December ii, 1915. 
L A .\ 1 ) A N I ) \X A T E R . 
SALONIKA. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NOTE. — This Article has been sub.-n'itted to the Press Bureau, which do;s not object to th: publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibility for the correctness of the statements. 
In aczsrJance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this .Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE military situation in the Near East, 
particularly that of the Allies in Mace- 
donia is not one which can be set 
forward this week in terms of an exact 
proposition. The interpretation of it depends 
upon a number of separate and contradictory 
h\"pothcses, several of them political. Only when 
we have examined these can the situation of the 
Alhes be estimated. 
The fundamental fact which was insisted 
upon in these columns last week is that to the 
Allied I or i^ you have opposed of Turks, Bul- 
garians and Austro-Ciermans, a possible 5 and not 
less than 3 who could be detached for the purpose of 
dealing with the Anglo-French forces. To come 
in aid of this r or i^ facing such extreme odds \'ou 
have perhaps at the most - at this moment- - 
another force of about the same size in the neigh- 
bourhood of the Adriatic, the Montenegrins and 
the remnant of the Serbians. They are not sup- 
plied. They have no artillery save a few mountain 
guns, for as each body fell back beyond the road- 
heads on to the mere tracks of the Western moun- 
tains it had to abandon its heavy guns, of course, 
and probably all its field artillery as well. It is 
possible that after a long interval for re-equipment 
this force might harass the enemy with guerilla 
warfare in the hills. It could not do more. 
You have possibly menacing Bulgaria upon 
the north-east at the very most another 2 of 
Russians gathering in Bessarabia, how far 
equipped and munitioned at the present date we 
do not know. You have in the capital and " key " 
position of the whole Peninsula the unknown factor 
of the Roumanian Armj'. 6, whose entry into the 
field upon either side would change the whole face 
of the war. You have the possibilit\-, but not yet 
the certitude of an ItaHan contingent. 
These things being so the position— apart 
from hypothesis of aid from present Neutrals or 
their other Allies — is as simple as we defined it to 
be last week. TTie present Allied force in Mace- 
donia is outnumbered. It will have to face, 
whenever the enemy is prepared to attack, 
a very large preponderance of heavy 
artillery. The extended positions which 
it now occupies can obviously be turned upon 
either fiank. Any considerable political change, 
but particularly a change in the attitude of Rou- 
mania would at once transform the problem. 
Greek refusal to let us use Salonika would alter it. 
But as it stands the problem is confined to these 
two alternatives : The abandonment of Salonika 
altogether and the re-embarkation of the AUied 
Expeditionary Force ; or the searcli for a line 
along which those forces would be sufficient to 
keep Salonika open — granted dreek neutrality at 
least. It is possible even for a force as small as 
that of the Alhes in this region to hold Salonika 
if it be decided that politically or ultimately for 
{(JopyriglU m America by.'.l.Jh3 ^Ifwjfork 4}ii::i'ican. > 
strategical reasons the defence of that Port be 
worth while. 
The choice between these alternatives is not 
one which can be usefully discussed in a public 
journal. It has been discussed widely enough — 
far too widely— in the Press. The Press is not 
competent for such a discussion. Only those who 
are privy to the international arrangements of all 
the Alliance, onl\- those who can estimate the 
chances of interference in our aid or against us, 
are competent. That is, only the men actually 
engaged in government at this moment, and the 
Higher Command which is in their confidence has 
the right to say whether Salonika should be held 
or no. If it is to be held let us see what the local 
conditions of ground are which would permit of 
such a tenure. 
When it was clear that all attempts to join 
hands with the main Serbian, force had failed, 
that the Bulgarians were firmly established in 
Uskub and at Veles, able to bring against us very 
much larger forces than our own, the retirement 
from the original line began. How far it has pro- 
ceeded we do not know at the moment of writing ; 
that is, on Tuesday evening, December 7th, 
But we know that the French were preparing the 
evacuation of the ("amp of Kavadar, were still 
holding a week ago the defile of the Demir Kapu, 
and were in general retiring down the single 
line which follows the Vardar Valley towards the 
sea. Suppose that retirement to continue success- 
fully, aided by the delay necessary to the enemy 
before he can bring up weapons and munitionment, 
(particularly for his heavy guns) from the north, we 
have to consider a line which 150,000 men — or say 
even 200,000 at the most — could hold. 
In order to judge what positions roimd 
Salonika would be helcl by a force of say, 200,000 
men, with the object of keeping the port open 
for further use later on, and of preventing 
the enemy from reaching the sea, and himself 
closing the Gulf and turning it into a base, we must 
recall the novel lessons taught by the present war.. 
They are, for the purposes of this study, 
as follows : — 
It has been hufificiently proved that isolated 
works of small area, whether permanent or tem- 
porary, only supporting each other over consider- 
able distances, will not hold against the modern 
siege train. 
There can be no question of permanent works 
in this case of Salonika, but isolated small tem- 
porary works such as can be defended by a com- 
paratively small ninnber of men and would have 
been the normal units of a defensive scheme in 
the past are now out of the question. So is any 
system of a series of such works lightly joined b\' 
temporary lines. 
The modern siege train utterly destroys in a 
few days works of restricted area, and the power 
they gave in past times to a comparatively small 
