September 25, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
the retirement of the main body of troops from 
the extreme of the salient. 
Two days later, upon Wednesday, the 15th, 
it was apparent that an altogether novel menace 
was developing towards the north. Great masses 
of Austro- German eavalrv were pouring over the 
region of Svenziany and' Widzy. Their rate of 
advance was so rapid that it was already apparent 
from the communiques, though nothing had been 
said as yet of the presence of this new feature, 
that the troops must be mounted troops. The 
Russians have since estimated their numbers at 
about 40.000 sabres, accompanied by 140 guns 
They swarmed all over this district on the 
Wednesday; occupied Widzy on the Thursday, the 
16th, and came on Friday last to Vileika. The 
local effect and character of this great cavalry 
raid from the north will be discussed in a moment. 
That it was possible at all was due to the fact 
that the separation of the Russian armies into 
three groups is already accomplished, and that 
while the troops defending Dvinsk and Riga will 
in future depend on the main line to the capital 
the central armies from Vilna to the marshes will 
tall back on Minsk, and its main central railway 
trom Moscow. The third group is that to the south 
ot the marshes, and depends on the main Rowno- 
Kiev line and on the Tarnopol-Odessa line It 
was through the gap between the first and second 
'&GA 
III 
TSUoscoy^ 
ilimeiuec 
group in the south of Dvinsk, that the cavalry; 
raid of last Wednesday, the 15th, poured. 
Meanwhile, the other horn of the enveloping 
crescent had got east of Orany, and had crossed 
the railway somewhere about' C, in Sketch II., 
thirty odd miles south-east of Vilna. 
The Vilia line had been forced both above 
and below the town of Vilna ; the enemy marching 
rapidly from Skidel had reached, and was being 
held upon, the line of the little River Lebeida, not 
much more than a day's march in front of Lida, 
and had reached, though not yet crossed, the line 
of the River Schara, to the south. 
On Friday, the 17th, while, as we may pre- 
sume, the retreat southwards and eastwards from 
Vilna was in full swing, the fords of the River 
Vilia between the station of Podbrozie and the 
town of Vilna were all of them crossed by the 
enemy, fighting was still proceeding along the 
Lebeida. But the enemy had got a bridge acros.i 
the Schara just south of Slonim, much at the 
point marked D. 
On the evening of that day, then, Friday, 
the 17th, we must regard the German posts aa 
occupying something like the line of crosses on 
Sketch II., the irregularity of the line being due 
to the fact that everywhere violent fighting was 
going on. We must be careful to remember that 
the forces which had made the salient so very 
acute by their rapid advance on the north were 
cavalry. And all that part of the line of crosses 
indicated on Sketch II. by a double set of crosses 
was for the most part composed of that fluctuat- 
ing arm. If the Germans had been able, by some 
miracle, to put upon the double line of crosses to 
the north full bodies of troops composed of the 
due proportion of all arms, and in numbers equal 
to those present upon the rest of the salient, the 
thing would have been done — the Russians within 
the pocket would have been doomed. For, as is 
apparent from Sketch III., Minsk is the only 
direction for the retreat, and the railway to 
Minsk would have been permanently interrupted, 
and forty-eight hours later the road"as well. But, 
of course, this very rapid advance on the north was 
only possible because it was undertaken by horse, 
and the limitations of that kind of operation are 
well known. A great cavalry raid, finding an open 
gap in which to work, can cut communications and 
can play the devil with the district through which 
it passes, but it cannot solidly establish itself, and 
it is subject to retirements as rapid as its advance. 
It cannot attack and defeat great bodies of in- 
fantry in its neighbourhood; and these great 
forces of cavalry, though forcing suddenly so 
bold a dent into the salient of Vilna, did"^ not 
menace the retreat in the fashion that it would 
have been menaced had troops of all arms been 
present in the same positions. What it did do was 
to threaten, for two days, in a degree which is still 
somewhat obscure, the railway from Vilna to 
Minsk. 
Now, I repeat, it is on Minsk — or, rather, 
on the region of Minsk — that tjie retirement of 
the Russian troops from the salient of Vilna 
must take place. If the reader will turn 
to Sketch III. he will, as T have said before, 
see why. All tlie central group of Russian 
armies must fall back upon, and be dependent on. 
the great main line from Moscow and Cenlral 
Russia to Minsk. They have no other avenue of 
supply upon which to retire. The great eavalrv 
