters were to begin by employing sufficient force " ^^Vf List," engaged the enemy imperturbably 
so as not to be overwhelmed, but not so great a ^^®" ^^^Y fled, losing one man from a fragment of 
force that tlie enemy would refuse altogether to ^^^^^' though practically unhurt herself. Private 
engage. And, once the enemy's destroyers and letters speak of salvoes falling short and over in 
cruisers had been driven towards Heligoland, to ^^? "^^st disconcerting manner, and of the ship 
creep up with a more powerful squadron in readi- ^J«g so drenched with water as to be in danger 
ness to rescue the van if rescue were necessary, at '^^ foundering. But no official or detailed infor- 
any rate.to secure the final and immediate destnic- nation on this subject has been given. In Decem- 
tion of as many of the enemy's ships as possible. "^^ ^ second and much more successful raid was 
Perhaps the most interesting part of the busi- wi?\ Scarborough, the Hartlepoois, and 
ness IS to be found not in what did happen but in ■'^"^F .were bombarded by a squadron, whose 
what did not. The German Commander-in-Chief <;Omposition was not officially announced. The 
must have known long before eight o'cloc^k in the ^*^^^"^oan papers have printed letters from Ger- 
mornmg that fighting was going forward within ^% stating that the Von der Tann and MoUke, 
five-and-twenty or thirty miles of him But yprck and the Bleucher, with smaller cruisers, 
beyond sending in a few more light cruisers he P^^^^^iii^ted the force. The squadron that bom- 
. appears to have done nothing either to rescue his ^^^^ Yarmouth made off in the thick weather, 
own ships, or to attempt to cut off and sink *^, ^as obvious from the terras in which the 
ours. It IS more than probable that he suspected ^^'"'f^Ity announced the fact that the bombard- 
the trap that was indeed laid for him But ™^"^"^d taken place that it was considered quito 
the opportunity had been given of appearing in S?^^^^ *^^^ ^'^^J could not escape a second time, 
the North Sea in force, and the opportunity was Unfortunately, however, they did; but they lost 
not taken. It seamed very dear to most observers u u a.7 ^ German mine when re-entering 
alter this that the German fleet would not will °^^^^^.- . The details of the arrangements made 
mgly seek a general action, or even risk a partial anticipating them were quite properly kept 
action in the North Sea,, except under conditions ^?^- ^"^^ '^ ^^^"^^ known that a sudden fog 
-entirely of their own choosing. It seemed obvious ^^^P^^^^^^ why these, arrangements did nS 
that ,f such action was not sought in the ear?v ^"'^^^^v . 
days of the war, it certainly would not be soutrht q i^^^ 'P the case of the Yarmouth and the 
later, when the balance of naval power wouid be ,^^^,^^?"gh ^f i^s the enemy appeared at day- 
turning increasingly against them t,^^'^.*- ^^ ^ad evidently crossed the North Se» 
The engagement off Heligoland had no sue- tu^lft^^ r't^' ^ ^""T "^^'^^^ *^« ^^« °»^^ 
cessor. A second sweep some cfays afterwards wa^ wh , ^ Heligoland is a4x>ut 275 miles, a distance 
made en the same waters, but^ notW of The o f/tf^nTf ?V^' '^?' ""^^^^^'^^ ^^^^ «>^«' 
enemy was seen. Whether such sweeps have hl^n g^^J^^^'^^^ortably in thirteen or fourteen hours. 
^^ppun,em u, r.^ .^ ,.^ ,_, .^ ''' '"^"^^'^ ^^" ^^^" H^d the squadron left Heligoland an hour befor» 
34» 
