L A X D A X D W A T E R 
December 4, 1915. 
advantage of their experience, have shown that 
the navy can - t'll surprise the world by the daring 
originality of its tactics. Is it then certain that 
the problem of forcing the Germans out of the canal 
is insoluble ? 
And what of an attack on the German forts 
and communications, or in the waters where so 
far he has only been attacked by submarines ? 
The latter is too difficult an affair to discuss. The 
bombardment of forts is unquestionably under a 
cloud since our unfortunate efforts at the Darda- 
nelles. And Lord Sydenham, I notice, seems to 
think that from this cloud it ought never to have 
emerged. The \erdict of history, so this careful 
critic reminds us, is against such enterprises 
altogether. But is not this to argue that there is, 
in the tactical relations of guns in a fort and guns 
aHof\t, something which puts the latter at an 
inherent disadvantage from which no alterations 
in the conditions of the problem can free them ? 
But, after all, at the Dardanelles, when the outer 
forts were attacked, it was the ships' guns that 
prevailed. It was only when the Narrows were 
attacked by long range fire that the advantage was 
with the forts. This only repeated the verdict of 
history. Superiority of fire has, in a few cases, 
in the past been secured in combats of this kind, 
and where it has been secured the forts have fallen. 
And for myself I cannot doubt that the navy 
possesses men quite capable of specifying what are 
the right craft, guns and projectiles and above 
all the right method of using these things for securing 
that same superiority of fire in almost any con- 
ditions to-day. It merely remains a question 
whether to pound up Heligoland, Zeebrugge or 
Borkum is worth the necessary preparations. 
substance to these complaints. Are we drifting 
into a position which may be difficult to defend ? 
I do not propose now to "enter into any argument 
as to what our policy in this matter should be. 
But it is certain that the navy is .convinced 
that its powers are not being used to the full. 
Finallv note that within the last month only, 
ten British, nine French and nine Italian sliips, 
some of them transports, have been sunk by 
torpedoes in the Mediterranean. Just liow many 
were transports and how many supply shi])s or 
merchant ships it is not possible to say, because 
the news is not ]:)ublished. And as, for good 
reasons, the announcements of attacks on sliips 
carrying troops are often held back, the total 
number of casualties in the Straits may be larger 
yet. To protect our sea communications against 
submarines is one of the major problems of amphi- 
bious war, and in spite of eight months' experience 
of Germany's commercial blockade and sixteen 
months of defending the Ifeet against submarines, 
it seems as if it was still possible for great armies 
to be sent by sea incompletely protected against 
this menace. 
SIEGE TACTICS. 
Thirdly, comes the question of subjecting the 
enemy to the fullest rigours of siege that command 
of the sea makes possible. The order in council 
of March last w-as designed, so Mr. Asquith told 
us, to prevent commodities of any kind either 
leaving or reaching the German Empire. It was 
obviously a thing that could not be completeh- 
achieved. Holland and Denmark have land frontiers 
to Germany which we cannot control, and until 
mid October the sea trade between Norway and 
Sweden and Germany was entirelv uninterrupted. 
We had, then, but a limited capacity to check the 
imports and exports of these four countries. But 
so far as our capacity went, we all understood that 
the embargo on goods reaching or leaving Germany 
was unlimited. Reuter's agency now announces 
that an arrangement has been made with Denmark 
that shows that for the future our check on German 
imports is to be limited to contraband only ! 
This in view of our disputes with America is surely 
a very serious departure in policy, and taken in 
conjunction with our licensing system, .seems not 
unlikely to accentuate our dif^culties with Wash- 
ington. But what is in every respect more im- 
portant, it may greatly diminish the efficiency of 
our blockade. The principal quarrel of the 
Americans with us is, hrst, that our policy is with- 
out the sanction of law, next that it lacks definite- 
ness of aim, singleness of principle and consistency 
m Its application, and thirdlj- while putting every 
kmd of obstacle in the way of the American trader, 
permits the British exporter to prosecute a neutral 
trade which ma\- benefit the enemv to almost any 
extent. The Danish agreement "seems to gi\-e 
CRUCIAL PROBLEMS. 
Here then are four, indeed five, crucial 
problems of naval war. To arrive at any better 
solution of them than those which we are adopting 
mayt of course, be beyond human ingenuity. But 
are we doing all that is possible towards bringing 
the ingenuity that may be available to bear ? We 
can only be sure that we have taken every pre- 
caution when we know that the administration of 
the navy is making the best concerted use of those 
to zc'hom tear has given the xvidest experience, Whom 
war has demonstrated to possess the keenest 
enterprise. Are these men — almost self-selected by 
the events of the last sixteen months — at the dis- 
posal of Whitehall to-day ? And if they are made 
available, is Whitehall organised to make the best 
use of them ? 
In the most vital matter of all we have at 
least the Prime Minister's word that legally and 
constitutionally the administration of the navy is 
no longer a dictatorship, but a dictatorship in 
commission. Mr. Asquith's answer to Lord Charles 
Beresford terminates this controversy once and for 
all. The responsibility of the members of the 
Board of Admiralty is a joint responsibility. The 
theory that they were answerable only to the First 
Lord, and he only answerable for Admiralty policy, 
is a working theory no longer. 
Until the discussions to which Mr. Churchill's 
retirement in the spring gave rise, I had always 
pubhcly maintained the view which Mr. Asquith 
now says is the right one. But it is idle to deny 
that an entirely contrary view held the field, and 
was acted on not only by First Lords, but bv 
other members of the Board. The most striking 
thing about Mr. Churchill's apology was un- 
doubtedly his failure even to mention the Board 
of Admiralty in connection with any of his acts 
as head of the navv". But Ave should not have been 
surprised if we had known that practically all the 
naval officers who, during the last ten years have 
accepted the offices of the Junior Lords, have 
done so on the distinct understanding that they 
were to be heads of departments onh- and not men 
responsible to the country for the advice they gave 
J-his is not an academic matter ; it is vital to getting 
the best out of the Navy. Had the Sea Lords— 
none of them, remember, except Lord Fisher 
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