Uecember 23, 1915. 
LAND A .N D WATER 
be denied that greatest of all ad^'antages accruing 
to surface ships to-day, namely, their capacity to 
be used in flotillas, squadrons and fleets. Confined 
areas mav, of set plan, be made the field of the 
activities of several giant submarines, but it seems 
quite incredible to suppose that they could ever 
be manoeuvred together, be brought under one 
command, or lend themselves to the tactical com- 
binations which are the characteristic of organised 
force in surface ships. 
THE SALE OF THE GERMAN SHIPS. 
Several papers mentioned on Monday morning 
that the sale of some German liners to Sweden had 
been agreed to, subject to the British Government 
allowing these .ships to be used after coming under 
the Swedish Flag. One correspondent went so 
far as to say that consent of the British Govern- 
ment was assured. If it is, then a very important 
change has been made in this country's policy. 
For when the Dacia was purchased earlier in the 
war, we refused to consent to the new ownership, 
and when the ship after much discussion was sent 
to sea, she was captured by the French and con- 
demned as lawful prize. The attitude of the 
Allies in the matter had imdoubtedly an important 
effect on American opinion, for it was known that 
President Wilson was anxious that a large purchase 
should be made in America of the German ships 
interned there, and there is no doubt that he haa 
behind him a great deal of support. There was 
an unanticipated opportunity for re-establishing 
a mercantile marine. It was a thing to. appeal 
to national sentiment as strongly as to the 
national interest. The fate of the Dacia made 
the further prosecution of President Wilson's pur- 
chase scheme incapable of immediate realisation, 
for obviously ships purchased in the manner 
proposed could not have been used during the war 
if such use must have involved the United States 
in quarrels with each of the belligerents in turn. 
The Allies' attitude may have had some influence 
in making Mr. Wilson's deportment towards 
Germany so friendly, and so very un- military. 
But if Great Britain, France and Italy have 
changed their policy in this respect, there is no 
reason why German ships in America should not 
be purchased either publicly or privately and put 
at once into trade. The shortage of shipping is 
so serious that all belligerents, Great Britain no 
less than the others, would be the immediate 
gainers. There is no doubt that two and a half 
million tons of shipping, now lying idle, could be 
put to very effective use. 
But there is another point bt view. A great 
part of Europe has been devastated, a very con- 
siderable amount of British merchant shipping has 
been sunk, by a Power which, without a scintilla of 
excuse, suddenly began a war of aggression, which 
she has conducted as unscrupulously as she began 
it. That Power cannot make peace nor resume 
her normal life in the world, without the consent 
of those that control the British Navy, because 
the normal life of Germany needs a vast foreign 
trade, 76 per cent, of which is water borne. I 
take it for granted that this country would never 
consent to peace with Germany until the last 
mark of compensation that can be wrung from 
her has been paid or provided for. The shipping 
which she possesses abroad is one of the assets on 
which we must rely for this purpose. If the sale 
of these ships is permitted now German finance is 
the immediate gainer. For an asset which is of no 
value at present and of which ultimately Germany 
can never regain possession, she will be receiving 
in either cash or credit a sum that would help 
materially in prosecuting the war. Is a lowering 
of freights an adequate compensation to us ? 
No doubt all these considerations will be fully 
weighed before a decision is reached, but I find it 
difficult to see on what ground one favourable to 
the proposed bargain can be reached. 
SUVLA BAY AND ANZAG. 
The withdrawal from Suvla Bay and Anzac 
must have been, in every sense of the word, a 
sensational performance. To force a landing in 
the half light of dawn was wonderful enough. To 
withdraw men, guns and stores in the darkness 
and to conceal so vast an operation from so vigilant 
an enemy, borders on the miraculous. It is diffi- 
cult to comment on an event of this kind with 
intelligence when the details of the operations are 
unknown. And as the operation may, before the 
end of the war, have to be repeated, it is not 
desirable that particulars of the methods cm- 
ployed should be communicated to the enemy. 
The detailed organisation required for removing 
the whole of this and carrying out everything 
in darkness and silence is almost beyond estima- 
tion. It represents one of those tours de jorce 
of co-operation, for which the training of the seaman 
during peace is the most admirable preparation. 
In no other profession in the world does the 
attainment of any given end stand so often i'n 
such sharp contrast with the means available for 
achieving it. The ingenuous layman who finds 
himself on board ship is constantly tempted to 
show his superiority by demonstrating how this 
operation and that can be made more expeditious, 
more certain and to demand less of the personnel, 
if only certain fairly obvious mechanical and 
electrical devices were employed to simplify the 
undertaking. He forgets that one of the main 
elements of strength of the navy is the almost 
unlimited power of improvisation, which the lack 
of the obvious assistance has taught. A shrewd 
observer who watched the early efforts of the 
navy at long range gunnery, and was asked after- 
wards if the success obtained was not rather 
moderate, was not disposed to quarrel with the 
appraisement of the result, but objected strongly 
to the remark as a criticism of the performance. 
" The ratio of hits to rounds fired may not have 
been extraordinarily high, but if you had seen the 
means by which it was proposed to obtain hits, you 
would have said that each hit was a miracle." 
It is the regular fate of naval officers to make 
personal skill, energy and resources triumph ovei 
the shortcomings of material. 
The withdrawal from Anzac does not raise 
the question discussed in these columns some weeks 
ago. It was carried through without the, with- 
drawal being at any time seriously disputed. 
It was the secrecy of the thing also that protected 
the men from attack as well as the ships engaged 
from being disturbed by submarines. The prob- 
lems presented by a disputed withdrawal are natur- 
ally very different. And difficult as are those 
which have just been solved, the difficulties of a 
forced withdrawal -would of course be . greater. 
This is not to say that a forced withdrawal could 
not be made, but it certainly could not be made at 
so light a cost in men. Arthur ,Pqu.bn / 
