I. A N I) AX D W ATE R 
December 4, 1915. 
Could be counted. So stated it is no more than 
the presence of one man, awaiting, not far from 
the sea, tlie immediate assault of three men and 
l)erhaps four out of the possible five : the one 
man confined to a single entry for his sui^ply 
and necessarily handicapped as much in munition- 
ment as in numbers. 
A certain academic interest has attached to 
the debate whether the attack by the enemy from 
the north upon our Macedonian position would 
take the form of attempting to turn it by the .left 
or by the right ; either course is open to him. 
The turning of it by the right is the easier. He has 
there one good road down the Struma valley and 
more open countr\'. On the left, after the occupa- 
tion of Monastir he has both road and railway, 
but worse country behind him for his supply. 
But it is of little moment to guess between 
these alfemati\es. The real point is the hopeless 
disproportion in numbers. It is true that the 
enemy's sole avenues of supply for advance south- 
ward are imperfect and will need repair. The 
munitionment and the men and guns which he 
already has on the Mitrovitza railway and road 
can be brought down to Uskub easily enough, but 
further supply can only reach his new front by 
coming down along the upper Morava valley by the 
railway which follows that valley to Nish and so 
on to the Danube. 
It is to be presumed that this railway has 
been badly damaged by the retreating Serbians 
and will take some time to repair. There is no 
continuous road by that route, and these con- 
ditions should impose a certain delay upon the 
enemy's next effort. But subject to this delay that 
effort may be delivered almost as the enemy wills 
and with the advantage in men and weapons 
quite evidently and overwhelmingly upon his side. 
There is no end to be served in labouring the 
point. It is quite clearly apparent to all the 
authorities concerned and to all those occupied 
in studying the campaign. One can only repeat 
that nothing can redress the balance save a possible 
political change to the north and east of the 
present Balkan seat of war — that is, the entry of 
Roumania or a neutrality on the part of that 
State so benevolent as to result almost certainly 
in war against her by the enemy. 
BEGINNING OF THE ENEMY'S 
OFFER FOR PEACE. 
Meanwhile the enemy, now at the maximum 
of his actual occupation of territory, at the maxi- 
mum, therefore, of his extension of front, and also 
at the end (with the exception of his classes '16 
and '17) of his reserves of men, is clearly sounding 
opinion neutral and belligerent for the chance of 
peace. 
From this moment onwards that political 
effort will proceed. It will not be continuous — at 
least not apparently continuous perhaps — but the 
various stages of that effort will follow each other 
now at short intervals as the strain of the war 
increases, and it will become part of all intelligent 
study of the war to keep this capital political 
element in view, side by side with the purely 
military efforts, which haA'e hitherto engaged our 
attention in these columns. 
So long .as there was no question of either 
party accepting anything near his opponent's 
terms, the military problem alone was sufficient for 
discussion. Henceforward it will not be whollv 
sufficient, and the increasing effort to conclude 
the great war upon terms that shall leave Prussia 
strong, and though only negatively successful, still 
successful in the eves of her own subjects and 
allies, must form as large a part of our appre- 
ciation of the war as the movement of troops, the 
rate of losses or the progress of Russia's re-arming 
and equipment. 
\\c must keep in mind three main points in 
the whole of this all-im]wrtant business :— (i) 
The effort for Peace is coming from Prussia. (2) 
It is coming from Prussia because the Prussian 
Government knows that it has passed its military 
maximum, and that in material and numbers the 
future in general is full of disaster, even the imme- 
diate future full of peril. (3) The terms of peace 
will be made as favourable as possible for the 
AlHes because Prussia needs only one thing : time 
to recuperate— that is, to be left intact and strong. 
Conversely euch a peace wcukl be, for the 
Allies, a defeat — however favourable the terms — 
so lono; as Prussia was left intact and strong. 
The indications that the general effort for 
peace has begun are many. 
The first and most important is this, that the 
matter is now^ being discussed or suggested in a 
general fashion and not by appeals to various 
members of the Allies. 
We have had in the past about half a dozen 
separate and fairly detailed offers to Russia and 
France respectively, perhaps at one moment to 
both, and in the smaller field of the Balkans there 
appears to have been a definite offer made for a 
Serbian surrender about a fortnight' ago. 
But the tone of this week has been different. 
It has concerned the whole field of operations. It 
has been coloured by the most general consideration 
of humanity. It has based itself also upon the 
most general considerations of finance. 
That the neutrals should have been thus 
worked upon for the first time in the course of the 
campaign to effect a general settlement if it were 
possible, is, I repeat, the most significant element 
in the present position. 
It was perfectly clear to anyone who cared to 
follow the known figures of the enemy's man- 
power and the known figures of his wastage, that 
this effort would begin when his efficient reserves 
were nearing their end. His efficient reserves 
have now neared their end and the effort has 
begun. 
My readers are well acquainted with the 
numerical position as with the fact that it is 
common knowledge to all competent opinion 
•thrcughout Europe. 
Germany holds (and is already training in 
part) what remains of her classes '16 and '17. I 
repeat in identical form the statement of a recent 
issue : — 
Excluding these classes, a total German 
efficient mobilisable force of a little over eight 
million at the very utmost has lost from all 
causes, counting "permanent margin of tempor- 
ary losses," quite three million and a half, and 
yet has to keep going units in the field of over 
three million with auxiliary services hardly less 
than a million. The sum is simple and the 
result obvious. 
Germany alone— the Prussian head of the 
enemy's system— has now left for drafts to fill 
up the gaps in her units (gaps opening at the rate 
of not less than se\'en thousand a day), nothing 
12 
