LAND AND WATER 
October 2, 1915. 
could oontinue Hring a salvo a minute, and, in a 
verv short time, explcision after explosion sho\ved 
tlie destruction that was l)eing effected. In lialf 
an hour the Koeuifffiberg ceased altogether to 
reply. A second aeroplane now replaced the 
first, and the Meisci/ took up the shooting— 
apparently from another station — thus giving the 
Secern a rest. The writer says : "We had done 
all the firing which had destroyed her. The 
Mei-seij only started afterwards. That was part 
of the plan. Only one ship was to fire at a time." 
On the first day eight hours' continuous 
firing had left the Koenigsberg — in spite of some 
1, its— so undamaged that, four days afterwards, 
she was engaging the monitors as rapidly and as 
accurately as" if nothing had happened. If she 
had lost a gun on the previous Tuesday she had 
moved atiother across from the other broadside 
to take its jilace. The ship itself must have been 
completely undamaged. The accuracy of her 
fire makes it obvious that she could have had no 
list. Yet on the second day, the Severn, firing 
alone, reduced her to silence and to a burning 
wreck in half an hour. It was precisely because 
the Secern was firing alone that the thing was 
done. 
Some months ago, in discussing the problem 
of how the battleships at the Dardanelles could 
engage the forts, I pointed out, amongst other 
great difficulties, the intricacy of the problem in- 
volved in correcting the fire of several ships 
simultaneously engaging the same target. For 
practical purposes the tiling is altogether impos- 
sible, unless there is a separate observer for each 
battery or ship, and nearly impossible unless 
there is some method by which each observer can 
identify the shots of his own battery and employs 
some means of communication that reaches that 
battery only. If the two monitors were engaging 
the Koenigsberg simultaneously there is nothing 
at all surprising if the spotting broke down 
altogether. To begin with, the river in which 
she was moored — or more probably fast aground 
— could not have been more than 500 yards or so 
across. The whole of the surrounding country 
is mangrove swamp, jungle, and forest. It 
would, therefore, be almost impossible for the 
aeroplane to see the fall of any shells except 
those that fell in the water — i.e., that came quite 
close to the target. The aeroplane presumably 
would signal the fall of each shot the moment 
it was seen. But it would not be able to distin- 
guish between the Severn shots and the Mersey 
shots, and the monitors would not be able to guess 
which of them was to act on any particular 
correction. 
It looks, from the story, that the Koenigs- 
berg must have been unlucky in not making more 
hits npon the monitors. One shell, it is true, was 
landed in the Mersey on the 6th; but on the 11th 
salvo after salvo fell all round the Severn without 
hitting. Some shells burst in striking the water, 
and sent showers of fragments on board. What is 
the explanation of shooting apparently as accurate 
as ours not nieetiiig with an equal success? 
The accuracy was due to the excellence of the 
ariaiigements for correcting her fire. The river 
reaches not within sight of the Koenigsberg itself 
were commanded by neighbouring hills, and 
observers on these could spot far more exactly 
than our observers in the aeroplane. The situa- 
tion being what it was, the Komigsbcrg's firing 
ought to have been— as, indeed, it proved to be- 
exceedingly good. That she did not hit was partly 
luck, partly due to the fact that a river monitor 
is a far smaller mark than a cruiser. Just as they 
draw only a few feet of water, so their freeboard 
is exceedingly low. The details of their measure- 
ments are not published, but it is unlikely that 
their length was within 100 feet of the Koenigs- 
berg s, or the height of their sides within a quarter 
of what the Koenigsberg's would be, even when 
fully loaded and at sea. But if the Koenigsberg 
was aground, she may have been showing 30 to 
50 per cent, more of her sides than she would do 
at sea. As a target, therefore, she may have been 
anything from four to five times as big as either 
of the monitors. 
It is impossible to leave this episode, so credit- 
able to all concerned, without asking for the name 
of the unidentified hero who was acting as observer 
in the first of the two aeroplanes that directed the 
firing on the 11th. Having signalled " We are 
hit ; send boat," he continued, while the pilot was 
heading his machine for the water, watching the 
firing and signalling the position of each round 
exactly as if nothing had occurred. For all he 
knew, he might have been within a minute or two 
of eternity. It was a splendid — though far from 
unique — piece of nerve. Is it possible to suggest 
to the Admiralty that the public would be very 
grateful if the dispatches relating to these two 
engagements could be published ? 
THE SUBMARINE WAR. 
Our last diagram showing the results of the 
submarine campaign was printed in the issue of 
August 28. That diagram showed that thirty- 
four British ships had been destroyed in thirty- 
seven days. One has to be added now for the date 
of August 20, making thirty-five, or a total less 
than one a day. In the same period thirty-three 
neutral ships and eight Allied ships were 
destroyed also. Our diagram to-day is from 
August 21 to September 24 inclusive, a period of 
thirty-five days, in which thirty British ships, five 
Allied, and thirteen neutrals have been sunk. The 
average of British ships still remains below one a 
day, which has been the rate since the middle of 
June. From the beginning of the submarine cam- 
paign, 184 British ships have been sunk — a little 
more than three every four days, ninety-four 
neutrals, and forty-four Allied. The Admiralty 
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