LAND AND .WATER 
September 11, 1915. 
tear. In spite therefore, of the fact that Ger- 
many has proclaimed her own perfidy, tliat her 
conduct of war has been barbarous and in- 
human, it remained that the American Govern- 
ment kept up the forms of diplomatic friendship. 
And so long as Germany's offences against " fair- 
ness, justic-e, rea.son, and humanity ' were limited 
to the cruelties and outrages that she committed 
on land, there seemed to be no rea.son why the 
American attitude should ever change. 
But with the proclamation of the submarine 
blockade of these islands it became obvious that 
in a very small degree Americans would suffer 
with their fellow-Cliri.stians in Europe, though, 
of course, only in a very small degree. The terms 
of the February Note n>ade it er^ually clear that 
Americans would not remain either .silent or 
merely passive sufferers. When, thei'efore, the 
eea outrages began, and, in due course, Americans 
were threatened with, or sent to, death, protests, 
(ending with the unveiled threat of active resent- 
ment, followed. The situation from ^lay to July 
vras, therefore, that unless Germany abandoned 
the campaign as she was carrying it on, the bel- 
ligerency of America was inevitable. 
A M.4TTER OF TEMPERAMENT. 
And it seemed equally inevitable that Ger- 
many would find it impossible to abandon the 
campaign. For, as I have frequently pointed out 
in these pages, the genesis of the submarine 
blockade is to be found in the total failure of the 
German Fleet either to diminish the strength of 
the British .sea forces, or to protect German trade, 
or materially to damage ours. The German 
people, therefore, were brought face to face with 
the fact that the German Xavy — that had cost 
them such enormous sacrifices in money, the 
existence and power of which seemed to be the 
only justification of the final challenge to Great 
Britain — was made to appear not only a useless 
and unprofitable investment, because in the stress 
of war it possessed no military value, but from 
beginning to end the outcome of a fatal error in 
policy, because its existence made it inevitable for 
England to take up arms against Germany when 
the day of trial came. Unless, then, the whole 
high seas policy of the German Emperor and the 
Btatesmen was to be shown up as the merest folly, 
something had to be done to retrieve the situation. 
It was at this moment that von Tirpitz 
promised that the submarines should bring Great 
Britain to her knees. Neither he nor any 
failor could have expected it to succeed in its pro- 
fessed object. But it did succeed in its real 
object. The murders of the Lusitania were 
received with wild rejoicings by the strange 
people that inhabit Germany. And I have never 
thought that Germany could abandon this policy, 
because to do so was not only to admit that it was 
in a military sense a failure and in a moral sense 
a crime, but because .surrender must recreate, in a 
worse and emphasi.sed form, the situation to mask 
which the campaign was invented. It would be 
an admission of a double failure. Even if war 
with America were the alternative, so great a 
climb down seemed impossible. 
THE NEW SITUATION. 
But during the last few weeks the position 
Ms materially changed. It has become obvious 
mat it is impossible for Germany to terminate 
the war by obtaining a military decision. The 
benefits Germany derived from ber better pre- 
paration have, it is true, for a limited period 
made her invincible by the Allies. But they have 
not sufliced to give her the power of conquering 
either all or any one of the Allies on land. 
In a war which is b<5und to be prolonged, 
time fights on the side of the combination that 
has the greatest ultimate resources. It is the 
Sea Power of Great Britain that has secured to 
the Allies the time nece.s.sary for converting these 
resources into instruments of war. For some 
weeks, then, Germany has realised that the one 
and only business before her now is to play for the 
best peace she can get. At its best, peace will put 
it out of her power for at least some generations 
to recreate the machine which originally inspired, 
and was ultimately to make effective, her 
militaristic religion. In other words, Germany 
now perceives that in its ultimate essence the 
war has been a fight between an invincible army 
on the one side and an invincible Navy on the 
other, and that it is the invincible NaAy that 
must win. This is the fundamental idea behind 
the German Chancellor's recent speech in the 
Reichstag. It is for this rea.son that he puts 
in the forefront of Gennany's programme 
that the destruction of British " navalism " 
is from henceforth the cardinal point of German 
policy. 
Where, in seeking this object, is any help to 
be sought outside of Germany? Even to German 
intelligence, any hope of inspiring distrust be- 
tween the Allies must novv seem chimerical. But 
President Wilson has given ?. warm welcome to 
those aspirations for the " freedom of the sea ' 
which sound so strangely when uttered by 
German tongues. If it is a choice between a 
domestic admission of failure on the one hand and 
finally antagonising the only Power that, after 
the war is over, may prove a makcAveight again.st 
the sea might of England, Germany will prob- 
ably elect for the former. It is, after all, the 
lesser evil of the two, even if there were not other 
and substantial reasons for desisting from a 
course which hitherto has brought no military 
advantage. But, as we now know from Mr. Bal- 
four's letter, there are very substantial other 
reasons. And what Mr. Balfour has told us of the 
losses of German submarines, Mr. Palmer in an 
interesting account of a visit to the Grand Fleet is 
now allowed to confirm. And the French states- 
men who were of the party add their testimony to 
it. It need no longer be doubted that Germany 
has lost submarines faster than she can build 
them. The campaign may then have to be 
given up simply because it cannot continue, and 
for what it is worth a virtue may be made of 
necessity. 
Short, then, of one of those acts of incredible 
folly of which German statesmen may at any 
moment be guilty, the expectation is that the 
case of the Hesperian will not be allowed to inter- 
fere with the course of the diplomacy initiated on 
August 27. With the surrender to America 
there will be undoubtedly a stronger effort than 
ever to make peace. The fundamental purpose 
of this effort will be to hamstring the sea power 
of this country. It is to this that all the talk of 
" freedom of the seas " is directed — a subject I 
will discuss on a future occasion. 
A. H. POLLEN. 
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