LAND AND W,ATER. 
October 9, 1915. 
BuE once let Bulgaria take the fieUl ami her 
forces, combined with the Austro-Germans, have 
only to break down the resistance in the north- 
eastern corner of Serbia to provide an ample open 
way joining all parts of the enemy alliance. 
I siiy that these first elements of the military 
situation are obvious, but there are other less 
obvious elements, almost as important. 
Note, in the first place, the nature of the rail- 
way trajectory whereby communications once open 
can be maintained. With Nish, the old capital of 
Serbia, in the hands of the enemy, the continuous 
line of Constantinople is in their power — another 
point as obvious as the first. But it is not only in 
their power — it is more defensible tlian any other 
of the great strategical lines upon which the 
present war has depended. 
It so hapi^ens that neither in the east nor in 
the west has there been an essential strategic line 
unique to the provisionment of either party. It 
also so happens that with the possible exception 
of the rinhvay running from the Pusterthal 
there has been no important line, let alone 
one unique in its own region, which is cap- 
able of permanent and prolonged defence all 
Blong its flank. But in the case of this all- 
important international line from the heart of 
Bulgaria to Turkey-in-Europe and Constanti- 
nople you have a geographical situation playing 
directly into the hands of the enemy the moment 
(Bulgaria declares herself for Germany and 
fTurkey. For the line runs through a sort of 
natural corridor, defended by mountains to the 
porth and to the south. Beyond the point marked 
upon Sketch II. with the letter X, from that point 
eastward through Philippopolis and Adrianople, 
the line everywhere follows one valley until 
'Adrianople is reached, and beyond Adrianople 
there is no danger of its being severed. The 
defences to the north of that natural corridor need 
not be considered until, or if, Roumania mobilises ; 
and Roumania shows no sign of mobilising, for, 
as we have seen, it is the chief effect of the Austro- 
German advance in the east during the last four 
months — and almost the only one — that it has 
alTected Bulgarian opinion so strongly, and that 
the Balkan States are now, so far as vague general 
sentiment is concerned, converted to a belief in the 
ultimate victory of our opponents (these words do 
not apply, as I shall explain in a moment, to cer- 
tain political forces at work in Bulgaria itself). 
But south of this corridor there exists a for- 
midable wall, lending itself beyond most such 
natural obstacles to defence, and this wall is the 
.wall of the Rhodope Mountains. 
Without a contour map, even without one 
ihowing heights, one can appreciate what the 
Rhodope Mountains are by the absence of roads. 
I have no personal acquaintance with the 
country, but I believe I am right in saying that 
there is not between the Roumanian frontier south 
of Sofia at the point marked A upon Sketch II. 
and the coast road from Kavalla through Gumul- 
jina at B, and so up to Adrianople, anything 
along which you could drive a battery. Those of 
my readers who have visited this district and have 
here an advantage over me will correct me if I am 
wrong. Even at the point marked A the road is 
.very doubtful. From Sofia to Jumaya it was 
metalled and workable in the last war; thence on 
the middle waters of the Struma there was, if I am 
not mistaken, before and up to the Balkan wars, a 
gap, marked in dots upon the sketch, in the heart 
of the mountains; it was hardly a "modern avenue 
of communication. At any rate the southern 
defences of this corridor are formidable. A 
successful attack against it. even if the 
Allies could lend a sufficient force to be 
superior to the Bulgarian fo/'^e^. ^^^^.^^^^^ 
hardly force the wall of the Rhodope 
Mountains. For all the supply of an array 
there is no avenue of communication save the 
railway and road system which runs ij||b 
from Salonika to Nish directly and T^ 
roundabout way to Sofia. From Kumanovo 
over the Deve Bair Pass to Kustendil there 
is a workable road, and at Kustendil you find the 
railway which leads you down the water to feotia 
(Indeed this railway has recently been prolonged 
beyond Kustendil towards the frontier.) But this 
combination of the one road and the one line 
through very difficult mountainous country is not 
sufficient for any considerable attempt to turn tlio 
defensive line of the Rhodope Mountains. 
The mention of Bulgarian numbers leads me 
to another point. We may be confident that 
Bulgaria will not mobilise more than that normal 
maximum of one-tenth upon which any nation 
can count as its main effort in time of war. We 
may be confident of this, because we have had the 
object-lesson directly before us for several j^ears. 
As has been frequently pointed out in these 
columns, neither in the first nor the second Balkan 
wars, though Bulgaria was certainly putting fortli 
her very utmost endeavour, did she arm and 
ration 10 per cent, of her population. 
That population has suffered heavily by the 
two great wars through which she has passed so 
recently (there are but three new classes avail- 
able). It contains elements which will hardly be 
called to the colours, as we know that many of the 
Mohammedans, for instance, were exempted three 
years ago, and we may safely count on a force no 
greater than 380,000 even from new Bulgaria, 
with its extended boundaries. 
But that is formidable. Serbia cannot now 
put into the field two-thirds of such a force. 
Greece, with her newly-extended boundaries, 
could mobilise more men than she did in the 
Balkan wars, were these trained, which they are 
not, or were her military organisation already ex- 
panded to meet the new population (which it is 
not). As it is, she will not put into the field much 
more than half Bulgaria's forces. 
The truth is that in all these steps there will 
always be one decisive last factor, which is the 
Roumanian arm^. Some in this country affect to 
