LAND AND WATER 
August 21, 1915. 
be growing. It is a confirmation of many other 
reports, all tending to the same result — viz., that 
the work of the submarines has barred the Sea 
of Marmara to Turkish trans[X)rts altogether, so 
that the Gallipoli forces have to be supplied ex- 
clusively through Bulair. If a landing in force 
can be made north of this, the double attack on 
the Turkish communication would jeopardise the 
enemy's position in the peninsula in a very 
formidable manner. But, apart altogether from 
the cutting of the isthmus, the denial of the Sea of 
Marmara to the transports must hamper supply 
at the fighting front considerably. The true moral 
of the situation is that the Germans and Turks 
have been quite unable to deal writh our sub- 
marines in a fashion at all parallel to that in 
which we have treated theirs. In the Sea of 
Marmara, at any rate, the submarine menace 
appears to be all that the scaremongers of a year 
ago predicted. 
ENGAGEMENTS IN THE 
BALTIC. 
My last week's article was, as I have 
said, written on August 7, three days, therefore, 
before the news reached us that the Germans had 
made another bid for sea communication with 
Riga. The argument I advanced, it may be 
remembered, was that, while it was clearly within 
the power of the German Navy to establish com- 
mand of the Baltic Sea, this power could only be 
exercised at the risk of losses so severe as would 
make her sea power quite useless for any other 
purpose except to command the Baltic," which 
made me doubt if the thing would be seriously 
attempted. "What has followed almost im- 
mediately seems to confirm this view. Few details 
have been published, but the following appears to 
have been the course of events. 
On August 8 a force consisting of nine battle- 
ships—shall we say the Deutschlands and Braun- 
schweig s— the first class reduced from five to four 
by the loss of the Pommernf— twelve cruisers 
— the classes of these are not specified — some mine- 
sweepers and destroyers, appeared off the Island 
of Oesel and tried to enter the Gulf of Riga by 
the Dirben Channel. This channel, nowhere very 
broad, and in places only a few hundred yards 
wide, IS normally marked by buoys. Outside of 
this channel, no ship with a draught of the 
Ueutschland and Braunschweig can proceed with- 
out the risk of grounding on innumerable shoals 
and shallows. It is a situation, therefore, par- 
ticularly adapted for the use of mines, and one 
m which those who know the waters well enough 
to be unembarrassed by the absence of guidin^r 
buoys have a distinct advantage over those un" 
familiar with them. What exactly happened is 
not cJear^ But apparently three efforts were made 
by the Germans to test the mine-field, and an 
enemy cruiser and two destroyers seem to have 
^X'^" ."?>'"'' ^°^ ^^ h^^^ been damaged. A 
Lt/Xl th "''^T ^''""^[ ^^^ '^^' '^^ Germans 
tL A ^T ^^'P^- This the Germans abso- 
Jutely deny, though they admit the loss of two 
warsH,rfi,^V.!"'"^' ?^«"^' ^^^ seaplanes and 
Gulf a?sis^H l^"^^P^■°b^Wy cruisers inside the 
sbip wirSieS. '"""^ ''^" °^- ^° «"--- 
-theTr^^SsltL' ^ '^T^' of German squadrons 
composition is not specified, but 1% prob- 
12 
ably consisted of cruisers only — attacked, one the 
Aland Islands the other once more the Dirben 
Channel. Both squadrons were driven off without 
loss to the Russians and without the Russians 
claiming the infliction of any loss. The Germans 
declare the first attack on Riga to have been a 
mere reconnaissance. Indeed, all three efforts 
seem to have been of this character. They imply 
that the most important Russian ship they 
encountered off the Alands was a cruiser of the 
Markaroff class, which was driven off. The Mar- 
karoff is little more than a protected cruiser, with 
a broadside of two 8-inch and four 6-inch guns. 
She was one of the squadron of four cruisers that 
drove the Albatross ashore in the engagement off 
Windau and sent the Roan crippled back to 
Koenigsberg. It does not appear from either 
account that anything approaching a fleet action 
was ever imminent. 
The situation is highly interesting. To enter 
the Gulf of Riga the Germans have obviously first 
to clear the channel of mines. This is not a thing 
that can be done unless they are prepared to 
defend the mine-sweepers till their work is done. 
You cannot employ ships capable of defending 
themselves against gunfire on this job, for to do so 
would be to risk their destruction. And the 
sweeping of a channel, even so narrow a channel 
as this, cannot be carried out with very great 
expedition. To attempt it, therefore, would mean 
the maintenance off the Gulf of Riga, and in 
immediate contact with tlie mine-sweepers, of a, 
force fit to fight the entire force of the Russian 
Navy — always, of course, assuming that the 
Russians are determined not to allow the Germans 
the use of Riga. 
The reader may wonder why the Russian 
Navy should have permitted these attacks, one on 
each side of the Gulf of Finland, without bring- 
ing out their whole force to prevent them. The 
nine battleships that came to the entrance of the 
Gulf of Riga on the 8th must have been a sore 
temptation. They certainly should have been no 
match for the four Dreadnoughts and two pre- 
Dreadnoughts, which presumably now form the 
main squadron of the Russian Fleet. But it is 
to be remembered that this is not only the main, 
but indeed the only battle squadron which Russia 
possesses. It is not lightly to be jeopardised. If 
the necessity should arise" we may be quite sure 
that there will be no holding back. But so long as 
the Germans confine their activities to somewhat 
costly investigations of mine-fields and to attacks 
on lighthouses and land fortifications, as at Uto, 
no niihtary results of the slightest value are being 
attained, and therefore there is no occasion, and 
indeed no excuse, for taking unnecessary risks. 
What Russia has to prevent is the establish- 
ment of sea communication between the main 
German bases and Riga. These main bases are 
Koenigsberg and Danzig. Libau, if sea communi- 
cations can be maintained with Koenigsberg, 
might be made an advance base for the army in 
tourland but it is 130 miles from Riga, an"d of 
inlmitely less value, if a northern advance is con- 
templated. It is the opening of the Gulf of Riga, 
then, and the free use of the waters south of it 
that the Russian Navy is to prevent. In discharg- 
ing this task patience is the essence of sound 
strategy. So long as the mine-fields, destroyers, 
cruisers, submarines, and aircraft can keep the 
Germans off, so long should, and indeed must, the 
Dattle fleet be kept in reserve. 
