December 23, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER: 
DEFENCES OF SALONIKA. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NOTE. — This Article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
respongibilily for the correctness of the statements. 
In ac23rdanc2 with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustratin)£ this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE positions dictated by the ground as 
most natural to the defences of Salonika 
liave already been briefly examined in 
these columns. It may be of advantage 
to the reader to follow them this week in somewhat 
more detail. 
They begin, obviously enough, with the line 
of the Vardar upon the West. The Vardar is 
unfordable, is crossed here by only one road and 
one railway] bridge at A and at B (Plan I), and 
the lower part of its course to its delta in the Gulf 
is marshy upon the further or Western side, the 
marshes also appearing upon the hither or Eastern 
side before the mouth is reached. It will there- 
fore not be necessary to hold the line of the Vardar in 
any great force south of the village of Gundoghlular 
(or Yalmazes), and perhaps no troops would be 
needed at all south of Yunjular. On the other 
hand the line of the Vardar for some eight miles to 
the north would have to be held strongly, because 
it runs through flat country very bare of cover 
and overlooked (though at a great range) 
from the heights before Yenidje Vardar to the 
north and west. Observation from these heights 
at the nearest point to the Vardar could be carried 
on at a distance of a little over 6,000 or 7,000 yards. 
This sector of the defence is further threatened by 
the communications in its neighbourhood. The 
enemy has here the undamaged railway from 
Vodena and Monastir, and the good metalled 
highroad as w-ell, while he can be striking at right 
angles, upon what we shall see later to be the most 
vulnerable sector in the lines, when he has repaired 
the main railway from Serbia which runs down 
along the east bank of the river. 
^^^len the lines leave the Vardar they climb 
up and cross an easy slope (just over 800 ft. high 
at the summit) which leads them to the Valley of 
the Galiko. 
This sector is a long one, over ten miles, and 
it is also open. A trace taken across it in a shallow 
bend would everywhere command the landscape to 
the north. The two railway lines however come 
up to either end of it, and we shall discuss later 
the peculiar opportunities it offers. It is thai 
part of the dejence which will best lend itself to the 
enemy's attack and is marked on the Sketch Map 
" Vulnerable Sector. 
Once over the Galiko one comes upon very 
different conditions. Here begins that continuous 
line of mountainous ridge which lends to the 
landscape north, east, and south-east of Salonika, 
an aspect of easy defence — an aspect not wholly 
corresponding with real ease of defence under 
modern conditions. At any rate this front is 
far more defensible than the western sectors and 
presents the physical appearance of a great wall 
of hills. ' 
Tliis ridge or wall starts due north of 
Salonika, with the Daud Baba group, rising to 
{Copyrv^lit in America by " Ths New York American."] 
nearly 1,500 feet, confused in outline but very 
steep on the side presented to the enemy. The 
lines then sink to a Pass not quite half as high, 
820 feet, where a carriage road from Salonika to Seres 
crosses the hills, rise again to the summit just 
over 2,000 feet in height, and thence — after cross- 
ing another saddle of 1,500 feet — climbs to a 
peak little short of 4,000 feet, the summit of the 
Hortak or Khortach Mountain, the highest point 
in the whole system. 
It is on this ridge, betw^een the Seres Road 
and the Hortak Peak, that the lines come nearest 
to Salonika itself, covering the harbour at a range 
of almost exactly 9,000 yards. The importance 
of this belt of cover will be dealt with in a moment. 
The Hortak Movmtain mass has wooded cover 
upon its slopes, particularly its northern slopes 
(which face the enemy) and this type of cover con- 
tinues for some miles at intervals as one proceeds 
south and east. 
But whether the lines will be carried along the 
ridge right round to the south and east and so to 
the sea (going across the Suka mountain, only little 
less high than the Hortak, covering the 1,716 foot 
Pass at Galatista, and thence following down the 
spurs to the Coast land, covered by fire from the sea), 
is doubtful for two reasons : First, that the number 
of men required for such an ideal extension 
(a matter of 25 miles or more) would be very great, 
and secondly, that an enemy offensive from this 
quarter could hardly be undertaken save at the 
expense of great delay. It could even then suffer 
for a long time from what would be at the outset 
almost insurmountable difficulties of supply. 
For the district is a mass of mountains with no 
road from the north. It is far more probable that 
the fines will bend to the south-west from the 
Hortak group, cover the isolated wooded height 
of the Kara Tepe, and cross the Kaloron Ridge, 
beyond which is a sort of glacis coming down 
to the sea, which would need to be held in no 
great strength because an enemy attack from here 
would be almost impossible. AH the lower slopes 
are directly under fire from the sea. 
A perimeter of this sort from the Kaloron 
Ridge through the Hortak thence all along the 
Mountain ridge to the Daua Baba summit, thence 
west across the open upland to the Vardar, thence 
along the Vardar to the marshes at its mouth, 
would be, in all its sinuosities, not far short of fifty 
miles in extent. 
The very first comment which anyone 'will 
make who has followed the present war, is that 
so extensive a line will require a very [large force 
to hold it. 
To repeat what was said three weeks ago in 
this place ; the whole of this campaign has proved 
that the modern siege train can master in a few 
days the old-fashioned permanent works of re- 
stricted area. 
To defend any point, therefore, with a system 
of isolated works requiring comparatively small 
