October 2, 1915. 
1 A N D A N D W A T E R 
no credit on those who carried it out. The fuller 
knowledge we now possess throws a very different 
light upon these proceedings. It appears to have 
been an operation as full of risk as the hardiest 
could desir^ and as intricate and difficult an 
operation as can be imagined. . 
The Koenigsberg was built about ten years 
ago, displaced 3,400 tons, and was designed for 
a speed of about 23 knots. She carried ten 4.1 
guns, three on each side, and two forward and 
'W " 
^al^f^UOi, 
Mouihs of the Rufigi River. 
two aft, giving a broadside of five. She was 
manned by a crew of about 300. Her length was 
between 350 and 360 feet, her l)eam 44 feet, and 
her sides showed about 12 to 14 feet above the 
water line. She drew Vl\ feet. These points 
are of importance. 
At the beginning of the war she was known 
to be in the neighbourhood of Dar-es-Salaam. On 
August 6 she sank the Citii of Winchester off the 
Island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea. 
Six weeks later she sank the Pegasus off the 
Island of Zanzibar, catching that unfortunate 
ship when she was repairing boilers and practic- 
ally helpless. Shortly afterwards, early in 
October, she took refuge up one of the innumer- • 
able mouths of the Rufigi River. Why did not 
the Koenigsberg attempt a ravaging campaign 
upon the trade routes as did the Kmdeni From 
Zanzibar to Colombo is, roughly, 2,500 miles; 
her nominal radius Of action was more than 
double this. Perhaps her exploit in sinking the 
Pegasus made her the focus of the attentrons of 
several British crui.sers. Be this as it may, she 
sought the safety of the river, and it became our 
business to prevent her escape, and, if possible, 
to secure her destruction. 
The Rufigi River, as will be seen from the 
enclosed sketch map, has several mouths. Omit- 
ting the most southerly, and beginning with the 
Msala, there are in succession the Kiomboni, 
seven miles to the north, the Simba Uranga, four 
miles further on to the north-west, and the 
Kikunya, a further four miles on. Of these, the 
charts give the soundings of the last three only, 
and it would appear from these that a ship draw- 
ing 17 feet, even if lightened as nuich as possible, 
wdulil not be able to get very far except at spring 
*'Jes. But if full advantage had been taken of 
the November tides the Koenigsberg might have 
been towed such a distance up stream that there 
would be no possible chance of her being engaged, 
at any reasonable range, by any ship of her own 
draught, and, therefore, power. Once hidden; 
away in this labyrinth of streams and islands, it ,, 
must have appeared to the Germans that she 
would be open to attack only by a force coming 
overland, with guns of sufficient weight to destroy 
the ship, or by boats furnished with torpedoes 
and dropping gear. The first was only a remote 
possibility so long as no determined efi'ort had 
been made to conquer German South-East Africa. 
As to the second, very moderate protective 
measures on the. banks, the construction of a, 
boom, and the mining of the main channel, woUld 
have afforded complete protection. The Germans, 
then, probably thought that the ship was safe;: ^ 
But in so thinking they reckoned without the fear • 
of ships armed with heavier guns than, the "• 
Koenigsberg, but drawing only one-third as much '■ • 
water, to whom there might be a wide choice pi 
entrances. The river monitors, purchased in the 
early days of the war from Brazil, to join in the 
attack on the . Belgian coast, were exactly the j\'- 
craft for the situation. They were accordingly ■ 
taken out to Mafia Island, and, after a month's 
special preparation — which, we may take it, in^' ' ■ 
eluded special means of protecting lx)th the ships • 
and the crevi' from shell-fire— ^and thorough prac- ■ 
tice in indirect firing with aeroplane spotting, all 
was ready for the first attack. . 
And here we come to the discrepancies ' 
between the Admiralty story and that recently 
published in the Tivies, The '' Admiralty dates 
the first attack on Sunday, July 4. The writer 
of the letter dates it July 6. The Admiralty ' 
story leaves the Koenigsberg, at the end of ithe 
first day's bombardment, powerless for reply, 
and, if not wrecked, at least incapacitated. The 
more detailed account shows the Koenigsberg vq- 
ceiving first one and then the other monitor on 
the 11th with rapid salvoes of four guns at a 
time, and salvoes that were as accurate as they 
were frequent.- The discrepancy in dates i* a 
trivial matter. What is the explantvtion of the 
Commander-in-Chief's estimate of what hap- 
pened on tiie first day's fighting being so entirely 
at fault? 
The Admiralty announcement was published 
on July 15, and one guesses the acbount of the 
proceedings of the first day was sent immediately 
after the monitors returned. Now these ships 
had had a prodigious doing. They had. gone 
under v.-ay at 4.30 in the morning and were not 
out of action till 4.30 in the afternoon. They 
were practically under fire f I'bm the moment that 
they got within range at the mouth of the river 
until they were over the bar on their return. They 
had themselves been firing certainly for over six, 
and probably eight, hours. They made sure that 
five nits had been made on the Koenigsberg. 
Some observers believed they saw her on fire. 
This must have been a mistake. It illustrates 
the difficulty of judging tlie efii'ects of shells. Ah 
interesting sentence in the fuller ac6ount seems • 
to give the clue to it. 
In describing the final operations of the 
lltli, the writer — an officer on board i\\Q Serern — 
tells us that shortly after tlie aeroplane had gf)t 
them the range so exactly tl>at salvo after salvo 
hitting, the. aeroplane was hit and '&x-mc-> 
was 
lowiv. As the Ser-ern now had the range, ?;ho 
ii 
