LAND AND WATER 
October 9, 1915. 
and an estimate of its own total losses actually 
less than the number of uuwounded prisoners in 
the hands of the Allies ! 
But all these things are frills. It would not 
matter in the least to the real militiiry situation 
if either of the opposin" Governments had pub- 
lished mere falsehoods. What really counts is the 
position which the conunander upon either side 
nas to face. 
Koughly speaking, it would seem that this 
position is as follows : 
The enemy took it for granted that his first 
Jine defence could not fall into the hands of the 
Allies. The proof that he took it for granted lies 
in this, that he held on to it with a force in men 
and in guns (and suffei'ed consequently a loss in 
men and in guns) which would never have been 
iised. and which would not have involved such a 
iloss, had he l»een i)repared for a retirement upon 
'his second or third lines. To say that he suffered 
surprise is not accurate, but to say that he guessed 
•ill both as to the exact moment of the attack and 
as to his own powers of resistance is accurate. He 
nuist have known that where a special concentra- 
tion of artillery fire lasting uiiintermittently for 
three days had taken place, there an attack was 
being prepared. What apparently he mi.sjudged 
was the exact moment when that fire would cease 
and the infantry would move and his remaining 
ability to bear such a sti-ain. The proof that he 
misjudged time is to be discovered in the counter- 
attack launched by the Crown Prince on the other 
hide of the Argonne. It is evident that this big 
move upon the part of the Crown Prince's forces 
was prepared and held in readine-ss as against the 
Mipposed moment when the French would strike. 
The fact that the German counter-move only got 
under way forty hours after the first French blows 
were delivered is irrefutable evidence that the 
enemy miscalculated his time. The fact that he 
misjudged strain is proved by the loss of one un- 
Mounded man a yard, and six guns a kilometre. 
The Allied success, therefore, in grasping the 
German first position, putting out of action in two 
days 7 per cent, of the enemy's whole forces upon 
the Western line, and capturing 150 field pieces 
and some 25.000 unwounded prisoners, was due 
to the enemy's miscalculation. He miscalculated 
his power of resistance and he miscp.lculated the 
extent of the movement and the rapidity of our 
own concentrations. But the interest of the 
moment lies in this : that the enemy did not make 
a nuscalculation which he may later correct. Ho 
miscalculated because the elements of calculation 
have generally been taken from him and remain 
absent. 
For if we look a little deeper into the matter 
We shall sec that these miscalculations were not an 
exceptional thing which better judgment next 
.me may correct, but were the product of some- 
hi g essential to the whole situation of the war 
thnMhrT'f ' ''h'?^ something essential is this : 
tnat the ^\ estern Allies can now concentrate more 
men, more rapidly, and (on account of their 
Buperionty in the air) more secretly, and accumu- 
late more munitions for the service of more heavy 
If this war were being fought upon one front 
n!'i •.?!r"'^?7 ^''^ ^'^"^tria were only con- 
■ned with the Western Alliance, thev would still 
- - very grave superiority' in "men p ob 
alone, 
rei 
have a 
ably su:ne superiority in inunitionraent, and a 
superiority in heavy pieces; but the war is being 
fought upon two fronts, and the enemy has 
chosen to si^end his cncrcjics thioxttjhout this 
summer, when those energies were at a maximum, 
which can never he reichei again, in attempting 
to find a decision in. the East. 
This is the capital mark of the whole situa- 
tion. It has given to the Western Allies time to 
establish a sui>eriority in all the essentials of 
modern war, and it is probable that the enemy has 
so engaged himself in the East as to make a 
retrievement of this iK)sition impossible to him in 
the West. 
The study of war, like every other study, must 
be approached both in its largest lines and in 
detail by those who would master it. When in 
any science we are taking the largest outlines 
detailed criticism occurs at once to the reader, ii^o 
it is here. This very broad statement would at 
once suggest to an3one who intelligently follows 
the communiques upon the map and compares the 
omissions and claims of the two parties in the 
West during the last fortnight, innumerable ex- 
ceptions and modifications — e.g., that the rauni- 
tionraent of the enemy is still heavily superior on 
the Eastern front to that of the Russians; that the 
enemy would appear within the last few days to 
have obtained the services of a new and most valu- 
able ally; that the superior munitionnient in the 
West is not as numerically overwhehning as was 
that of the Austro-Germans over the Russians in 
Galicia when they effected in four days upon the 
Dunajec the full work which the Allies in the 
West have only recently begun without yet carry- 
ing to a conclusion; that our losses, if inferior to 
those of the enemy so far in this offensive, must 
yet be considerable; that the enemy's counter- 
offensive within the last few days has been 
vigorous, and has shown its power to con- 
centrate in considerable numbers after prolonged 
delay, and so forth. Nevertheless, the main truth 
is, I think, as that stated above. The whole war 
is now dominated by the fact that the enemy 
cannot, in the West, recover equality Avith the 
Allies : That he will, as time goes on, be in an 
increasing inferiority to him in men, in munitions, 
and in pieces, because his Eastern adventure 
thrust forward so far, still quite undecided, and 
apparently further than ever from a decision, 
strictly binds him. 
There is in this connection a somewhat 
pathetic note in the enemy communication issued 
by the German Government to the world at large 
and Its own citizens in particular. It complains 
that its enemies in the West had at their disposal 
the arsenals of half the world, meaning thereby 
that the control of sea traffic hitherto exercised by 
the Allies left open to them neutral sources o'f 
supply. There seems to be a sort of feeling that 
these cx)nditions are unfair. But the enemy must 
remember that he only forced this great war upon 
Europe last year because he felt absolutely certain 
(and he had the best military ground for feelin^ 
certain) that he had a far greater superiority in 
his own hands then. It was not only overwhelm- 
ing superiority in munitionment, it was over- 
whelming superiority in numbers; and it is 
also true to say that if, as the German Command 
tells us, the Allies have half the munitioning 
power ot the world open to them, the enem? 
has the other half oi)en to him. All Indus- 
