A X D AND W A TER. 
December 18, 1915. 
utterly unscrupulous and bnital, did not exhibit 
any lugb oi.li^r of efilicicncy. When the defence 
was. full>' developed tlie success of the submarine 
fell to almost negligible proportions. Yet here, if 
anywhere, the success should be absolute. Trade, 
Sir Percy informed us, was timid, and at the first 
intimation of attack would refuse to leave its 
harbours. Actuall}- the number of ships entering 
a;nd clearing day by day has increased since the 
submarine campaign began. The percentage of 
casualties reached in one month a rate equal to a 
loss of 10 per cent, per annum. Over the whole 
nine months, however, since February, it does not 
exceed 4J per cent, of British merchant shipping. 
The blockade, as a blockade, in short, has been a 
total failure, for in the last great war the rate of 
loss scarcely ever fell below 5 per cent.; it averaged 
this in the Napoleonic wars, and reached 7 per 
cent, in the Revolutionary war before it. 
Measured by the number of its warship victims, 
the submarine has not come up to expectations. 
Formidable, Triumph and Majestic were all caught 
in exceptional circumstances. The three cruisers, 
it is universally admitted, were, in the cant phrase, 
" asking for it." Hawke, Hermes and Niger were 
in a similar case. Yet Mr. Hannay will have it 
that, in spite of all this, the submarine has made a 
revolutionary change, and for the following 
reasons. The Germans are supposed to have had 
notice that the three cruisers would rendezvous, 
undefended by destroyers, at the place where 
Captain Weddingen found them. What influence 
would such news have had upon an enemy before 
the days of submarines ? He would have recalled 
his light craft and avoided this rendezvous alto- 
gether, unless he could have sent more units of 
equal strength or an equal number of units of 
greater strength. To-day he sends a single sub- 
marine to the spot and these great powerful ships 
must fly or sink. Again, no sooner was it known 
that German submarines were approaching the 
Dardanelles than Queen Elizabeth, the mightiest 
vessel in the world, accompanied by all her more 
modem consorts, had to retreat incontinently to 
an unknown and safe destination. Only ships 
whose loss would be immaterial were left to do the 
work. The old standard of values then is gone. 
Hitherto size, strength, armament and speed have 
been a measure of a ship's strength. AH vessels 
inferior in these respects have had to avoid her. 
Now, in spite of their power there is something 
which they fear. They have to be protected by 
something external to themselves. It is a revolu- 
tionary change, and the relative values of ships 
are for ever altered. 
Such is the argument, and it seems to me to be 
fa]la.cious for the following reasons. The primary 
purpose of a battle fleet is to win command of the 
sea by destroying or immobihsing the enemy's 
battle fleet. It is the British battle fleet of Dread- 
noughts which has immobilised the German fleet. 
Mr. Hannay does not fall into the error of sup- 
posing that it is the British submarines that confine 
the Germans to the Kiel Canal. If this is admitted, 
then in their main function the relative values of 
ships remain the same. Command of the sea, on 
which the use of the sea depends, resides, as it 
always has, in the old element which constitutes 
primary naval force, that is in the guns of the 
capital ship. This fact is not fundamentally 
altered because capital ships are faced by a new 
peril. Not even if that peril is an invisible one. 
For invisible perils are not new. From the dawn 
of navigation it is the unseen and unexpected 
perils that the saUor has had to face. Rocks and 
shoals under water, hurricanes, storms, unknown 
currents the mariner has always passed his lite 
in the face of incalculable risks. It does not alter 
the character of the problem that the danger is 
created by an enemv- I^ong before submarines 
were thought of the torpedo-boat and the destroyer 
were the source of unseen attack. Again, it does 
not alter the nature of the change that the methods 
of dealing with the unseen daylight danger differ 
from those for counteracting the unseen night 
danger. Neither of these, for that matter, re- 
sembles the precautions that must be taken 
against the mine, which has always been ac 
unseen danger, both by night and by day. There 
is then really no novelty in the capital ship 
being dependent upon units exterior to herself 
for protection. 
GUNNERY AND MANOEUVRE. 
If we examine into the problem we shall find 
that the influence on tactics of the submarine is a 
mere extension of the influence on tactics of the 
torpedo. This influence had been analysed long 
before this war began and the submarine put to 
the test. The long range torpedo employed in 
shoals by large flotillas of fast destroyers is a 
formidable menace to a battleship or cruiser 
squadron that proposes to maintain the course 
it is on when the attack is threatened. All students 
of tactics then have realised since 1908, when the 
long-range torpedo was developed, that it must 
impose two new courses on the Commander of a 
battle fleet. He would have to shorten the line 
of his squadrons or divisions, and he would be 
compelled to manoeuvre more frequently, and if I 
may use the word, more violently, than heretofore. 
The disadvantage of manoeuvring is that it throws 
out gunnery. Six years ago the problem of 
keeping the range when the ship was under helm 
had not been solved and there was no solution in 
sight. The necessity of the solution had indeed 
been foreseen, but until igo8 it was advocated only 
on the ground that unless gunnery were made 
helm free the tactician would enjoy no liberty of 
action — he would be tied to the maintenance of a 
steady course. But after 1908 the desirability of 
a solution of this problem could no longer be 
looked upon as a luxury of grand tactics. It 
had become an absolute necessity unless the 
artillery of fleets was to be reduced to impotence. 
That our ships are not equipped with the means of 
keeping range under helm to-day is one of the 
disadvantages inseparable from the fact that the 
subject of fire control has never been dealt with on 
General Staff principles at Whitehall. 
A realisation of this fact is important if we 
are to appraise Mr. Hannay's point about the 
withdrawal of the Queen Elizabeth at its true 
value. We know from Mr. Bartlett's letters 
that the ships, whether engaging the forts or sup- 
porting the army, used their guns only when at 
anchor or at least stationary. Once under weigh, 
in any circumstances under helm, accuracy could 
not be preserved, and both when engaging forts 
and in shelling trenches, the most, meticulous 
accuracy is vital. Now it has alwaj^s been per- 
fectly understood, that while an escort of destroyers 
preceding and accompanying the ship while steam- 
ing was to a very great extent a complete pro- 
tection against the submarine, they could not for 
obvious reason so protect a ship that was anchorec" 
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