October 9, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER, 
leads above Riga nearly six weeks ago. He 
began fighting for the bridges of Dwinsk a 
month ago, and he is still fighting for them. 
The cavalry raid on to the Lida-Polusk railway, 
which was a last gambler's throw of the autumn, 
to encircle the Yihia salient, has broken down 
with very heavy losses — perhaps half its effectives 
— and the forces thus hurried eastward have 
fallen back. Lower down, through Baranowichy 
and Pinsk, through the marshes, the line stands 
ailchanged. Lower down still, he has recovered 
Luck, but only just, leaving Rovno and Dubno 
still in the hands of our Alty; in the last section 
of the line down to the Bukowina, in front of the 
Sereth, the avenue of supply from Kieff and the 
southern depots keeps the Russian line quite firm 
and even occasionally advancing. 
By what new munitionment, or what new 
sources of energy in munitionment or in men can 
the enemy now hope to achieve anything final 
upon the Eastern line? 
Prophecy in war is futile, but if judgment 
from known elements counts for anything, the 
answer to that question is that the enemy has no 
such source of new energy. He cannot increase 
his power of munitionment; he cannot increase 
his dwindling reserves in men. This is a 
plain piece of arithmetic which everyone through- 
out Euro]>e knows, and no one better than the 
enemy's higher command. It is a piece of arith- 
m.etic which even extreme panic, recently seizing 
a portion of the Press in this country, has not per- 
manently obscured from its readers : for elemen- 
tary arithmetic is open to the meanest capacity. 
One nev; force of energy, and one only, has 
the enemy any prospect of tapping, and that is 
the having upon his side forces hitherto neutral. 
He has in this already obtained a certain 
success, for it seems certain, at the moment of 
writing (the afternoon of Tuesday, October 5), 
that the Government of Bulgaria have decided to 
enter the field against us. 
I will conclude this by examining the geo- 
graphical conditions under which this new force 
can work to our disadvantage. 
III.— THE MILITARY SITUATION OF 
BULGARIA. 
The strategical analysis of the Bulgarian 
position is, in its first elements, an exceedingly 
simple matter, which has occurred to everyone. 
Bulgaria holds a bridge. Bulgaria commanda 
the passage between two se[)arated branches of 
our enemies. The Austro-German forces cannot 
reach Constantinople, what is left of Turkey in 
Europe and their Turkish allies as a whole, save 
with the aid of Bulgaria. They could if 
Roumania were willing to pass munitions into 
Tui'key by railway through her neutral territory, 
but it is very much more than the munition- 
ing of Turkey which the enemy is after. He 
wants a regular corridor through which he 
can communicate freely, passing troops in any 
number. The factory at Tophane outside Con- 
stantinople can manufacture enough shells to 
maintain the position in Gallipoli indefinitely and 
to prevent the opening of the Dardanelles. The 
enemy wants much more the opportunity for 
prosecuting his larger designs towards the south 
and east. The German Colonial Secretary haa 
already spoken of an attack on Egypt and of a 
thorough reorganisation of the Turkish strength 
by a direct connection with An stro- Germany. 
Bulgaria alone can furnish that direct connection. 
Eor the reader, looking at the general sketch 
map below, sees what has been universally 
recognised for the last six months. The frontiers 
of the Balkan States are now so drawn that 
unless Bulgaria enters the field upon the side 
of Austro-Germanv there is no direct connection 
between our allie(i enemies : Turkey-in-Europe, 
with Constantinople as its nucleus, and Austro- 
Hungary. 
i^>iM?ii 
