LAND AND WAir.It 
Ik.^V l-'VV ■ 
twenty other Iccally expensive actions in Eastern 
^'"^xtsav that t..e very least the enemy has «^^ 
lost-that'is. by the first day of beptember, 1915-- 
fmen killed, vroimded, prisoners, and sick. ..- 
dud n- losse^ permanent and temporary, is 
ov"erW,000 m/ght be to exaggerat^ the figure^ 
though, in strict proportion to the 6^500 000 
arrived at for the earlier date, the end of Juh , 
?bi figure is too low. But to say that the enemy 
toial losses now reach 7.000.00C would be to 
remain strictly within the truth. 
Now of such losses we can only count three- 
nuaiters'as permanent from various causes. 
AliTiOugh the enemy perpetually suffers temporary 
losses which more than make up for the return ot 
men to the front, yet of really permanent 
losses which can never return m useful time to tiie 
field we cannot now allow for the enemy even in 
the "first week of September, 1915, more than 
5,250,000 with safety. ,, ,i f Rp 
lie may have lost much more than that, ne 
has certainly not lost less. We are at any rate 
safe in calculating upon that basis. 
Let us put down that figure as the constant 
permanent enemy losses not less than 
' Let' us ne'xt see what this figure of total loss, 
5.250,000, means to his total position at this 
moment. 
III. 
THE MINIMUM REQUIRED TO MAIN- 
TAIN PRESENT ENEMY FRONTS 
AND CONSEQUENT RESERVE OF 
MAN-FOWER LEFT TO- THE ENEMY. 
The elements for determining the enemy's 
forces upon the various fronts are the reports 
sent in by the Allied commanders facing those 
fronts. They mark the nature and title of the 
units opposed to them, which they obtain through 
their Intelligence Departments. They further 
note the character of the pressure they have to 
meet, the numbers deployed in local attacks, &c. 
They thus establish, though only approximately, 
the numbers of the enemy before them in any par- 
ticular sector. 
The enemy's forces actually present upon the 
various fronts fall into four groups— the 
Western front from the Swiss mountains to the 
North Sea; the Southern front against Italy; the 
Eastern against Russia; and the South-Eastern 
against Serbia and watching the Roumanian 
boundary. 
It is important for the purposes of our cal- 
culation that we should count the least number 
with which the enemy can act upon the various 
fronts. We must in all this calculation put the 
figures as much against our own side as possible, 
for only so do we arrive at conclusions upon 
which we can be certain and which will form an 
irrefutable basis for our judgment. 
Upon the Western front the enemy has never 
had less, even at the most critical period of his 
resistance, than 1,600,000 men actually pre- 
sent upon the fighting line. He has increased 
these forces considerably since the winter, having 
found that there were very dangerous points in 
the line because it was too thin, and having run 
the risk of seeing it pierced more than once 
(though no general offensive has yet been launched 
against him) even in Iwal attacks. It is certain 
that he has increa.sed it now to no less than 
1 800 000 If we add the very considerable 
numtei^ which his foolish original Belgian policy 
of terror now compels him to keep m that country 
for a garrison, and the bodies behind tlie hr.st 
line and between that line and the Rhine, it is 
probable that there are between the Rhine and 
the Western front 2,000.000 men, but if we 
scale this figure down to 1,800,000 we can be 
absolutely certain of being within the mark 
On the Eastern front against Russia we have 
certainly more than 2,600.000 actually in the 
first fighting line. 
It may be very much more. 
It may be well over 3,000,000, and of course 
with its reserves and communications it is very 
much over that figure, but we are concerned for 
the moment only with the actual fighting line, and 
we know, I say, that that is more than 2,600,000. 
We know it from the least number of German and 
Austrian divisions that have been noticed, and the 
fact that they have been kept hitherto at full 
strength at least by perpetual reinforcement. We 
know it by the' Russian observation of the 
Austrian forces, w^hich gives 1.000,000 bayonets, 
or a total force of far over 1,500,000 men. We 
know it by the district covered and by the inten- 
sity of the effort throughout that district. 
I say that the troops in the front line, from 
the Bukovina right away to the Baltic, are cer- 
tainly more than 2,6001000, though how much 
more we cannot precisely estimate. And that, of 
course, is omitting all consideration of communi- 
cations, auxiliary services, &c. 2,600,000 and 
1,800,000 make 4,400,000. 
The Austrian forces upon the Italian front 
are also fairly well known. The Austrians have 
maintained there from the beginning of the 
Italian menace about 250,000 men. The total 
number that they have poured in during the 
three months are. of course, a great deal larger 
than that, for, like all the other fronts, this new 
front has been a steady drain upon the reserves. 
But we are only concerned with the existing front 
line for the moment, and we must not put this at 
much over six full corps, although the total en- 
gagement of Austrians now present, killed, 
wounded, prisoner, and sick, used up by that 
front since May must be more like nine corps. 
Lastly, we have the forces watching the Ser- 
bian and Roumanian borders. This is the un- 
known quantity in the problem, but also it is 
luckily Uie least important factor. We will put 
it at the lowest possible figure, so as to be within 
the mark, and count it at 160,000 — or only four 
full corps. 
Remember that all these figures are absolute 
minima. There may be more than 1,800,000 men 
west of the Rhine;" there are certainly not less. 
There may be very many more, there must be many 
more, than 2,600,000 men in the very front line 
against Russia. There are certainly not less. So 
with the quarter million between the Adriatic 
and the Trentino; so with the 160,000 upon the 
Danube-Save and Transsylvanian front. 
Adding together these minimum numbers, we 
get over 4,800,000 men. Now, it must be re- 
membered that this figure, 4,800,000, is absolutely 
the very least number necessary to the mainten- 
ance of the enemy's fronts as they are now 
developed. « 
12 
