LAND AND W A T E II 
September 11, 1915. 
enemy's grip upon it achieved at the end of Inst 
week of" sucli im|x>rtance in this particular 
theatre of the war. 
FURTHFR GE R.MAN OR J EG FIVE. 
What the next move of the enemy, who now 
Tnd btill possesses a t-nmplete initiative in the 
East, may he it is impossible to tell. But it is 
clear that only certain objectives for a further 
offensive are open to him, and only certain ways 
by which these can be approached. 
A very valuable summary of the position 
appeared in the Morning Post of the 7th, with the 
suggestion that the disposition of the enemy 
forces led one rather to imagine a movement to the 
north thai) to the south of the marshes. It will 
be remembered that the Russian armies, as a 
whole, held during their slow retirement of the 
last four months chains of positions which 
formed, if not continuous lines, yet a continuous 
occupation of territory right across Poland from 
the Baltic to the boundaries of Roumania upon 
the Upper Dniester River. 
Taking the successive ways of the retirement 
one by one, marking the limits of each after an 
interval of alx)ut a fortnight, we arrive at nine 
lines (for the process has now taken four months 
and a half), which are roughly those shown uf.on 
the accompanying sketch. 
PETRDGRAD 
This sketch shows the outlines of the country 
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the theatre of 
operations running from the Baltic in the north 
to the frontiers of Roumania iu the south. The 
outermost line upon the left, or west, represents 
the chain of Russian positions across Galicia, 
along the Carpathians, up the Dunajec, across 
Russian Poland, and along the frontiers of East 
Prussia, at the opening of the movement in the 
end of April. Taking the positions fortnight by 
fortnight, they are represented by the successive 
lines 1, 2, 3, &c., up to 9, which stands for the 
positions held at the time of writing, just includ- 
ing Riga in the north, but excluding Kovno, 
,Grodno, and Brest. It will be seen that all these 
four and a half months have accounted for a belt 
cf rather over two hundred miles at its widest, 
and rather less than one Imndrcd at its narrowest, 
while the length of the belt of country over which 
the operations have taken place is nearly eight 
hundred miles in a straight line. 
Now these successive ways of retirement, each 
maintaining a more or less continuous line, have 
reached, as was explained last week .".nd the week 
before, the impossible area known as the Marshes 
of Piiisk, north and south of which, if the move- 
ment is to continue, both the retreat and the 
corresponding enemy advance must clip into at 
least two main bodies. 
That there will probably be more than two, 
and why, will be seen in a moment when we come 
to consicler the railway system of Russia proper. 
But at any rate there cannot be less than two. 
Whether we regard Avhat shall follow as an 
enemy movement impelled by the Russian retire- 
ment, or as a Russian movement controlled by 
the enemy advance, it is necessary that German 
commanders should determine whether their chief 
effort shall be made to the north or to the south 
of the marshes, for these, as an obstacle, cleave 
the advance and the retreat as the pile of a bridge 
cleaves the stream of a river. 
Now ihe very valuable summary, to which I 
have just alluded as having appeared in the 
Morning Post the other day, suggests that the 
eneni}' would prefer the northern to the southern 
road for the mass of his effort. 
The reasons in favour of the southern effort 
I gave last week when I showed how an advance 
on Kiev, cutting off Roumania, ultimately 
threatening Odessa and the chief avenues of 
supply and export to and from the Black Sea, 
the better climate in winter of the .south, &c., 
would advantage the enemy's plans. 
On the other hand, the reasons of ground 
against such a movement were also given, and 
particularly the fact that a large force thus 
advancing south of the marshes would necessarily 
be cut off from reinforcements and supply from 
the still larger forces to the north. For the rail- 
way communication between the two sections is 
very poor and the road communication almost 
negligible. The suggestion above referred to, 
reinforcing this argument in favour of the 
northern rather than the southern effort, has its 
strength in the disposition of the forces engaged. 
It is pointed out that the German forces lie 
almost entirely to the north of the marshes, the 
Austrian forces mainly to the south. 
Now it is true that the Austrians have rather 
more men on the Eastern front than the Germans, 
and it is true that the Austrian siege train, which 
is altogether superior to the Germans', has been 
lent hitherto to the northern field, for no con- 
siderable permanent work lay south of the 
marshes. It is further true that there are Ger- 
man contingents in the Austrian Army south of 
the marshes, and that the Austrian contingent 
under the Archduke forms Mackensen's left wmg, 
acting upon the north of the marshes. 
Still, roughly and as a whole, the disposition 
is German on the north, Austrian on the south. 
But, without wasting ourselves upon abusive 
exaggeration, we may generally admit that both 
the direction of the operations in the East is in 
German hands and that the pi'esence of German 
troops in a majority determines the principal 
movement, and it is this somewhat political argu- 
ment w^hich makes one lean towards the concep- 
