Deccmbei i8j 1915. 
LAND ASD WATER 
THE POSITION IN MACEDONIA. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NOTE. — This Article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which doss not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibility for the correctness of the statements. 
In accordance with tbe requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only bo 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated. 
'W'lr TE have discussed in these columns, 
my%/ during the last few weeks, the nature 
WW of the situation in Macedonia. 
We have seen that the first effort 
of the Allies was made with the object of reaching 
Veles, for if Veles had been reached Uskub would 
have been rendered untenable by the enemy, and 
it was the enemy's occupation of Uskub which 
separated the mass of the Serbian army from the 
advanced bodies of the Allies. One may regard 
the roadless mountains north and east of Uskub 
as a sort of barrier, through which was one gate 
at Katchanik, and behind which lay the mass of 
the Serbian army. Uskub was the' position 
barring that gate. Veles, lying at the base of a 
triangle of roads and railways, of which Uskub 
was the apex, commanded the plain in which 
Uskub stands. If the Allied Contingents had been 
strong enough to force their way to Veles, and to 
threaten an advance on Kumanovo, Uskub would 
have been abandoned by the enemy, the Katchanik 
gate would have been open, the main Serbian 
army could have joined hands with the advanced 
bodies of the Allies, the whole would have formed 
one line and that line would have been able to 
stand against the enemy, receiving continual 
reinforcements and supply from the sea. 
Gate was never open. The main Serbian army 
was, therefore, not able to join hands with the 
Franco-British to the south, and on the contrary 
were compelled to retire to the north-east along 
the direction of the Arrow A in diagram i. 
The consequence of this was that the Franco- 
British force found itself holding a line unconnected 
with any other forces, open on both its flanks, and 
opposed to forces which were already ijjore than 
double its own and might grow at will to three 
times its own. 
It is self-evident that when such a line, un- 
supported on its flanks, is opposed by largely 
superior numbers those largely superior numbers 
can turn it at will. If I am holding the line A B 
But the Allied forces were not strong enough 
to push their way to Veles. The numbers of the 
Bulgarians already occupying the Uskub, Veles, 
Kumanovo triangle were far more numerous by 
the time the advanced bodies of the AUies had 
cstabHshed contact with the m. The Katchanik 
{Copyright in America hy " The New York American."] 
with 20,000 men, and there is country through 
which the enemy can march beyond B to the right 
or A to the left, then with larger forces than mine 
— say 40,000 men — as at C D my enemy can hold 
me on the line A B, and can turn me round the 
right or the left flank at B or at A as he chooses : 
or, if he is in sufficient strength, upon both flanks 
at once. If I stand still and let him do that my 
force is annihilated. Therefore, before the threat 
of such a turning movement I retire in the direction 
of the arrows (i) (i) towards my base at C. In 
the process of such a retirement my object will be 
to save all I can of my stores and equipment while 
sufficiently holding the enemy and inflicting upon 
him as much loss as I can. On whichever flank 
the enemy has chosen to act there will the greatest 
danger of loss be, there will the greatest pressure 
be exercised by the enemy. 
In the particular case of the Allied position 
in Macedonia, the line extended over a distance 
of about fifty miles a fortnight ago, when the 
possibility of effecting a junction with the Serbians 
was at an end, and when the ultimate necessity of 
retirement had become evident. This line was 
thus composed. 
On its left the French held positions in the 
triangle between the Vardar and Czerna Rivers, 
an open piece of land among the mountains, in the 
centre of which stood the village of Kavadar, 
which gave the position its name. The mass of 
the French forces were in this triangle, and had 
in front of them increasing Bulgarian forces 
threatening both sides. Down the valley of the 
Vardar ran a single line railway to Salonika, and 
immediately behind the main French position was 
