L A N D A N D W A 1 L R 
L'ecemDei 23, 19 15. 
ample avenue of supply for those holding the fort 
and an bbstu'J" for the enemy. Therefore,' if \ou 
have command of the sea sufhcient for regular pro- 
visionment, evacuation of \vound«d, recruitment, 
and all the rest of it, as also for* the landing of 
great new bodies securely when the time for an 
offensive has come, then a Port held' in this fashion 
is the best example of "a fortified ^ate of entry 
niaintained as a menace ufyo)i the fiankoj lite enemy" 
which is the formula of Torres-\'edras. 
I n the case of Torres- Vedras all these four ele- 
ments were fully present. The lines could be 
securely held with the forces at \\'ellington's 
disposal for a verj- long time and presumably imtil 
attrition should affect Napoleon's effectives in the 
Peninsula both in efficiency and in numbers. The 
Army necessary to contain those lines would have 
had to be very large and would have had a difficulty 
in maintaining constant suppl\-. The Port of 
J.isbon was upon the flank of Napoleon's main 
efforts in the Peninsula. For the axis of these lay 
from north to south, representing as they did the 
conquest and holding down of an unwilling Spanish 
people by armies proceeding ultimately from 
France to the south and supplied from that coun- 
try. With the axis of Napoleon's Peninsula eftort 
thus lying from north to south, the port of 
entry at Lisbon, behind the lines of Torres- Vedras, 
lay due west. 
Finally, Wellington relied upon a complete 
command of the sea acquired several years before, 
at Trafalgar ; and even if the British drafts 
were insufficient in number he could count upon 
very large recruitment from local levies when the 
opportunity for an offensive should come. 
Let us see how these four points stand in the 
matter of Salonika. 
In the case of Salonika the first point, the 
security of the defence, is still doubtful. Only the 
future can show whether the enemy will attack, 
and if he attacks whether our forces are sufficient 
to hold the very extended lines which the position 
demands. 
The second and the third points are much the 
same as in the case of Torres-Vedras. For, as 
to the second, Salonika is on a flank — for Salonika 
lies to the south while the main Austro-German 
line of action Ues east and west ; while, as to the 
third, if the considerable perimeter round 
Salonika can be held by the AUies at all, then 
nothing can contain those lines from without 
but very large forces indeed of the enemy — any- 
thing from 300,000 to 400,000 men. With not 
quite the same security as in Wellington's day there 
is yet a full command of the sea in the hands of the 
Allies. A more doubtful point is the presence of 
contingents capable ultimately of taking the 
offensive. 
Torres-Vedras, the model and godfather of all 
such policies, relied upon the disaffection of the 
Spaniards to the rule of Napoleon's brother, the 
iiatred the Spaniards felt for the French invader, 
the admirable powers of resistance which the 
Spanish peasantry and townsfolk had e\'ervwhere 
shown from and after the affair of the 2nd of May. 
It relied further upon the desire of the Portuguese, 
in spite of their traditional enmity to Spain, to 
save themselves from foreign government. W'hen, 
after a prolonged defensive, Wellington was again 
able to attack, he had very large local forces in 
aid of his ow^i. forces which increased as time 
went on, and he was moving forward through 
a country not hostile. 
The Allies at Salonika are in no such situation. 
The attitude of their hosts— the Greeks stand here 
for the Portuguese— is at the very least doubtful, 
and in the Biilgarian population inland, as in the 
Turkish population, they have no friends but open, 
active, and well-organised enemies. The Allies 
can recruit 'their forces in Salonika when the 
moment of the offensive shall come, but hardly in 
any very great degree compared with the forces 
opposed to them. Very lairge numbers cannot 
be spared from the West until some decision has 
been arrived at upon that all-important line, and 
when such a decision shall have been arrived at 
Salonika will not matter a rap. For if or when 
the enemy is beaten on the West he is beaten 
to the ground all over Europe and the war is at an 
end. 
From the Eastern line, which is only second 
in importance, nothing can reach Salonika, and 
even if it could be the same remark would 
apply. 
On the other hand, an element is present m 
the Salonika position which was not present at 
Torres-Vedras, and that is the possible or probable 
future action of the Allies upon other flanks of the 
enemy's main line of action. Russian forces, 
when equipped, may act from the north (they 
are perhaps most likely to strike at Czernowitz); 
Italian forces may appear from the west ; and the 
remaining half of the Serbian army, though de- 
prived of all artillery save a few mountain guns, 
may carry on a guerilla warfare in the hills when it 
has been equipped and supplied. 
It is further to be remarked that an advance 
from Salonika, when the decline in the eriemy's 
effectives or the enemy's occupation elsewhere 
renders it possible or advisable, is not so easy a 
matter as the advance from the Lowlands of Portu- 
gal towards the Spanish Plateau. One reason for 
this is the absence of roads, the tracks there being 
far worse than the Spanish communications of 
which the armies in the Peninsula complained so 
much ; another reason being the new factor 
introduced by railways. To supply modern 
artillery (as against an enemy himself provided 
with railways) and to supply it continuously a 
railway is essential. 
But the rail communication up into the 
Balkans from Salonika is restricted to one line. Of 
the three lines there converging the coastal one 
brings you along the foot of the Balkan Hills 
but carries you no further ; the line to Monastir 
stops at that town, and the only line supplying a 
prolonged advance follows the trench of the Vardar 
Valley. The enemy if or when he retires would 
destroy it as effectively as did the Allies in their 
recent retreat, and even when it is restored 
it is but a meagre and narrow avenue of 
supply. 
On the other hand, there is a road up the 
Struma Valley ad^'ance along which soon begins 
to threaten Sofia, and turns the great wall of the 
Rhodope mountains. But this is only one other 
suigle avenue of advance, and a push northward 
agamst an enemy could only be made if that enemy 
were very gravely inferior to the forces the Allies 
could put into line. 
H. Belloc. 
Wc arc informed that the total amount received bvlhc 
.Agricultural Relief of .\llins Committee up to date, and in- 
cluding about £4,300 from the jumblesalc at the Smithficld 
bliow, now exceeds /..;5,ooo. 
