August 28, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER 
indeed been the sole means on which Prussia has ever 
relied for the attainment of her ambitions. From the 
first (and in this lies his claim to be a great statesman) 
Bismarck divined that the wild ferment and democratic 
tumult of the revolutionary crisis were not fundamental. 
Under those shifting sands he felt a more rocklike 
foundation, and, feeling it, he was able to defy and 
scorn, and in the long run to scatter and overcome, the 
progressive spirit which, during the revolutionary years, 
appeared so popular and so inevitable. 
It is in this sense that he " is Prussia " and that he 
interprets Prussia. Never must we, too, while studying 
the details of the struggle which Bismarck single- 
handed carried on against the forces of freedom, over- 
look or underestimate that adamantine core of Prussian 
absolutism which, for all it appeared to be swamped by 
Jhe revolutionary tide which flowed over it, yet remained 
fhe one fixed point round which a permanent policy 
might be woven. What was reaction in another State was 
self-realisation for Prussia. Prussia, experimenting in 
Constitutional government and the application of liberal 
ideas to life, was a Prussia acting a part, a mountebank 
Prussia. Less by an act of reason than by an inward 
identity of character did Bismarck realise the grim 
antique tenacity which underlay these new-fangled doc- 
trines. The country would come through this, he thought. 
He himself had come through it. In his college days he, 
too, had cherished liberal ideas and had been cured by 
coming in contact with the strength of feudalism in Prus- 
sian life. Let him gain a few years, let him thwart this 
plot to drag Prussia, while the fever was on her, into an 
Kmpire in which she would be swallowed up, and she 
would presently be herself again and ratify his action. 
Characteristic Tactics. 
His tactics were perfectly characteristic. The refusal 
of Parliament to vote the Army Estimates brought the 
long struggle to a head in 1862, and it became evident 
that the only alternative to surrender was to carry on the 
government of the country in defiance of the Constitu- 
tion and of Parliament. Pitt had tried the same experi- 
ment, but Pitt had the country behind him. For four 
years, by disposing of the State revenues, Bismarck 
governed without a Budget. The Press was muzzled, 
liberal officials and liberal officers were persecuted and 
degraded. Distrusted by every political party, execrated 
by the mass of the middle classes, his life threatened, 
with eleven votes in the House of Representatives, and 
the King, who had prepared to abdicate, hanging on him 
for support, Bismarck, always conscious of that some- 
thing in Prussian life deeper and more permanent than 
the forces with which he was engaged, stood like a rock. 
We need not dwell on the issue. The appeal to 
the progressive instinct is by argument and reason and 
thought ; the appeal to the despotic instinct is by the 
sword. While withstanding Parliamentary attacks and 
political combinations, Bismarck was skilfully and 
swiftly arranging a more genuinely Prussian solution of 
the German problem. To vindicate the dominant posi- 
tion of Prussia in a confederation of German States it 
was before all things necessary to dispose of the rival 
claims of Austria. On the carefully prepared ground of 
the division of the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, Bis- 
marck goaded his rival into war, and its triumphant con- 
clusion not only worked a counter-revolution in his 
own favour, but resulted in the first confederation of 
North German States with Prussia and the Prussian 
despotic tradition in supreme command. 
Thus was half the allotted task accomplished. The 
(ierman Empire was forming, and forming in, for Bis- 
marck, the right way. There remained still, however, 
the need of linking-up the Southern States, and, with the 
coolness of one who thoroughly appreciated his country's 
maxim that war is but the realisation of policy, Bismarck 
proceeded to handle France with a diplomatic address 
which secured the desired war precisely at the desired 
moment. In six months it was fougiit to a finish, the 
.Southern States joined the completed federation, King 
iWilliam was crowned German Emperor at Versailles, 
and at the head of the Empire, in all military and poli- 
tical essentials, stood Prussia, the Prussian Army, and 
the Prussian Ilohenzollern dynasty. 
Thus the fateful question — was the free spirit or the 
autocratic spirit to be incorporated in the making of 
Germany ? — was answered at last, and into a Europe 
which was more and more making up its mind to be 
guided by the ideal of liberty there had entered an alien 
power which adhered to an exactly opposite principle. 
It may have been thought- — it was certainly thought by 
Bismarck — that the consolidation of the Empire implied 
the climax and limit of endeavour. A new nation had 
been born into the world which would need skilful adjust 
ment to the European situation. That would suffice. 
As years crept upon Bismarck his conviction grew that, 
like himself, who had handled it so adroitly, the 
Prussian instinct had done its work and might now retire 
from active service. 
Dreams of Conquest. 
It could not, however, do so. The new nation came 
with a new idea which was not linked to any particulai 
circumstance and would not cease to operate on the 
attainment of any particular object. Bismarck had 
identified the feeling in his own soul — the feeling that 
strength is sacred and has a right to crush opposition 
and dominate the weak — with an immediate purpose, the 
consolidation of the German States. But that end had 
not exhausted it. It had gone through that. While the 
old statesman looked at his work its spirit had already 
passed on and was animating with fresh dreams of con. 
quest the rising generation. 
So it is to this thought we are brought back, to the 
Prussian thought, so difficult for us, a free people, to 
reali.se or gauge the strength of. It is, I think, Mr. 
Trevelyan who somewhere likens Bismarck to our Straf- 
ford, and it was indeed rather in their surroundings 
than in themselves that the two men differed. Strafford 
in Prus.sia would have made a Bismarck; Bismarck in 
England would have met the fate of Strafford. The truth 
is, the Prussian instinct is not indigenous to our country, 
and therefore, as I say, is strange to us and more or less 
incomprehensible. All the more let us grasp it when it 
shows itself. From 1862 to 1870 Bismarck reveals it as 
it never was revealed before. He trusts it, he leans upon 
it, he triumphs by it. All the others, his rivals and 
opponents, the liberals of that age, clever men and full 
of ideas, are of a quite different, lighter, and flimsier 
make. They drift on the surface. They are not sus- 
tained, as he is, by the essential forces of Prussian life. 
He stands like a cliff while they go bobbing by. Not a 
voice is for him. He is alone against a host. Nevertheless 
the f)Ower he trusts to will see him through in the end. 
It is tough and hard to beat. It has come down through 
the centuries. To every word of Prussian history it has 
lent its own accent. What does it consist in ? They call 
it nowadays the " will to power," the determination to 
rule and dominate others by a superior pride and 
strength, and out of that pride and strength to evolve a 
moral code justifying their action. We know it as an 
ingredient in human nature, but circumstances had 
developed it in Prussia and made, as it were, an essence 
of it. And now this it is, this instinct for domination, 
that Bismarck will clear a way for. It shall dominate. 
Glaring Defiance. 
Once more to-day the menace is uttered, and once 
more we seem to see the fierce eyes of the old Prussian 
glaring defiance at the enemies of his country. No one, 
making the retrospect that we have attempted, will 
belittle or underestimate the power against us. We 
know its record. Three times in the last fifty years it has 
drawn the sword, each time as the result of a definite 
policy, after careful thought and preparation, and with 
an adequate object in view. Its first war gave it a State 
Federation; its second gave it an Empire; its third will 
place Europe at its feet, or, failing that, will reduce to 
fragments the most perfect instrument of tyranny that 
the world has seen. 
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