LAND AND WATER. 
December 2j, iQi5- 
But it is not possible to concei\e of a crossing 
being forced over such an obstacle in the face of 
anything likt adequate artillery concealed in the 
hil s to the south. 
The obect of an enemy att(?mpting (o force 
this line would in practice be confined to the Gate 
of Sarai and the course of the outlet ri\er between 
the Beshik Lake and the sea. 
The first, as we have seen, is completely domi- 
nated by the heights to the south of it ; the second 
almost as thoroughly guarded by the Sugliani 
Heights and Woods,' while it is so completely 
swept from the sea tliat it is difficult to imagine a 
successful forcing of it by even a large body of 
men with ships against them. 
One may sum up the advantages and disadvan- 
tages of this line of the lakes stretching from sea to 
sea by saying that it would be a longer line than the 
horse-shoe following the mountains round the (uilf 
of Salonika, and that communications along it 
would be so particularly difficult as to interfere 
with the mobility of troops and guns defending it. 
But on the other hand the opportunities for attack 
against it are few and are practically restricted to 
the single gate of Sarai ; so that, once the defence 
was organised, rapid massing of men or of guni 
upon any other spot would hardly be necessary 
It should be noted that the heights to the north 
of the Line of Lakes though dominating that line 
completely, and often higher than the hills to the 
south, are at a very long range. Guns within 
useful range for covering a crossing of the lakes 
would everywhere be overlooked from the southern 
hills and the difficulties of communication on the 
northern side are as great or greater than the 
difficulties of the south.) 
The easier supply from the sea and from 
the town andport have almost certainly determined 
the Commanders upon the spot to rely mainly 
upon the horse-shoe of hills running round the 
Gulf of Salonika from north and round by east 
of the town. But it is probable that subsidiary 
works will also defend. the line of the lakes — or at 
any rate the gaps in it. 
THE EXPOSED SECTOR. 
From the elemeaits of defence thus analysed 
from the Vardar eastwards, it is fairly clear that 
the attack upon the entrenched camp of Salonika 
should it come in force, and should the defence of 
the place be left quite unencumbered with Greek 
hostility from within, is likely to develop upon the 
open ten miles front bet-v/een the Daud Baba Hills 
and the Vardar, which I have called on the 
sketch map, " the vulnerable sector." There 
would, presumably, be a double pressure, one across 
the Vardar front, the cxther coming in flank upon 
the vulnerable sector from the north. But the 
latter will offer the best opportunity for the enemy's 
success, and that for the following reasons : — 
(i) First, and meet important, the lines by 
which heavy munition can be brought up He on 
either side of this ten-jnile sector. The two rail- 
ways, the one the coar>tal line coming from the 
Struma Valley road, the other the main line coming 
from Serbia and the Au?tro-German depots by the 
Vardar Valley will, when they are repaired, be 
the only main avenc£s of supply possessed by the 
enemy. 
The Monastir road and railway has no base 
of supply behind its terminus at Monastir itself. 
Whereas the two lines ^ust spoken of lead, the 
one continuously fjomtlv Austrd-German arsenals 
at home and their advanced bases m Serbia ; the 
other, partly by road and partly by rail from 
Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, and all the Bulgarian 
depots of supply. 
(2) A successful attack upon this vtilnerable 
northern sector destrovs at a blow the whole value 
of the strong Vardar line. Whenever you have a 
right angle hke this in a defensive system the 
thrusting back of one limb of the angle destroys 
the value of the other. It turns it. Ihis was 
seen on a large scale when the Russian line on the 
Dunajetz was thrust back last May, with the 
consequence that the Carpathian line at right 
angles to it had to give way at once. 
(3) The approach to this northern sector is 
much easier than that to any othei^ part of the 
perimeter. The northern slope of the Daud 
Baba Hills and the northern and eastern slopes 
of the mountain ridge continuing onwards south 
and east from thence to the Hortak group— that is^ 
the slopes facing the enemy— are very steep and 
in many places precipitous. On the Vardar sector 
the Vardar is, of course, a formidable obstacle. 
But here, between the Vardar and the Daud Baba 
Hill it is clear open country all the way up north 
for 15 miles. 
(4) A successful blow delivered on the lower 
Vardar would bring the enemy's troops under the 
fire, though at long range, of ships' guns. But the 
vulnerable sector between the Vardar and the 
Daud Baba Hills is something hke 17,000 yards 
from the sea at. its nearest point. It would be 
perilous to draw the line closer to the sea between 
the Daud Baba Hills and the River because that 
would involve the loss of the road and railway- 
crossings over the Vardar. The defence would 
of course in that case destroy as completely as 
possible not only the bridges themselves but the 
approaches thereto. But you cannot thus wholly 
ehminate the advantages an enemy obtains by 
the possession of an existing railway track and road 
leading up to an obstacle like the Vardar. Indeed, 
if there is a sufficient force for the purpose the 
defence will not only hold these bridges but create 
and hold if possible a bridge head beyond them. 
For all these reasons it seems that the attack 
on the entrenched camp of Salonika, should it 
take place, will succeed or fail in the open sector 
between the Vardar and the Daud Baba Hills, 
accompanied by simultaneous demonstration upon 
the Vardar front. 
It must not be forgotten in these calculations 
that the enemy's power to attack at all is post- 
poned to the date upon which he can begin to use 
the railway as a continuous communication. 
How far the Serbians destroyed the railway 
in its northern sections between the Danube and 
Veles we do not know. The French in their retreat 
from the entrenched camp at Kavadar blew up 
the short rock tunnel at the north of the Demir 
Kapu gorge, and both the bridges north of Gradetz 
and south of Strumnitza station. They also 
thoroughly destroyed sections of the line between 
all three points. 
But though it takes some time to repair any" 
damaged railway track the opportunities for 
preventing restoration altogether hardly ever exist 
and those for procuring a very long delay are 
;'ire. In hard rock — which is the soil of most of 
this line— it is particularly difficult to do damage 
to a road-bed which will be of lasting effect, 
and as for abridge the Vardar, though unfordable, 
was (and can be aeain) crossed by wooden trestle 
i 
