I, A X D AND W A T E R . 
December 23, 191 5. 
THE POSITION IN MESOPOTAMIA, 
By Sir Thomas Holdich. 
WHEN a military expedition was ])lanne<l for 
Mcsopotairia the obvious- and probably at 
the time the only — objeetive was the pro- 
tection of the oil tields at the head of the 
Persian Gii!/ The growing importance of this source 
of oil supply for our Navy in the liast was beyond 
<|uestinn, and the arranfjements for its protection imposed 
on the Indian Government the necessity for vigorous 
action. 
Whilst the oil fields are Persian and well within 
the Persian border, the most direct (indeed the only 
practicable) way of getting to them is by the way of 
Muhammera on theShatt el .Arab at its junction with the 
Persian ri\er Karun ; the Shatt el .Arab being practically 
a Turkish river conveying the united waters of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris into the Gulf. Some twenty- 
live miles above Muhammera lies Basra the commercial 
centre of Mesopotamia possessing a large export trade 
in wheat and dates, and a colony of British merchants. 
Basra is gradually becoming familiar to the British 
]niblic. The Karun river is navigable up to Ahwaz, 
which is 80 miles in a straight line from Basra, and near 
it " somewhere in Persia " is the head of the oil supply. 
The river, after the fashion of the rivers of Me.sopotamia, 
winds and twists in a devious course from Ahwaz to 
Muhammera, but it protects the oil pipe to the east of 
Kuc-el-Amom 
it from the unpleasant attentions of the Arab tribes people 
to the west. There are Arab tribes on both sides the 
'river, but those on the eastern side, in the plains called 
Arabistan, are familiar with the oil works, and sufficiently 
well satisfied with the results of the introduction of a 
large commercial business amongst them to be friendly 
to the Company. 
The boundary line between Persia and Turkey is 
somewhat indefinite, but it leaves a strip of at least 20 
miles of Persian territory to the west of the river and 
the Kab and Anifiga Arabs within it may be reckoned as 
doubtful friends. The straight 80 miles between Basra and 
Ahwaz thus lies in quasi-friendly territory all the way, 
and the occupation of Basra at one end of the line and 
of Ahwaz at the other might seem sufficient to secure 
[he protection of the oil fields, especially as the river 
Kanin is itself a strong natural defensive barrier. 
But having effected this occupation our small army 
from India found itself in face of a new proposition. 
Equidistant from Basra and frorrf Ahwaz about 120 miles 
(direct) towards the north-west is a considerable town on 
the Tigris called Amara (not Kut-cl-Amara) and Amara 
Wfts' an important rendey.vous for Turkish forces. As 
a strategic position it jjossessed the advantage of possible 
action directed against Ahwaz or Basra, or both, anoA 
if might be impossible to say against which position the 
main attack was to be delivered. In fact it was utilized 
against both. Thus it became necessary to ascend. the 
Tigris and occup\- .Amara. and at this point it appeared 
as if, strategicalh', the position (so far as regarded the 
safeguarding of tlie oil fields) was sound. Then, of ((inrsc, 
occurred the unexpected. 
It was not known that there was another channel 
than that of the Tigris river whereby Turkish troops 
could be conveyed southwards to the Iiuphrates so as to 
threaten Basra from the West. The existence of the 
Shatt el Hai connecting Kut el Amara (another 126 miles 
by the straight road above .Amara) upset all calculations. 
The Turks were thus able to assemble in force at Nasrie 
(Nasiriyeh) on the Euphrates about 120 miles W.N.W. 
of Basra (there is a remarkable uniformity in distance 
about all these strategic points) and were only displacetl 
by an amphibious exjiedition through the Euphrates 
marshes which is now a notable record in the history of 
the campaign. It should be noted that in this fiat 
expanse of mid-river country, channels are opened uj), 
or closed, with such surprising frequency that fresh 
geographical information is required from year to year 
in order to keep mapping up to date. Then, of course, it 
became necessary to occupy Kut el Amara. We know 
the story of that brilliant expedition and we now know the 
importance . of holding Kut el Amara as the last and 
most advanced strategic position necesr.ary to cover any 
direct attack on the Persian oilfields. \Vas it necessary 
to go gQ any farther ? 
Turkish Opposition. 
It was. known that the Turks would occupy a strong 
position (but not so strong as that of Kut) at Ctesiphon 
80 miles above Kut, and it was evidently expected that 
after Ctesiphon there would be more than one position 
to carry between that place and Bagdad. But the full 
strength of the Turkish opposition was clearly not known, 
for no (ieneral with any knowledge of the stiffness of 
Turkish defence would have risked an attack against 
odds of four to one. The prestige of an occupation of 
Bagdad would have been very great ; the fame of it 
would have sustained our military credit throughout 
Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, and Bagdad 
would have been a valuable asset when it comes to peace 
terms, It was worth some risk, and the risk was taken — • 
successfully so far as Ctesiphon was concerned — but the 
loss of one-third of a division was too great to admit of 
any further venture with the remaining two thirds. The 
action at Ctesiphon was a brilliant episode which will 
ever redound to the credit of our Indian army, and the 
retreat from that position to the stronger lines, of Kut el 
Amara was masterly. Nevertheless it was a retreat, and 
a set back which is most disappointing. 
Th? position at present is this. Wc have secured 
our first objective, the safety of the oil supply, and there 
seems to be little fear of our not being able to retain the 
defensive at Kut el Amara. Incidentally, too, we ha\e 
learned some useful lessons. We know at least that a 
trained and seasoned Indian Army, including both 
European and Native troops, commanded by Generals 
who have not been called upon to deal with" masses of 
men so large that all previous experience, even in peace 
manoeuvres; must absolutely fail them ; supported bv 
an efficient and well trained staff, not selected at hap- 
hazard from aspirants to fame, but well tried ofticers— 
such an army can beat the Turks handsomely (even to 
the point of turning them out of defensive Ijnes by direct 
attack) wherever they meet them at any less odds than 
four or five to one. We have also learned something 
new about the strength and the weakness of our native 
troops which will lead ultimately to a readjustment oi 
popular idea about the fighting" value of certain units. 
All this is good value, and goes far to discount our dis- 
appointment at not reaching Bagdad. 
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