L A X D A X D VV AT E R 
Ucct-mber jo, 1915. 
thirds again can be marked as itltimuteh useful 
lor some kind of service. In other words, rather 
more than cue-third of any given large casualty 
list will remain " on the strength." But it is an 
error to suppose that the whole of that one-third 
can be sent back again to the same full duties 
that they left. A very considerable proportion will 
remain doubtfully convalescent and their return 
continually postponed. Another considerable pro- 
portion, though still useful for many duties and 
technically " with the colours " again can ne\er 
more be sent to ihe same active service they dis- 
charged before entering hospital, and if this pro- 
portion that really go back to the hring line in 
useful time be reckoned at about one-quarter 
of all casualties, we are, with all modern services 
properly equipped on the mecHcal side, not far 
from the truth. Where medical equipment is 
bad the proportion is, of course, very much smaller ; 
but medical equipment in (iermanv and in Austria- 
Hungary is as good as that of any other of the 
Western nations. The conception' that it is far 
better and in some mysterious way " more 
efficient " is simply one of those superstitions 
which men may hold if they will, but which do 
not correspond with realities, any more than the 
superstition about the special efficiency of the 
enemy in his railway service or in his intelligence 
department. 
(4) Of what advantage is it to anal\se in 
detail the German wastage alone when there is 
also the Austro-Hungarian to be considered and 
the reserve of man-power in that Empire, as also 
their new allies ? 
The value of specially analysing the German 
figures and using them as a "basis for further 
calculation resides in these three things : 
First, that we have far more e\idence available 
for the German figures than we have for the figures 
of the other enemy services. 
Secondl}-, that the German service is the 
nucleus of the whole enemy system, and that 
with its exhaustion that system"^ loses its motive 
power. 
Thirdlx-. that the GeiTnan numbers bear 
certain ti.xed and more or less known proportions 
to the numbers of the armies allied with the 
German. If, therefore, we arrive at sound con- 
- elusions upon the German figures we can proceed 
to a general calculation for the enemjas a whole, 
and we can also decide the condition of what is the 
dri\ing force of that whole. 
The reason the Cierman figures can be better 
analxsed than tho.se of the other enemy services is 
primarily that the Germans commit" (what the 
French at least regard as) the error of jniblishhig 
casualty lists. ^ These lists permit us to analyse 
closely the proportion of wounded to killed, to 
discover the omissions the German officials make, 
to fix the rate of dela\- in the publication of the 
names ; to make an estimate of the proportion of 
sick to wounded (though this last number is not 
actually given), etc., etc. 
For instance : The French capture in the 
lighting of the 25th of September a whole companx- 
yf a certain regiment. About the middle of 
Xovember you find in one of the (lerman lists a 
number of " missing " under the heading of that 
company and that regiment. You know that in 
this case there has been a delay of seven weeks 
in compiling the reports and checking it. You 
compare the names of known prisoners with the 
names on the list and you find what proportion 
have been omitted. You obtain from the interro- 
gation of your prisoners an estimate of the cases 
of sickness in that particular unit, etc., etc. A 
process of this kind carried on not in the case of 
one unit, but of thousands and over many months 
allows you to form a very complete estimate indeed. 
It must be remembered that the Allies are informed 
in the matter by an excellent Intelligence Depart- 
ment, as much superior to that of the enemy as his 
was superior to ours at the beginning of the war, 
and among the enemy prisoners are a number of 
disaffected Alsatians and Poles who are also most 
valuable sources of information. 
When we ha\e arrived at a sound estimate of^ 
the German ligures (with a liberal margin of 
error, it is true) we are met with greater difficulty 
in jjroceeding to the iolnl enemy losses. 
Take, for instance, the case of Austria-Hun- 
gary. Austria-Hungary put at first into the field 
units only two-thirds those of the Germans ; that 
is, the number of Austro-Hungarian companies, 
squadrons, batteries, battalions, regiments, divi- 
sions, etc., was. at the most, two-thirds of the 
corresponding German number. On the other 
hand, Austro-Hungarian man-power was four- 
fifths of the German. Therefore, if everything 
had been equal Austro-Hungary ought to have a 
much larger proportion of men to draw upon in 
proportion to her size. As a matter of fact we 
know that she has not ; for we know that she has 
begun to draw upon very inferior material, and has 
called up certain classes not yet touched in Ger- 
many. We conclude, therefore, that her heavy 
losses in prisoners and the terrible nature of the 
Carpathian fighting last winter, coupled with the 
severe losses upon the Italian front, have caused 
an excessive wastage in Austria-Hungary, a con- 
clusion which is supported by occasional criticism 
upon Austria-Hungary which reaches us from 
Germany itself. There is also a certain amount 
of information available from Austro-Hungarian 
sources, especially as to entries into the hospitals, 
statistics of which are kept and published. Turkish 
wastage we can only average upon the losses 
sustained by other armies elsewhere and by our 
own forces and the Russians engaged with the 
Turks. But a considerable error one way or the 
other in this case makes little difference to the; 
total, because all the Turkish forces put together 
have not hitherto added more than 12 per cent 
to the Alliance against us. The Bulgarian losses 
are even more insignificant to the calculation, as the 
Bulgarians have added hardly 5 per cent, to the 
enemy forces and ha\e been engaged for no more 
than two months. 
AVAILABLE NUMBERS OR "MOBILIS- 
ABLE STRENGTH" OF THE ENEMY. 
A number of questions have also been put to 
me with regard to the calculations of mobilisablc 
strength, and not a few really- fantastic estimates 
ot enemy numbers in this respect have either been 
submitted for criticism or put forward as argu- 
ments against the general estimates receixed. 
Ihe number ot men actually with the Colours 
m a given period, say the first year of a war, in any 
army is known onl>- to the authorities of that army. 
It IS careiully concealed from opponents and not 
too readily given to Allies. Even the authorities 
themselves cannot fix this figure at any j-ivcn 
moment to within a few thousands, because the 
returns of various sorts will refer to various dates, 
