L \ N D A N D \V A T E R . 
December 30, 1915. 
Vodena. It is to this tliird column that the greater 
part of the .Austro-(ierman contingent is credited, 
aijd we are tolu that its rail head is at Veles, from 
which station a fair road leads through Prilep to 
Monastir. 
All this is, with the exception of the Bulgarian 
massing west of Lake Doirart, very uncertain ; 
but it is all we liave to go upon, and such as it is, 
we shall do well to examine the communications 
behind either of the three bodies and the oppor- 
tunities possessed by each for the conxerging attack 
upon the Allied base and seaport. 
The hrst question which w:e all ask ourselves 
in this connection is whether an attack will reallx 
be pressed ht)me or no. That is a question no 
one can answer, because the decision in\ol\es 
political considerations which are still in doubt. 
But if one is estimating j)robabilities the proba- 
bihties certainly are in favour of such an attack 
and in favour, moreover, of delivering it at the 
earliest possible moment. It is further clear that 
the Allied Governments believe such an attack 
to be impending, for they sent to investigate and 
report upon the local conditions their highest 
military authorities, while the commanders upon 
the spot are putting their whole energy into the 
establishment of the lines west, north and east 
of Salonika. 
What follows, therefore, will be upon the hypo- 
thesis — a probable hypothesis, an hypothesis onl\- 
— that such an attack is j)reparing and will be 
delivered at the earliest moment, that is when the 
railways are sufhciently repaired to insure suppl\-. 
We may at the outset rid ourselves of the 
•conception that the affair can possibly be con- 
ducted without Bulgarian troops. A perimeter 
is to be attacked some fifty miles in extent, thirty- 
live of which, at least, are open to attack the 
moment the enemy comes south, and ten of which 
form a highly vulnerable open sector, as we saw- 
last week. 
The attempt to force such lines cannot be 
piade whh less than half as many again. The 
number that will be required if the operations are 
prolonged will be far greater than this. 
The Austro - Germans can no more provide 
the bulk of such a force for a subsidiar\- 
operation upon the flank of their new Balkan 
line than they could establish an oversea 
trade. Remember that troops occupied in siege 
work of this soft are pinned down to their place. 
Unless the lines are rapidly pierced a siege of this 
kind, maintained against an enemy which can 
supp'y itself at will from the sea, will not only hold 
up this very large body of men, but will call for 
constant new drafts. The only large body of men 
available will be the Bulgarian Army. Whether 
political considerations will forbid the use of that 
army on Greek soil or no (lest the Greeks join us) 
only time can show, but it seems certain that with- 
out the use of that army no useful operations against 
the lines of Salonika can be undertaken. 
The heavj' artillery, on the other hand, and 
the scheme of operations will as certainly be Austro- 
German in origin and German in direction. 
We arc all amply informed by this time on 
the German method of attack, upon limited 
fortified areas. It is a method imposed by the 
conditions of modern war, and one from which no 
siege work of the immediate future can depart. 
It consists in intense artillery ])reparation 
directed against a comparatiwl}- short sector of the 
defence ; this preparation is dependent upon a 
siege train of the largest calibre and consisting of 
pieces ^uch as neither the Bulgarians nor the 
Turks possess. It is followed by a very expensive 
use of men in great masses against the sector so 
chosen.' The lo.sses, though exceedingly high for 
the time occupied, are gambled upon, as it were, in 
the expectation that success will come early 
encu-^h to make them worth while. That was the 
method which succeeded at Koxmio and at Novo 
Georgievsk and failed before Verdun. It is com- 
plicated, of course, by subsidiary attacks upon 
other sectors, of the lines to prevent the defenders 
from concentrating upon the main point, to confuse 
their judgment, and to mask the main assault. 
Now if we examine the conditions under which 
this method has failed and succeeded, we shall 
di.scover that where it has succeeded the defence 
has invariably been relying upon a comparatively 
small garrison — whether from necessity or from 
choice or from error, whether with the knowledge 
that a prolonged resistance could not be hoped 
for, or from insufficient calculation, that was the 
characteristic of the defence in the two Russian 
fortresses, which are the latest example of the 
enemy's success in this sort of work. \\'c further 
note that in these cases the heavy guns already 
emplaced in permanent works designed long before 
the war were not moved to an outer line because 
there were not enough men to hold such an outer 
line. Their position was known to the enemy 
and their ultimate destruction was fairly certain. 
But where, as in the case of Verdun, the lines 
were thrown well out from the oiiginal cir.jle of 
j)ermanent works, the heavy artillery removed 
from its old emplacements, given a certain mobilitv 
upon the new lines and concealed, and where 
those new outer lines of modern lield-works could 
be held by an ample garnishing of men, the German 
method failed. It is worth v of remark that the 
second of these conditions luckily obtains at 
Salonika. The town is not encumbered by old 
permanent works ; the lines are field lines, and it 
is to be presumed that the garrison is sufficient to 
Secure them. 
AVENUES OF SUPPLY. 
There is another clement in the matter which 
is all-important, and that is the element of supply. 
Though the columns are, as we believe, three in 
number, yet the lines of supply when they shall 
be opened are only two : — The Vardar Railwav 
and the road down the Struma Valley. And of 
these two the Vardar railway will alone, after it is 
repaired, permit the rapid and continuous transport 
of the heavy munitionment which is essential to 
such work. The colmnn which it i^^ presumed will 
operate from Monastir ultimately iclies upon the 
same railway for its supplies by "way of the Veles 
road, and though the lirst or Eastern column finds a 
railway again (which it will have to repair before 
It can use it) in the lower part of the Struma 
Valley, yet there are between this point and the 
rail head near Kustendil between 60 and 70 miles 
of road not all of which (those who have seen it 
within the last two years tell' me) is in good 
condition or capable at this time of the year of 
supporting motor traffic until it has been imjproved. 
In a prolonged siege there would be time, of 
course, to improve the old roads and make new 
ones and to lay down light railways. But if the 
o})erations are to be prolonged they" lose their main 
pomts for the enemy. The threat of Salonika 
upon the flank of the enemy, maintained for several 
