LAND AND WATER 
December 4, 1915 
'y rrivolak 
^t5k ^ ^- Strumnitza 
monastir: 
.SALONIKA 
Tresent Allied Troizt 
100 SMiles 
whole of the area between the rivers. It is not 
perfectly clear whether the Russians were thrown 
back across the Borse or no, but it would seem that 
they were. 
The next day a counter attack carried the 
triangle again and left Borsemund in Russian 
hands, so far as one can gather from a rather con- 
fused-general description which reached England 
two days later. ; 
There was yet a third struggle in which ^the 
Germans got hold of the farm, and of part of the 
triangle again, but were finally driven out, and 
we must presume that the slightly rising ground 
which forms the base of the triangle XX is now 
firmly in Russian hands. 
Over the rest of the Dwina front there is 
nothing remarkable unless it be signs of the deple- 
tion of the enemy's forces in this region, such as 
one sees in the loss of the eastern part of Illuxst 
village and the loss of a few trenches in the Lakes 
to the south of Dwinsk. 
POSITION IN MACEDONIA. 
The position of the allied force in Macedonia 
is one strategically so simple that all observers 
have agreed upon it, and appreciate its character 
and gravity. But, on the other hand, it is a matter 
so dependent upon unknown political factors, and 
these of so complex a character, that no one can 
pretend to forecast, even on their larger lines, the 
operations in this region. 
If one confines oneself to the purelv militarv 
aspect of the thing it is this :-^A force is in occupa- 
tion of a front about 100 miles long from the neigh- 
bourhood of Monastir to the neiglibourhood of 
(just south of) the Bulgarian town of Strumnitza. 
This force consists of a small Serbian body 
on the left— about the equivalent of a brigade'"; 'an' 
Allied force actually deployed (that is, holding the 
front and not used in any auxiliary fashion or 
upon communications), of perhaps 100,000 men, 
perhaps a Uttle more : of this body the strongest 
portion is holding a sort of forward bastion very 
much advanced from the general line, at A, the en- 
trenched camp of Kavadar. That " forward 
bastion " is guarded on its left by the unfordable 
Czerna river and on its right by the unfordable 
Vardar. It has occupied bridge-heads on the 
further, or left, bank of the Vardar, notably on the 
height of the Kara Hodjali at B, and at one or 
two other points between Krivolak and the Demir 
Kapu defile, as at C and D. 
But across the Czerna river it has occupied no 
bridge-heads, and it has destroyed the bridge of 
Vosarci (V) and withdrawn entirely to the right 
bank of the Czerna. 
Next we may note that though we call it the 
occupation of a Hue, that line is probably not 
continuous, and there would seem to be a gap 
between the Serbians near Monastir and the French 
upon their right, for the Bulgarians are already on 
the Upper Czerna at X. 
Further, note that the central mass of 
the allied. force is dependent for its communica- 
tions upon the single' line of railway up the Vardar 
valley from Salonica, and that this Une, as we have 
seen in previous articles, is particularly vulnerable 
in two points : (i) at the Demir Kapu gorge ; 
(2) just south of it at Strumnitza station,' where 
a long wooden trestle bridge crosses the unfordable 
river at Y. 
The extreme left of this line in the neighbour- 
hood of Monastir is also dependent upon "the single 
line railway -running from Monastir to Salonica. 
Its extreme right, wnerc the EngUsh are, at Lake 
Dorran, is served by yet a third railway, also a 
sihgle-rHne railway, terminating at Salonica and 
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