August 14, 1915. 
LAND AND JV.ATEE, 
of , them were burning, and no injuries to this 
point were reported to the English sliips at all. 
But there had been two destroyer attacks 
threatened or made by the enemy, one appar- 
ently at about twenty minutes to ten and one at 
some tinre between then and 10.40. It is possible 
that each of these attacks caused the British 
squadron to change course, and we know that be- 
fore 10.45 the stations had been altered. Each 
of these three things may have prevented some 
gain. Still, on the analogy of what had happened 
in the first two hours, we must suppose the range 
at this period to have been at most about 12,000 
yards. At six minutes to eleven the action had 
reached the rendezvous of the German submarines. 
They were fifst reported to and then seen by the 
Admiral on his starboard bow, whereupon the 
squadron was turned to port to avoid them. 
Very few minutes after this the Lion 
was disabled. What happened from this point 
is not clear. We know that as the Admiral 
stopped he signalled to Tiger, Princess Royal, 
and 'New Zealand to close on and attack 
the enemy. The Bleucher had been allotted 
to the Indomitable some twenty minutes be- 
fore. Whether the squadron stopped when the 
Lion stopped, or whether it proceeded in an un- 
successful attempt to carry out the Admiral's 
orders, is not said. The Admiralty's version of 
what followed is that the enemy were able to con- 
tinue their retreat into a region where mines and 
submarines prevented pursuit. In a preliminary 
dispatch Sir David Beatty had said the presence 
of submarines necessitated the action being broken 
off. German accounts placed the disablement of 
the Lion at a point seventy miles from Heligo- 
land. All we know for certain is that on the Lion 
stopping the command of the squadron passed to 
the Kear-Admiral in New Zealand. All that is 
authentically known of the conclusion of this 
action is as follows : 
The enemy's ships must, of course, havp been 
lost to Sir David Beatty's sight within very few 
minutes of Lion stopping. Sir David Beatty 
called the destroyer Attack alongside and trans- 
ferred his flag to her soon after half-past eleven. 
He then proceeded at full speed in pursuit of his 
squadron. It is clear at 11.45 not only the enemy 
but all Sir David's ships had been out of sight. 
Bleucher, with Indomitable attacking her, was out 
of sight also. After a chase of between forty and 
fifty minutes he found the squadron retiring 
northwards. He then hoisted his flag in Princess 
Royal and learned from her Captain that Bleucher 
had been sunk and that the enemy cruisers, con- 
siderably damaged, had continued their course 
eastward. The circinnstances in which the enemy 
were allowed to retreat have been much discussed, 
and there is nothing to add to the considerations 
that are already so well known, 
SIR DAVID BEATTY. 
Six months before war the command of the 
First Battle Cruiser Squadron had been given 
to Sir David Beatty, by very much the youngest 
in years of the Rear-Admirals. The pace of his 
promotion through the Service had been without 
■precedent in modem times. He had passed from 
sub-lieutenant to captain in a far shorter time 
than many have taken to get from midshipman 
to commander. He had been promoted for actions 
of signal gallantry in land fighting. It was a 
ground for promotion which many in the Navy 
had questioned, saying that while courage was 
an almost invaluable quality, professional know- 
ledge, which could only be obtained by experi- 
ence, was, after all, essential to command. But 
Beatty's progress silenced all criticism. He 
proved an admirable executive, an excellent and 
most hard-working captain. He spared no pains 
to master the duties that had come to him so 
young. Still, his appointment to what ia war 
would probably be the most important command 
next to the Grand Fleet created surprise. But 
he had not held it long when once more all criti- 
cism was silenced. His squadron was made up 
of the fastest and the most modern ships there 
were, the extreme embodiments of high speed and 
high-powered guns. They were commanded by 
captains whom the whole Navy regarded, each 
in his way, as exceptionally able and brilliant 
men. It was not long before the Service knew 
that the Admiral had got the confidence and. 
admiration of eveiy officer under him. 
SIR JOHN JELLICOE. 
The selection of Admiral Jellicoe to command 
the Grand Fleet required far less discrimination. 
The whole Navy, I think, had long been unani- 
mous that he must be the first choice when it came 
to war. He held the unique position of having 
been a thick-and-thin supporter of Lord Fisher 
without once antagonising a single individual 
amongst Lord Fisher's opponents. Few men had 
better combined a genius for civil administration 
with the power to command afloat. It is more than 
possible that his experience in the first helped him 
greatly in the second. For a naval officer of 
original ideas and retentive of them needs a very 
ccmsiderable gift for the diplomatic handling of 
opponents if he is to succeed at Whitehall. He 
must master not only the art of working with 
others but that of making others work for him. 
Sir John Jellicoe's periods of office as Director 
of Naval Ordnance and as Controller of the Navy 
had been quite exceptionally fruitful of results. 
If the advance of the Navy in the art of fire con- 
trol — represented by the difference between the 
4,000 yards which was considered to be an extreme 
range in 1904 to the 18,000 yards at which hitting 
began at the Dogger Bank — can be considered in 
any special way owing to any single man, then it 
is to Sir John Jellicoe that it is due. If the 
common opinion of the Navy made his selection as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy an obvious one, 
it is nevertheless true that in war neither men nor 
plans always come up to expectation. But Sir 
John Jellicoe's reputation grew with every day of 
the war, and as the weeks went, it came, to be 
known that, like Nelson, he had made the Fleet 
a " Band of Brothers." Here, too, the Board 
gained prestige by its wise and successful choice. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
The story of the naval effort to force the Dar- 
danelles is fresh in all our memories. It is un- 
necessary to go through the story in any detail. 
Suffice it to say that the enterprise was embarked 
upon in the apparent belief that a narrow channel, 
flanked by excee<lingly powerful forts, protected 
by numerous submerged torpedo tubes, and 
characterised by a current that could carry <J"ft- 
ing mines on to the bombarding fleet, could be 
rendered safe for the passage of a fleet by means 
SuppUnunt to ijkSD Ain> Watsx. Aucuit 14, IM5- 
37* 
