- X- Ji -N A-» 
iX i.1 i^ 
tion of a northern rather than of a southern 
advance. 
PKOBA15I ITY OF ACTION BY 
SEPXKATE ARMIHS AND THE FUNG- 
J IN OF THE RUSSIAN RAILWAYS. 
But an examination of the railway cora- 
nunication behind the present Russian line sug- 
gests most forcibly the further conception which 
has already been mentioned m these columns that 
any continued Russian retirement and correspond- 
in" enemv advance will no longer take the form 
o£° contiiuious chains of positions, even as 
separated by the marshes, but rather of separate 
armies. 
In order to appreciate the strength of this 
argument, let us look at the accompanying Sketch 
III. A modern arm\-, as we all know, exists by 
the railway. Indeed,' it has been the difficulty of 
railway communications, as well as the difficulties 
of equipment and munitioning, that have 
restricted Russia's effort and, in part, compelled 
the Russian retreat. 
But up to the present line, which is indicated 
by dashes upon Sketch III., the line of which, 
generally speaking, was held by our Ally at the 
.end of last week, there is both a sufficient railwav 
'communication with various Russian bases and, 
generally speaking, a sufficient parallel railway 
eommunication behind the front. 
A double line from Riga to Dwinsk, through 
.Vilna, thence right on to Rowno through the 
marshes, does, though at a distance, it is true, and 
most imperfectly (compared with similar oppor- 
tunities in .Western Europe), afford an avenue 
whereby men and munitions can be moved from 
Soint to point when they are required up and 
own the line. But once suppose the enemy 
astride of the main north-eastern line from Vilna 
to Petrograd, and the consequences are clear. 
There are, then, only three great avenues of 
iupply — the great double line from Petrograd 
down to, say, in the neighbourhood of Dwinsk, 
the great central line from Moscow through 
Smolensk and Minsk, and the southern line 
through Kiev to Rowno. There is one double con- 
necting line east of the marshes through Homel; 
all the rest are single lines, if I am not mistaken. 
or were so before the war. Add to this the facl or 
the immense distances involved. Remark the 
divergence of the three main systems of railway 
ipreading out like the fingers of a hand, admit 
tne effect upon all communications of the winter, 
and it would seem inevitable that, if the retire- 
ment should continue on the Russian side and a 
corresponding advance of the enemy should pro- 
ceed, it can but be in three or more groups. 
There is, indeed, one other possible alterna- 
tive, which is that the enemy advance should halt, 
and that he should attempt to hold upon the 
defensive this enormous line. The suggestion is 
Improbable, though possible. We have seen that 
on a much better opportunity — the line of the 
Vistula — the enemy deliberately refused to take 
the defensive, and preferred to pursue his chance 
— apparently his dwindling chance — of obtaining 
a decision. 
He has followed such a plan for now six in- 
conclusive weeks. It is just six weeks ago since 
the full line of the Vistula was in his hands, and 
since he inight have halted as Napoleon might 
wisely have halted at Smolensk. But apparently 
the enemy still believes in the possibility ot a 
decision— perhaps he hopes it will come by a turn- 
ing of the Russian armies by the north their 
right in the immediate future. Whether he will 
attain such a result or no only that future can 
show but he has not vet determined to halt, and 
he shows no signs of such determination. 
RATE OF GERMAN WASTAGE. 
A REVISED AND LATE FRENCH 
ESTIMATE. 
If the threat to Riga be the most important 
particular news, the most important genera news 
Sf the week by far is a statement which ha. 
appeared, with official authority behind it, in the 
fevips of Paris with regard to the present ra.e 
of wastage in one section of the enemy s forces. 
This official statement does not tell us an\ - 
thing with regard to the rate of wastage m 
Austria-Hungary; it only concerns the German 
Empire-that is, only five-ninths of the enemy s 
effectives. But we may infer from the hgures 
ffiven for the German contingent the correspond- 
ing figures that would be found for the Austrians 
were they available. 
This rate of wastage is set as being now 
300,000 a month. That is the figure which with 
advantages for information at their disposal such 
as no other authorities among the Allies can equal, 
the French War Office finds as the rate of wastage 
in Germany at the present moment. 
At first sight it would seem as though this 
estimate were higher than that formed for the 
fighting of the earlier part of the year. But it 
^11 be remembered that for the first five months 
a loss of 260,000 per month was the estimate 
formed by the same authorities, and every piece 
of evidence available since that date has confirmed 
the French official figure. This estimate of 260,000 
a month referred to total or permanent losses. 
A figure of 300,000 a month for drafts to repair 
wastage does not seem to indicate an increase in 
the rate of loss, but, if anything, a very slight 
decline, for these drafts to replace losses include, 
it may be presumed, temporary cases returning to 
service and certainly include men who are sent 
forward to replace losses only temporary at the 
front. 
We may take it, then, if the French official 
estimates are to be relied on, that the rate of 
wastage continues steadily at the average it 
reached some months ago. It is a rate which coin- 
cides with the total losses arrived at upon every 
other line of examination independent of the 
information available to the French authorities. 
It is loss at the rate of rather more than three 
millions a year. 
This exceedingly important official pro- 
nouncement leads me to return to the calculations 
which I put forward in these columns last week, 
and I will, with the reader's leave, deal with cer- 
tain criticisms I have received upon them, for 
work of this kind is valueless unless one knows 
the sources upon which it is based, and submits it 
to the most thorough examination. I will deal 
with the principal criticisms I have received in 
what seems to me to be the order of their 
importance. 
