L A N D AND AV A T E R . 
August 28, 1915. 
them along tlie Narcw and Nieracn front, upon 
the north of Russian I'oland, of great iorces that 
bhould co-operate with the armies advancing 
from Galioia to cut off all that was within the 
bend, of which Warsaw was the most advanced 
and westernmost point. 
We know what followed. The attempt to 
cut off the salient completely broke down. The 
two Russian fronts, the one stretching from lyan- 
gorod towards Kowel, the other stretching along 
the \arew and so up the Xiemen, maintained so 
easy and perfect a resistance that the evacuation 
of the salient and of Warsaw itself was effected 
in the fullest manner undisturbed, without dis- 
order, and the enemy plan was frustrated. 
But it was after this Russian strategical suc- 
cess—for it was no less— that the interest of the 
present phase developed. 
Had the enemy envisaged as his goal the 
command of the Vistula line; had he been con- 
tent to hold this line defensively and then to use 
elsewhere the troops released by his possession 
of so formidable an obstacle, his further strategy 
would have menaced that growing strength in the 
(j\'est which he must know to be ultimately his 
gravest preoccupation. It was free to the enemy 
to choose that course. Once the Vistula was his, 
in spite of his very hea\7 losses in the East already 
incurred, he might have come back west or he 
might still have turned south to use his surplus 
power for an attempted breaking of the Franco- 
iBritish containment, or for an attempted cut 
trough to his Turkish ally. 
He preferred to continue that adventure 
jipon which he was already launched and had 
already so far proceeded, and we are now, at the 
end of August, watching his continued effort to 
achieve a decision against an enemy still inferior 
Sn numbers of equipped men and munitionraent, 
although that enemy has successively eluded 
battle for now four months, and although the 
season wherein a decision can be obtained is now 
within some few weeks of its close. 
.Whether the enemy has been wise or not iji 
thus staking his very existence upon a real deci- 
sion and a tinal victory in the East it is not for 
contemporary chronicle to prophesy, or even to 
(judge. Only the future can determine. But we 
shall do well to appreciate most clearly in the 
'days immediately before us that on his success or 
failure in Poland all his scheme will depend. 
If he cannot so thoroughly defeat the Rus- 
sian armies as to bring either peace on that front 
(a thing psychologically almost impossible) or by 
B real victory to leave him free for action else- 
where with what remains of his strength, then 
he is ultimately doomed. 
Now this victory, this " decision," can only 
be obtained if he brings the Russians to battle. 
The whole meaning of the last four months 
is the refusal of a decisive action by the Russians, 
and the tenacious attempt by the Germans and by 
the Austrians to compel the Russians against 
their wills to accept a final struggle. 
The Austro- German Higher Command must 
In the next few days or weeks " compel its enemy 
lo accept battle." 
Even if it does " compel the enemy to accept 
battle," it is not certain of success. It may fail 
In the action so engaged. But if it does not even 
manage to -' compel the enemy to accept battle," 
ihen its scheme has broken do-\vn altogether. 
Let us first see what is meant by this phrase 
" compelling an enemy to accept battle." 
THE COMPELLING BY AN ADVANG- 
ING FORGE OF A RETREATING 
FORCE TO ACCEPT BATTLE. 
Generally speaking, of two forces in oppo- 
sition that one which is gravely inferior in 
numbers of equipped men or in m.unitions, or 
both, will retire before its opponent in order to 
prevent that opponent from using his superiority 
to its destruction. And, conversely, the superior 
force will advance in the effort to destroy its in- 
ferior opponent. 
Generally speaking, again, it is in the power 
of the inferior force, so long as it is still organised 
and in being, to continue such a retirement at 
will, its capacity being only limited by the spa'ce 
over which it can thus withdraw. The advan- 
tages it secures by escaping action until it shall 
be reinforced in men or munitions, or both, are 
limited only by a calculation of the men and 
material lost in such a retreat, and of the political 
effect produced by the enemy's occupation ot 
certain towns and areas thus abandoned. 
The reason that, as a general principle ot 
war, an army can thus retire securely from a 
stronger army pursuing it, lies in the fact that 
the retiring army normally uses communications 
previously intact and well maintained, while it 
leaves behind it as it falls back communications 
which it has rendered as difficult as possible by 
the destruction of roads, the tearing up of rails, 
the blowing up of bridges, the blowing in of 
tunnels, &c. 
It is exactly the same principle as that which 
boys at school use when one is chasing the other 
if they are both equally fast runners (and armies 
may normally be supposed to have much the same 
power of movement per day). The one who is 
running from the other kicks over benches on his 
way, slams to the open doors through which he 
passes, and in general leaves behind him obstacles 
more serious than he found in front of him. 
Further, in the case of one army retreating 
before the advance of another, the success of the 
retreating army is helped by the fact that any 
army desiring to fight must turn its dispositions 
from those of marching to those of deployment in 
line. That takes some time, and the time is so 
much gain for the retreat. Again, the pursuing 
army can only hurt the retreating army in action 
by a direct blow or by envelopment. But a direct 
blow means — especially under modern conditions 
— long artillery preparation, while envelopment 
means a longer operation than the retirement of 
the wings threatened with envelopment. That 
is why envelopment can never succeed unless there 
is some element of surprise present, and can 
hardly succeed unless there is also an element of 
superior mobility. 
In the particular case of this Russian retire- 
ment before the Austro- German superiority in 
numbers (and still greater superiority in muni- 
tionment), the retiring force has yet another asset 
in its favour, which is that the Higher Command 
at Berlin has pinned its faith to its enormous 
superiority in heavy artillery, particularly in that 
admirable heavy artillery in the construction of 
which the Austrians are their masters. Now of 
all kinds of armament the big gun is that which 
ties you most to slow progress. 
