LAND AND 
of that fleet's ^ns alone. The theory involved a 
Lr e^^of supposiu.ns which it is almost increchb le 
fhat anvon!.'in the least famiUar with the tech- 
ninue of naval gunnery could possibly endorse. 
Kl range naval gunnery, as we have seen in a 
^lous section, cin only be effective im the 
last resort experienced observers can find the gun 
ianThv n arking the fail of the shots that miss^ 
Tl"il process can%e carried out at sea from the 
firing ship, because the target lies in an element 
utterlv different from itself, on which each falhng 
shot sends up a visible evidence of its location^ 
But no artillJrvman in his senses would dream of 
Tt empttn. to correct the fire of a long--nge gun 
on shore ?rom a position from behind the gun 
uo.if Thp nninf of imoact can only be verified by 
JV.ATER. August 14. lyio. 
A SECOND CHANGE. 
The error in tactics was so colossal and 
its results so disastrous, that the P^^^j;;" ^/Jf^ 
responsible heads of the NP.vy became untenab^^^^^ 
There was much public ^ii\cu««^«\^',,'° rl^'f 
Mr. Churchill or I^rd Fisher, «[. ^oth. were re- 
sponsible for this unhappy policy, f^^ two 
things, surely, are obvious. It was for l^rd 
Fishir to say whether any given operation was 
within the competence of the Tsavy or not. The 
thing could not have been done in face ot bis 
opposition. If any attempt had been made to 
force his hand he could have stopped the whole 
itself The point of impact . « . ,, 
an observer far nearer the target than ^the^gun 
proceedings by resignation. 
There appears in the Navy to have been a 
very general and sincere regret at Mr. C hurchill s 
an ooservei .a. ..^«.w .... ™-.„ - -, faU. His unflinching courage had endeared him 
and in a position well to the right or lei t or lue ^^ ^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ being 
hne of fire. Only one fort in the ^Dardanelles lent ^^^^^^^^J reminded of their inteUectual attain- 
itself to tliis kind of observation beddumnr^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^p^^^. ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^J. 
Here one shi}. could fire, and '^"f^er lying out ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^_^.^^ ^^^ ^^^ gallantry. 
at sea on the flank, mark the shot Ana accoru- ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ succeeded to the positions 
inglv this was the only fort that tne navai guua ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ became empty it is enough to say, and 
it is all that need be said, that no civilian and no 
seaman could make a more ideal combination for 
the circumstances as they are. For the Navy is 
at last assured of what it most wants — viz., that 
its direction will be conducted on lines of sane 
strategy and only in the light of the most expert 
professional knowledge. 
THE MEN AFLOAT. 
The Navy has come to be called in common 
parlance " The Silent Service." And, though 
subdued completely. 
Many other forts were occasionally silenced, 
but silencing a fort and destroying it are two 
different things. Each such fort was reoccupied 
as soon as the firing ceased. Indeed, it would seem 
to be a military axiom that no fort can be con- 
sidered silenced until it has been physically taken 
and its weapons destroyed. This, obviously, is a 
thing that ships cannot do, and, more important 
still the ships were perfectly powerless e^ither to 
destroy the torpedo tubes or to prevent the send- 
ing down of mines upon the fleet. For both ot ^ __ ._ 
these purposes the occupation of the banks by a there are conspicuous instances to the contrary, it 
militars^ force was essential. is in point of fact a living tradition amongst the 
Indeed, the problem has only to be stated for officers of the Navy that so long as they are doing 
it to be realised that to enable the fleet to pass their work they should be neither seen nor heard. 
up the Dardanelles requires the purely military My experience' of them, and it is a long one now, 
operations of subduing the forts and holding the is that they are supremely indifferent to lay criti- 
shores In these operations, indeed, ^he ships cisra iind ai-e inclined to resent lay praise. They 
might have lent the most useful aid. They could are pleased that the public should try to under- 
have acted as the heavy artillery of the army and stand the Navy and take a pride in the wonderful 
supplied such an artillery as no army had ever service which it does us. 
been supplied with before. The naval guns, We have seen some millions of our fellow-sub- 
directed by observers on shore, if the heights above jeots flocking to the Colours and helping'to create 
the forts could have been taken, would in all prob- the vast armies which we are extemporising out of 
ability have silenced every fort on either shore nothing. These men are ready to follow those 
of the Narrows with two days of clear weather 
A bombardment, carried on at intervals for 
a month, produced, with the exception of the fort 
at Seddul Bahr, no results at all. Late in March 
b final attempt was made to repair previous 
failures. Three ships were lost and no progress 
Was made. The effect of this sustained failure 
who have preceded them on the field of battle and 
to emulate their countless deeds of heroism. 
But a navy can neither be extemporised nor 
expanded. It does not consist of just so many 
ships which you can add to by building more. The 
Navy is an organism which would cease to 
exist if some fifteen hundred men — admirals, 
captains, commanders, and lieutenants, were 
spirited away. It is this nucleus, men of the 
Iwas to give the enemy time to prepare for the 
military force which, on March 25, the Admiralty 
announced was present in ample numbers on the highest attainments and of still higher 
^pot. It now turns out that, though present, it character and ideals, who, by their con- 
bould not be used. When, then, the attack was tinual self-sacrifice and simple devotion to duty, 
finally made on April 25 the enemy had had six have created the skill, discipline, and the lofty 
weeks in which to prepare for its reception. In spirit of those under them without which the 
February marines had been landed without oppo- Navy could not exist at all. The men between 
Bition at Cape Helles and Seddul Bahr. In forty and sixty who now bear the brunt of the 
April an attempt to repeat the landing resulted 
In a liolocaust of lives. Between April and the 
present day it has become obvious that an opera- 
tion of colossal dimensions has now to be carried 
through. The Navy had been made to attempt 
khe impossible, and it only succeeded in making 
It almost impossible for the land forces. 
anxieties and responsibilities of this war have 
fitted themselves for the great ordeal by a lifetime 
of unrewarded merit. In times of peace the 
public has been content to be ignorant that such 
public services were being done. To-day it is the 
fruits of these long, silent services that we reap. 
A. H. POLLEN. 
tmppUment to Land and W4Tb«, Aunust n, ig^j. 
38» 
