December ii, 1915. 
LA^sD A X D W A T E li 
There would remain, then (exclusive of the 
classes '16 and '17) 34 million men, and everything 
depends upon what estimates of losses we admit. 
If the German Empire is apj^roacliing in one 
way and another a loss of 5I miUion men " off 
the strength," it has come to the end of its 
efficient reserves (with the exception of the two 
younger classes). And it is the conclusion which 
— in common I think with most observers and 
students of this war — (I had almost written with 
all competent observers) I reached in these 
columns, that these reserves were on the point 
of exhaustion. 
\^'e discover by every approach to such an 
estimate that bj- this time— that is, after nearly 
17 months of fighting— the ' German losses are 
equivalent or nearly equi\'alent to what was the 
efficient original (ierman reserve of man-power 
It the beginning of the war- — excluding the young 
:lasses '16 and '17. 
Now this American estimate makes the pro- 
vable losses of the enemy lower than those put 
forward in these columns; it presupposes no greater 
iiett loss to day (say the New Year) than some- 
what over two and a half million — sths only 
of the estimates arrived at here. But I propose 
to show that the very method employed, though 
it gives lower enemy losses than I had given, 
confirms my estimates when the defects in the 
method of estimation are closely analysed. 
The whole of this neutral's system of esti- 
mates reposes on one central document, the 
accuracy of that document, and fails to note 
other categories of loss to which that document 
makes no reference. 
An official German report was issued in Sep- 
tember which gave the German casualties up to 
July 31st (that is, the first year of the war), at 
2,640,000. It is upon this fundamental figufe-r- 
accepted as accurate by neutrals of such weight 
and accepted as covering the first twelve months of 
the war — that their estimate of wastage is based. If 
this figure is regarded as accurate and complete, the 
returns of men to the front put as J of casualties, 
and the whole as representing a full year and 
therefore as divisible by 12 to give the monthly 
wastage, then the German monthly losses must be 
put down as about 150,000 instead of tlie 220,000 
arrived at in these columns. 
But this fundamental figure— the German 
official return of last. September purporting to give 
the total casualties for the first twelve months of 
war — suffers under criticism in a fashion which no 
one I think will belittle if that criticism be honestly 
and carefully followed. 
(i) In the first place it does not deal with 
twelve months of war but with just over eleven 
months. 
The heavy fighting iand the proportionately 
heavy losses did not begin on the 31st of July. 
That was the date when Gerrnany suddenly forced 
war upon France and Russia. It is not the date 
from which full casualties must be counted. Those 
casualties only begiii to be heavy and, as it were, 
normal, three weeks later with the battle in front 
of Metz, the heavy fighting of Charleroi and Mons, 
with the advance of the first considerable Eastern 
forces against Russia and with the victory of 
Tannenberg at the \ery end of the month. 
We are really dealing, e\en if the statistics 
were complete, not with twelve montiis of war but 
with little over eleven and therefore- with an 
average -even iipon this rough calculation alone 
of more like 240,000 a month than 220,000 
That is the first point. It is the least impor- 
tant, but it is not negligible. 
(2) The second point is of much more weight. 
The full action of Germany in the field, the full 
number of units in action was not developed eveti 
by the first month of the war. Units were still 
joining the Eastern forces long after Tannenberg. 
And this was but natural, because all the German 
l)lans had been laid upon the theory that Russian 
mobilisation would be slower than it was. 
In other words, even if the German total losses 
in just over eleven months of war were onlj' 
2,640,000, yet the average monthly loss from, say, 
the middle of September onwards (and certainly 
from, say, the Battle of Ypres onwards) were mucti 
heavier than the earlier losses and have remained 
much heavier. For the full strength of Germany 
in the field was not realised until after the second 
week of September in the Eastern theatre of war. 
(3) In the third place (and this is of still 
greater weight) the type of the fighting and the 
proportionate casualties changed very much with 
and after the battle of the Marne. That is with 
and after the middle of September. 
Doubtless the German casualties were heavy 
in the first hours of the fighting on the Sambre, 
but until the Allied counter-offensive of the west 
on the 6th of November, the fighting was not of the 
same nature again. The losses to the Allies 
especially in prisoners, were extremely heavy : 
those of the Germans lighter. 
In the east the first Russian invasion of East 
Prussia was only met by two Army Corps in the 
field, and the victory of Tannenberg with its im- 
mense results was won quickly and at no dispro- 
portionate loss to the victors. The very heavy 
(ierman losses began in the west first with the 
Battle of the Marne, continued with the furious 
attempts carried on until the nth of November 
to break through in Flanders, and these enormous 
Western losses were continued in the east by the 
breakdown of the first Polish campaign, by the 
heavy, stubborn, and immensely expensive fighting 
for the capture of Warsaw, which lasted through the 
end of November, all December, all January and 
half of February. 
Immediately afterwards began the French 
offensive in the Artois,. then the very heavy fighting 
in Alsace. 
Throughout the spring and early summer was 
the great drive eastward of the Germans, less 
expensive to them indeed than to their opponents, 
;but involving such tremendous actions as the fort- 
night in front of Przemysl, the fortnight in front 
of the Lublin-Cholm Railway, and the particularly 
murderous and prolonged struggle upon the Narev. 
V.'hile before this you had the (ierman reinforce- 
ments sent to the Austrians in the Carpathians, 
under the most difficult conditions of fighting and 
of weather. 
In other words, the really heavy German 
losses come in more or less continuous bouts which 
cover up to the 31st of July, 1915, not twelve 
months and not even a full eleven months. The 
real rate of losses, taking this official statement alone 
was, after the heaviest fighting had begun, approxi- 
mately a quarter of a fnillion or rather more per 
month. 
(4) But the fourth point is more illuminating 
than any of these three. I say that, take the 
German official statement j^ublished last Septem- 
ber'and |nn-})orting to gi\e total (~asualties up to 
the'end of July as accm-ate, it would mean about a 
cfuarter of a million per month at least during all 
13 
