LAND A N D .W A T E R . 
October 16, 1915. 
and its ne.iehbourb*wa. including the occupation 
of the capitll, and there is next the group crossing 
from the mouth of the Momva eastward. . 
The reason that one should thus distingiu^n 
between the two groups is th.t the ^trat^^^^' 
effect of the crossing at Belgrade is ditleient in 
character from the strategical effect of crossings 
further to the east. ,. ,, e „^.i 
Belgrade lies at the junction ot the Save and 
the Danube. Across the Save, the narrower o± 
the two streams, ran in time of peace the main 
artery of railway communication between the 
Germanic Powers and Constantinople, and the 
most vulnerable point in that artery wxs the great 
bridge across the river between Semhn anu 
Belgrade. . , , ^i 
With Belgrade in the enemy s hands the 
bridge can be reconstructed and a continuous rail- 
way communication can be reopened so tliat as he 
marches up to Nish, and 50 miles further to the 
Bulgarian frontier, he will have an ample avenue 
of communication behind him all the way. Ihat 
is the strategical meaning of the attack upon and 
capture of Belgrade. 
But the crossings at Semendna eastward 
(which is in Serbian Sraederevo) have another 
character. A force of a quarter of a million men, 
certainly no more (at which one may estimate 
the enerav numbers upon this front) must have 
a certain breadth upon which to deploy. It must 
attack in several bodies or columns at some 
interval each from its neighbour. 
It could not merely roll up the railway line 
towards Nish. Even if the march up the railway 
line were the main attack it must have bodies 
upon the flank. Further, upon the assumption 
that Bulgaria intends to co-operate actively with 
the enemy for the crushing of the Serbian armies, 
it is necessary to effect a junction as soon as pos- 
sible between the Austro-German forces and the 
Bulgarian forces, and this can most rapidly be 
done, as a glance at the foregoing sketch (I.) will 
show, eastward of Belgrade, on the lower course oi 
the Danube. ^ _, , ^ . , 
The enemy in the course of Thursday, Iriday, 
and Saturday" last, and during Sunday morning, 
forced three crossings— one at Semendna (Smede- 
revo), anotlier at the point of the river marked on 
the Serbian side by the hamlet of Ram., yet 
another a few miles eastward of this at Graditze. 
Some 20 miles below the latter point the 
Danube begins to narrow into that gorge, from 
two to three thousand feet deep, whicli ends at 
the Iron Gates. The country is densely wooded 
upon both sides of the gorge; the sides are taii-ly 
steep, the stream veiy rapid and deep, and the 
defence of the further bank on all these accounts 
specially favoured. We have presumably from 
these causes no crossing attempted so far east of 
Graditze, but there has been heavy artillery bom- 
bardment at Orsava, just at the point where the 
Hungarian, Roumanian, and Serbian frontiers 
if we examine the points chosen for forcing a 
crossing, the causes at work can easily be deter- 
mined. 
Semendria represents two railheads, one on 
either side of the Danube with an island between 
