LAND AXD water. 
December ii, 1915. 
estimate of onr or more men known to be free 
ut this bias, and if tlial i*stimate confirms those 
I lia\e made, it will oKiously be a very strong 
confirmation of the metlw)ds I have used. 
Now there exists in the matter of German 
mmibers a neutral estimat*- of this sort, and one 
of the hij;hest value. Not <mh- for what it says, 
but from \Jtat it leaves otU. It is with this neutral 
estimate that I proj^ose to deal this week. 
But my meth»)d of dealing with this neutral 
estimate is one which i must put fairh" before m\- 
reader lest he should .aisunderstand it. I propose 
to show that though this estimate - w hich is of 
great authoritv— does not wholl\- agree with m\- 
own conclusions, ^-et the onl\- reason it does not 
do so is that it omits- perhaps puri)oseh — 
certain elements in the calculation which ought to 
be taken into account. 
In other words, .1 propose to show that this 
neutral calculation of German losses conlirms ver\- 
«xactl\' those which have appeared recently in 
Land AND Watkr because, wherever it is a full 
estimate, it agrees almost exactly, and where it is 
admittedlx- imperfect the tilling up of the gaps 
also results in an agreemeat. 
The estimate 1 propose to analyse is that of 
an American student of the war— a Neutral- 
basing himself upon the figures of yet another 
neutral student of the war, tlie Swiss Colonel 
Feyler, who bears perhcp.^ the highest reputation 
of all those who are now explaining the war in the 
Press of Europe. 
As a foundation to all his calculations Colonel 
Fevler 'arrives at a total nuobilisable German force 
of 7I millions, exclusive of the classes iqio-1917. 
He does not believe the German Empire has 
been able to put into the field during this first \ear 
of the w-ar, counting the young men who reached 
their 20th year in 1915, as much as eight million 
men. He notes, as wc all do, that the young men 
who are growing up and can be pressed into the 
service this winter or next spring (the young men 
who were 19 in the present year and many of those 
who were only 18 in the present year) must be 
allowed for — say more than 600,000 and less than 
800,000. But at any rate he takes for the original 
force, exclusive of "these two young classes, the 
number 7J millions. 
Now that to begin with is a very important 
point. 
In the estimates which have appeared in these 
columns the phrase " little more than eight 
millions " has always been used, or its equivalent. 
The official statements published by the 
French War Office have also thus stretched to 
the utmost possible maximum their estimates of 
German man-power in the field. In both cases the 
object of such an exaggeration (for exaggeration 
it was) has been the same : To weight the scales 
against oneself. Precisely because ther*» would pro- 
bably be a tendency, and certainly an aAusation, of 
bias towards ««rfci'-estimating these numbers, one 
deliberately over estimates them ; and this figure 
of eight niillions or a little over we see in the 
calculations of the most eminent Neutral engaged 
upon the task reduced to 7I millions. 
It is next of high interest to observe in wliat 
fashion this estimate is reached, because it' is by 
avenues of approach different from those used in 
these columns that Colonel Feyler and his American 
student have reached a conclusion confirming the 
conclusion of these columns. 
Mv readers will remember that my own 
methods of estimating the total mobilisable power 
of the German Empire-the basis o the whole 
calculation-were the following separate methods . 
(a) The known number of men of militar\ 
age, 20 to 45 less 23 per cent, rejected upon medical 
grounds.^^^ analogN- of every other conscript 
nation under many " different conditions of peace 
and war in modern times. 
(c) The analogx- of rejections under the 
voluntar\- system of Great Britain. ^. , . , 
(d) "Special examples from particular districts 
and particular professions within the German 
Empire itself where special statistics could be 
^^ Colonel Fexler's method is quite different and 
more particulaV. He takes from the census of 
1910 the total man-power then available of the 
men who Avould be of military age five years later. 
He then deducts deaths on the analogy of the 
known Swiss death rate in those years, and he 
scales this down from j.8 per cent., which the Swiss 
analogv would gix'e. to 33 per cent, so as to be on 
the safe side. From the figure thus arrived at 
he does not, as I did, take 25 per cent, at one 
operation, yet he arrives at exactly the same 
conclusion. " Bv following the Swiss figures for 
the two classes, (A) the " less fit," (B) the " ad- 
journed as unfit at the moment of examination." 
I mav point out that this convergence of 
results is remarkable precisely because the results 
are arri\'ed at in such totally different fashions. 
One man says : "I take as a rough and 
general rule to which I find no exceptions in very 
numerous cases submitted, that not less than one- 
quarter of the men summoned must be rejected foi 
medical reasons." Another man says : "I ex- 
amine in detail special categories, adjournments, 
etc., and adding together the various results I come 
to the conclusion that at least one-quarter or more 
can never find their way to the army." Both by 
quite separate roads reach the same figure. 
Next Colonel Feyler proceeds to deduct the 
numbers of men who' must be kept behind (though 
medically fit) for various civihan seryices, police, 
railways, mines, munitions, etc. 
Here again I gave the rough rule of thumt 
" Perhaps two millions, but certainly not less than 
one million and a half." 
For the sake of safety I estimated a millior 
and a half onl5'. 
Colonel Feyler with far more knowledge than 
I have and a more detailed examination takes them 
category by category, goes through the Navy, the 
railways, the postal services, the clerical work, 
the police, the factories, the mines, etc., and arrives 
at a minimum of 1,800,000. 
At the conclusion then of these carefully 
checked estimates he reaches the broad figure of 
7I million as the number of men available for the 
field, excluding the classes 1916 and 1917. 
In the matter of the number required for the 
units in the field and upon communications. Colonel 
Feyler, as used and quoted by the American 
authority I am following, gives four million men. 
r have in these columns said : " Not more than 
4^ millions and not less than 3 1 millions." And to 
weight the scales against our bias on the Allied 
side I have admitted a minimum of 3 J millions. 
But the higher figure of 4 millions is far more pro- 
bable, and Colonel Feyler, if I am not mistaken, 
adopts it as his minimum unreservedly. 
12 
