LAND AND WATER 
October 2, 1915. 
tense cannonade of three days was tollcwcd by five. 
jitti!'>k!>-of«.- IxmOpo Vpros, one noith i i Luis, one 
bciwct-i) Lt-ns .iri'l Anas, one north of ISt. Die, at 
tlio Bail ik Sapt, and a fifth, by far the hirgest, all 
luioss that oj)i)i C'lianijiagne countiy which 
i^i i>li h.-s from lvh< iiris t<» the Argonne. The main 
l)!i.w hi iv was diliveiod upon a front of a little 
iimler twenty miles in length — to be accurate, 28 
hilnmelre.--', r,r lyij ii.iles, from the village of 
AMherivc on the west to the little town of \ ille- 
snr-Tourbe on the cast. It is this front to which 
We will h.'ve to pay special attention in the 
development « that follow. 
The great offensive began, so far as infantry 
adv;ii.ce is concerned, with the early moining of 
last Saturday, the 25th. It OMitinued throughout 
that day and on into the Sunday. By the evening 
of that .second day it had established itself every- 
where in front of the .setwid line of the enemy's 
tie fence, save on the e.xtrerae ends in the ^'osges 
and before Ypres. The British to the north and 
Kouth of Lens, the French just to the south of 
them, north of Arras, the great main blow in the 
Champagne between Auberive and Ville-sur- 
Tourbe, all did the work they set out to do; swept 
over the battered trenches of the first line, and 
found themselves at the end of their effort in front 
of the second. 
With a few inconclusive reactions, l<jcal 
counter-offensives that did not develoj) seiiouslv, 
that is the story of the two dajs. Kather more 
than 20,000 unAvounded prisoners were taken, and, 
what is always the mark of really breaking a 
defensive organisation, even of the first line only, 
there was a considerable capture of field-pieces-^ 
thirty-three in this first part of the advance alone. 
Before proceeding to examine the ground and 
the nature of the movements in detail, Ave shall do 
well to grasp Avhat is being attem])ted, and hoAV 
that attempt should be folloA\'ed. 
What is being attempted is, of course, no less 
than a decision. What is hoped for at the very 
best is the breaking through of the enemy's defeii- 
sive as a whole— the separation of his armies. 
Falling that (Avhich, as it is the summit of 
what can he hoped for, is also what should be least 
expected), the attemjjt envisages the starting of a 
retirement, " the shifting of the enemy's defen- 
sive," which retirement, once begun, would be kept 
gomg indefinitely by a vigorous pursuit and by 
perpetual superior attacks at selected plac«s 
creating salients of the enemv's line and o-iving 
opportunities in envelopment. Failing that a 
third result, less decisive, again, but momentous 
under the particnlar conditions of the Western 
«'«/•, IS the goal of the offensive. It is the compel- 
Img of the enemy to modify his whole front; the 
forcing of Inm to fall back from the lines he has 
field and fortified for over a year to other lines 
behind, and in the process to lose men and 
•naterial, to be shaken in moral, to know hi)nself 
6nlMe<t immediately to renewed attack, to look 
at the whoic war henceforward from another 
standpoint t I.i n that of the past twelve months, 
t^) he in peril for his vitals, which, in the West 
lies close behind his lines. '^v>e.i, 
efie^^^fr.^'V^''' ^'"^"^ .superimj^osevl victorious 
tl„ i ; ^''^^ f;'-'^ ollens.ve connotes, and even 
1* ?, " "*'^ Western campaign, he amnlv 
the g.eat offensive would be seen in the con- 
tinned presence, after the effort had ceased, of 
the enemy in or A-ery near to his old lines. The 
event is, of its nature, one that Avill not be dcter- 
niined for many days. No one can say Avhile it is 
developing whether it is approaching or receding 
from success, for it is not mere occupation of 
ground, nor even cai)tures of men and guns, that 
tell us this any more than it is mere bloAvs or 
black eyes that tell us Avho is Avinning in a 
boxing match. In so Aast a movement success, 
if it comes at all, appears at some critical 
moment towards the end of a someAvhat pro- 
longed and jierhaps even struggle. It is not a 
matter of successive steps that can be each de- 
finitely peiveived and folloAA'ed by the observer; 
that stage comes only after the initial success of 
such an operation and during the retreat that 
follows. 
Now in grasping the character of this ]iar- 
ticular great offensiA^e in the West, the A'ery first 
thing we have to guard ourselves against is an 
analogy Avith the corresponding Austro-German 
o{>eration upon the Dunajec last April and May. 
To use a metaphor, the task of the Austro- 
Germans on the Dunajec last May may be com- 
pared to the task of pushing Imck some obstacle, 
such as a statue Avhich blocks an entry. The task 
before the Allies in the West may be rather com- 
jiared to tlie fighting back of a living man A\^ho 
blocked the entry. And the reason for this con- 
trast, the truth that makes the metaphor fairly 
accurate, is this : That on the Dunajec the Rus- 
sians Avere known to l>e lacking in equi])ment and 
munitionment. They could not reply effectively 
to the first distant jittack. All the work before 
actual infantry contact Avas a foregone con- 
clusion. The Austro-Germans Avent into that 
fight Avith a Higher Command that Avas able 
to say to itself : " Here I have in front 
of me an enemy Avho can hardly touch my big 
guns — an enemy Avhom I can pound at will Avith- 
out any interference initil it comes to the rifle 
Avoi-k from the trendies. Even there liis munition- 
ment and equipment is so inferior to mine that 
this last ' shove ' Avill almost certainly succeed, 
and if it does succeed he Avill not for some time 
after be able to clieck me.. Indeed. I have a good 
c hance of breaking right through him, because he 
has not an artillerA^ capable of matching: mine at 
all." ' * 
If the Austro-German bkm on the Dunajec 
had failed, it Avould have failed because the very 
last stage of the operation— the close Avork Avith 
the rifle, and even Avith the bayonet— would have 
been more than the Austro-German masses could 
stand. There comes in the metaphor of the moving 
of a statue or any other such obstacle. Nothing 
stops you in your rush at it, and if you fail it 
will only be because, Avhen you Avere once in con- 
tact, A'ou find the task beyond you. 
But the offensive in "the West is undertaken 
against an enemy aaIio. though locallv inferior in 
numbers and up,>n the whole locally inferior in 
heavy guns, has ample munitionment. can add to 
these from great n.-seivcs at home, and meets that 
heavy artillery Avork wiiich is the necessarv pre- 
paration ior a modern attack by re])lv of the 
same kind. All lliat such an offensive can hope to 
do IS, by some superiority in tlistant bombard- 
ment, and by a considerable su])erioritv in 
nuinbers during the actual attack, to take through 
a depth ot two or three or four or even five 
tliousand yards, a section of the defence, then to 
consolidate what he has taken, to withstand a 
