A N I ) A \ 1) W A 1 ]•: K . 
Decern her iS, 19 15. 
line of the railway, by Lake Ostrovo and then by 
the main road to Vodena, which is a very long 
• listuiue compaiid with that thr(nij,'ii wliich the 
Alhfd line has to retin-, ui it would lia\e to come 
over the mountain mass of the Kaiadjova, where 
there is no road, and across which no verj' con- 
siderable bod\- of men could mo\e quickly. 
The chances of an envelopment of the Allied 
lines by the enemy are small, but the enemy's 
po\fer to compel its continued retirement is clear. 
The whole interest in the immediate future will 
lie (if it be determined to hold Salonika) upon 
whether the Allied Forces are suthcientlv numerous 
to hold the semicircle of heights overlooking the 
town — that is of course supposing that they are 
given a free hand to attempt this defence. The 
shortest perimeter for safely holding such positions 
is between thirty and forty miles, and even these 
do not include the secure possession of the mouth 
of the C.ulf. 
For the purposes of this retirement the Allies 
are well furnished with communications. There 
are, as appears on the foregoing diagram IV, two 
lines of railway running parallel and connected by 
a lateral line. There are also fair roads and the 
mountain passes, through which these lines pass. 
V 
L.i^g^ 
iiyHortalcDaGh 
Vasilika i^ooo & 
G3Mist» •1800 
■'••^loron 
/Ridqe 
are not as liigh and difiicult as those to the north 
in which the first operations were undertaken. 
But the real problem would seem to be how such 
forces as the Alhes have been able to land and 
supply will be able to defend Salonika itself. 
As we saw last week, in a sketch map here 
reproduced, the series of positions surrounding 
the port of Salonika and establishing a stron^ 
unbroken line at a sufficient distance from the 
town Itself demand a force sufficient to hold in 
strength a Ime longer than that now held bv the 
advanced body of the Allies, and almost as long 
as the ongmal hne which the AUies held before the 
retirement began. Such a horse-shoe of positions 
now taken up in Salonika could not be turned for 
each flank would repose upon the sea, but to 
attempt to hold a shorter line nearer Salonika itself, 
and such a one as could be more securelv main- 
tained with the numbers at the disposal of the 
Allies, would have two grave disadvantages. 
First, it would be everywhere overlooked and 
we know from the experience of the whole cam- 
paign what this means. Dominating positions 
are no longer, as they once were, valuable for the 
emplacement of artillery, but they screen artillery 
and they give power of observation over the move- 
ment -, of the opposed force. 
Secondly, when the reconstruction of the 
railway shaM permit the enemy to bring up his 
larger pieces with their munitionment, it will be 
imperative to have the protecting lines thrust 
out at some distance from the port. If they are 
to(3 near, the (juass and the depots and stores 
will be subject to bombardment, even though the 
lines can be securelv held, and a limited area such 
as that of a seaport affords a target which could 
be rendered useless to our purposes under such a 
bombardment. 
Whether these problems will arise or no only 
the future can show. They depend upon political 
much more than upon military conditions. We 
do not know whether the attitude of Greece will 
permit such a defence of Salonika at all. We do 
not know whether the enemy will think it advis- 
able to enter Greek territory or no. But, elimina- 
ting these political factors and considering the 
ground merely as a terrain for the manccuvre of 
armies, the conditions are those just described. 
First, that the enemy can compel our retirement 
upon Salonika, secondly that the opportunities for 
that retirement are well provided with fair com- 
munications, thirdly, that the end of the retire- 
ment, the defence of Salonika, is difficult through 
the configuration of the land, for the heights most 
suitable to the defence of the town, and continued 
by the line of the unfordable Vardar, constitute a 
very extended three-quarters of a circle : to which 
difficulties may be added the time required for 
the consolidation of such lines. 
THE EFFECT OF TIME. 
An\-one v.ho will exercise the necessary re- 
straint, and discover the necessary wisdom, to 
look at the War as it now is, will agree that the 
uncertain temper of many people in this country 
at the present moment is due, not to calculable 
definite military forces the interplay of which 
they could define, but to nothing more than the 
efflux of time. 
It is the succession of days and weeks without 
events upon which anxiety can fasten for relief 
that has produced this mental effect. 
The more you consider the stages through 
which the opinion of such people has passed in the 
last year, the more you see that this mere lack of 
patience— the besetting weakness of the adven- 
turous at the best, the sensational and nervous at 
the worst— is the generator of this discontent. 
It has, of course, a certain negative basis in 
the absurd \-iews of War which preceded the 
present slow siege work in the minds of such 
critics. 
They had no conception of War upon a 
national scale. They had thought of it for a very 
long time past as a Colonial adventure undertaken 
against enemies inferior in equipment and usually 
not possessed of any military organisation. 
They had never been given a sense of measure 
with regard to War. 
They had been told (and thev believed it 
because It was comfortable) that superiority at 
sea worked miracles upon land. " Any position 
can be outflanked from the sea," " A force can 
iand anywhere under protection of the guns of a 
Again, they had the conception that any 
vvar, to be of real moment, must be a duel between 
ttieir own country and some one other country or 
combination of countries: although such a duel 
had never taken place. 
Lastly, they had been taught that victory 
was a matter of course, taking place far from these 
i 
