September 11, 1915. 
LAND AND SKATER, 
RUSSIAN RAILWAYS & RETREAT 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
KOTE—ThU article b.s been subnUtted to tbe Press Bureau, which does not object to the publicatloo u censored, and taket a« 
responsibility tor the correctness of the statements. 
In accordance with tbe requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans Illustrating this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point b indicated. 
THE THREAT TO RIGA. 
TO the general absence of positive news 
during the past week up to the time 
of writing there is but one exception, 
and that is the capture of Fredrichstadt 
by German troops. That the holding of this point 
(and another some twenty miles further east) by 
the Germans is a threat to Riga is evident, and has 
been noticed throughout the Press of the Allies. 
But how that threat may develop only an inti- 
mate acquaintance with the ground and even with 
the local disposition of forces (of which we know 
nothing) could tell us. 
Meanwhile, the main elements of the position 
are clear enough. The town of Riga stands near 
the mouth of the River Dwina where that stream 
is broad and forms a harbour. It is approached 
from the south by a line of railway which is, until 
the last few miles before the town, already in 
enemy hands. Roughly parallel with that Vail- 
way runs a metalled road, also coming from the 
south. 
But the singular feature appears from the 
map that along all the valley of the river east- 
ward above Dwina for thirtj' miles and more there 
are no roads. Immediately in front of Riga for 
some miles upon either side of the single road 
approach from the south, and of the railway, there 
lies one of those huge stretches of marshy forest 
which, from the Baltic to the Dniester, are the 
characteristics of the marches of Poland upon the 
cast. -and were, until the end of the Middle Ages, 
the heathen stretch dividing the Catholic Poles 
from the Orthodox Russians. In all that country 
up-river from Riga one seeks in vain for an 
avenue of communication of any service to a 
modern army until one comes to the site of Fred- 
richstadt. There is, indeed, a single line of rail- 
way running not quite parallel with the river, but 
approaching it from the south and west, but 
below Fredrichstadt there is no reasonable means 
of approach for trains of vehicles and guns to 
the river bank. It is at Fredrichstadt and above 
this point that conditions change. A road, toler- 
able only, crosses the railwa}^ here and leads to 
the town. The town lies upon the southern or left 
bank of the stream, and, so long as it was occupied 
by the Russians, formed a " bridgehead " over the 
River Dwina — that is, it afforded to the Russians 
a secure crossing over the obstacle, and a point 
upon which they could get out upon the other side. 
This " bridgehead," the first practicable one 
at all in the neighbourhood of Riga, and not two 
days' march away, has been taken by the enemy, 
the Russian communique telling us that the cause 
of the Russian retirement to the further, or right, 
bank of the stream was the destruction of the 
bridge by the enemy's artillery. 
The elements of the position are shown upon 
the accompanying Sketch I. 
Immediately north of the river, and parallel 
NaKasdt 
to it, runs the important double line of railwajr 
connecting Riga with Vilna. 
It is an error to suggest, as has been done in 
more than one newspaper, that the cutting of thia 
line isolates Riga. That large town is still con- 
nected Avith the northern bases, depots, and 
sources of supply of Russia by yet a third railway, 
which runs up gradually diverging from the sea- 
coast towards the north-east. But it is evident 
from the German capture of Fredrichstadt, with 
their corresponding control, if not of the obstacle 
of the Dwina itself, yet of the bridgehead com- 
manding it, that the main line connecting Riga 
with the interior may be lost at any moment, 
and is, perhaps, lost at the moment of writing — • 
that is, Tuesday evening. There is even a claim 
sent in rather vague terms, and without official 
sanction from the Germans, that they already, 
control Riga. There is not at the moment of 
writing any confirmation of this. Whether Riga 
can be effectively used by the enemy without his 
control of the approaches by sea I must leave it 
to my colleague upon this paper to discuss. It 
would seem that short of such control of the sea 
the occupation of even so great a town would be 
of little strategical advantage. It would further 
seem that with control of the sea it would be of 
the greatest possible advantage, because that port 
would furnish an advance base from which the 
northern advance could continue with ease. For 
munitions could come round by water in greater 
quantities and with greater rapidity than by land. 
It must be remarked that immediately to the 
north of this railway line, which runs thus east- 
ward from Riga parallel to the Dwina, the whole 
country is a tangle of small hills and valleys and 
streams without one first-rate road. If Riga were 
the only objective, such a district could be held 
defensively with almost as much ease as the 
marshes and woods to the south of the river. But 
any considerable Russian force thus defending 
Riga from an advance by way of Fredrichstadt 
and the Dwina railway would, as it fell back, be 
more and more cooped up towards the sea-coast, 
and would run the risk of capture. 
It is all these things combined which render 
the importance of Fredrichstadt and of the 
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