December ii, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
' ' At the first glance; and'before one has reckoned 
up one's available resources, the mountain country 
of which Salonika is the centre seems to lend itself 
naturally to a defence of this kind. 
There runs just to the north of the Port not 
a continuous ridge, but a fairly continuous line of 
positions from the Paiik knot of mountains straight 
away eastward along the Bechik Dagh Ridge to 
the neighbourhood of the sea. But these positions 
alone come to quite sixty miles of line or more, 
and they can be turned on the left by the road, 
railway and valley of Vodena from Monastir. It 
is necessary to complete them down southward 
to the sea. Eastward of Vodena is an open plain 
observed everywhere from the west and south 
whence it is dominated by the high ground 
of the Agostos ridge. To hold those western 
and southern positions continuously to the sea 
would mean at least another sixty miles of Une or 
more, or 120 to 130 miles in all. 
In other words, there does exist a natural 
horse-shoe of positions from which Salonika could 
be held, and which cover that Port from sea to 
sea, but their development extends over 120 to 
130 miles of country, and you will not hold that with 
less than half a million men. But such a vast 
force would have no need to defend Salonika. 
It could and would embark at once upon a strong 
offensive towards the north. 
If it be asked why the holding of heights in 
this fashion be necessary, the answer is not that 
a dominating position serves, as it used to do, for 
the emplacement of artillery, and thus " domin- 
ates " by its fire whatever is beneath it and in 
range, but that heights of this sort are so many 
observation posts which put land beneath them, 
and not too far off, at the mercy of the artillery 
which they screen. The whole story of the Dar- 
danelles expedition would have been utterly 
different if it had been possible to rush Achi Baba 
at the first landing, even if only that height had 
been held. 
We are constrained then to look for some 
alternative series of positions not too far from 
Salonika, not more than some 30 to 40 miles in total 
perimeter from sea to sea, and what is important, 
not themselves dominated by superior heights 
beyond. 
Such an alternative set of positions for the 
defence of Salonika exists but unfortunately on a 
rather extended line which such a force as the 
Allies have been able to spare could only: just 
maintain. 
I will describe these positions in detail. 
Kenul Hill 
III. 
-aza 
L.L^' 
{syHortakDach 
Vasilika"'; 3000 ~ - 
At the eastern horn of tlic Gulf of Salonika 
runs a ridge — the Kaloron ridge — which culminates 
at a peak some 3,000 feet above the sea. All the 
southern slope of this ridge towards the sea lies 
open to fire from men-of-war, and though it will be 
necessary to bring the trenches down to the water, 
yet the first considerable position is this peak upon 
the Kaloron ridge at about 3,000 feet above the 
sea. 
The series is continuous towards the north by 
two more peaks, the Suka Dagh (above the village 
of Vasilake) and the Hortak Dagh, eacli connected 
with its neighbour by a ridge. The positions along 
the ridge pass first of all over a point about 1,900 
feet high, covering the village of Galatista, and 
next by a rather higher continuous chain to the 
Hortak Dagh. The latter mountain, one of the 
nearest points in the series of positions to 
Salonika, is at an ample distance for its defence. 
To the north again the ground falls abruptly 
to the level of Lake Langaza. It will be neces- 
sary or advisable beyond the lake to hold the 
junction of the roads near the village of Ajvatli, 
which would thrust the line a little outward 
to the north. Thence it would turn eastward to the 
height of Dautbaba, rather more than 1,500 feet 
above the sea, and the nearest point at which this 
perimeter would come towards Salonika itself- — 
an ample distance of nearly 15,000 yards. Thence 
a full scheme of defence, if there were sufficient 
men for it, would cross the Vardar, occupy the hill 
of Remil, which gives an observation post over the 
wide marshy plains to the south. Posts and where 
possible, trenches, would be established in that 
plain, and where the fine bent round again to the 
sea the spurs of the Kaljari group of hills would be 
held, because they slope but gently upwards and 
the ground is not badly overlooked. 
But were this extension not possible the 
broad and unfordable Vardar river would be a 
sufficient dyke for more restricted lines following 
its bank down to the marshy estuary upon the 
coast, and such lines would be tenable by a smaller 
force. 
I offer this sketch of the Salonika district to 
my readers not as a suggestion that such positions 
will need to be occupied, still less as a forecast of 
policy upon which it is a foolish impertinence for 
journalists to invade, but in order to make clearer 
to readers at home the opportunity of ground that 
■■exists for the defence of Salonika, should that 
defence in the future be either advisable or neces- 
- sary. 
On the other hand, an attempt to hold the 
port of Salonika upon a shorter perimeter would 
be too expensive and even perhaps impossible, 
for such a perimeter would be everywhere over- 
looked. 
A NEUTRAL ESTIMATE. OF GERMAN 
NUMBERS. 
It has always been emphasised in these 
columns that the value of an estimate in some 
matter where absolute precision was impossible, 
increased with the number of independent lines of 
enquiry which converged towards much the 1 same 
result. 
But supposing that, for whatever reasons, the 
readers of my estimates (and I myself) are 
anxious to fix an estimate as high as possible, while 
certain oi)ponents of ours rathe: desire an estimate 
as low as possible. It is clear that under such 
circiunstanccs any estimate of mine (or my 
opponents) ' however diversely checked, will be 
open to a charge of bias. If I can obtain the 
